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ABSTRACT
EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION: THE DYNAMICS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN POST COLD WAR EUROPE
Thomas M. Lansford 
Old Dominion University, 1999 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
At a time when individual defense outlays are being significantly diminished, the 
national governments of Western Europe are confronted with the necessity o f reforming 
and adapting their militaries to address new security concerns and undertake new 
missions. This study will examine multinational military integration as one possible 
approach whereby national governments can limit defense spending and still maintain 
military capabilities to meet the contemporary security threats faced by the nationstates 
of the continent. The first three chapters of the work will explore the broad patterns of 
change in the international system which have propelled states to reexamine how they 
define the functions and interests of the nationstate. The second group of three chapters 
will discuss the new security issues facing Europe. The final three chapters will present 
specific case studies which illustrate the trend toward integration. In the end, it can be 
demonstrated that the convergence of factors, the evolution o f the nationstate, the 
change in contemporary security perceptions, fiscal constraints and the established 
progress in multilateral military cooperation, will continue to propel European military 
integration.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War and the resultant dissolution of the Soviet Union 
essentially ends the threat of a direct, large-scale military attack on the states of Western 
Europe. Yet even as the hard military threats o f  the bipolar rivalry diminish, there has 
emerged a recognition that Europe still confronts a host of security hazards. Many of 
these concerns had been either overshadowed or contained by the dynamics of the Cold 
War, while others were created by the events surrounding the end of the conflict. In 
spite of the growing acknowledgment of the potential security issues which continue to 
threaten the peace and stability of Europe, most Western states have engaged in dramatic 
defense reductions. These cutbacks were initially seen as "peace-dividends" which, in an 
era of increasing constrained national budgets, could subsequently be used, for instance, 
to finance continuations in Europe's social welfare system and decrease America's 
federal budget deficit. The drive for European economic union (EMU) accelerated as a 
result of the Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing decision to set January 1999 as the target 
date for launching the "euro," created additional pressures to limit defense outlays in 
order to qualify for monetary union. Consequently, at a time when individual defense 
outlays were being significantly diminished, national governments were confronted with 
the necessity o f reforming and adapting their militaries to address new security concerns 
and undertake new missions. One of the most pressing security questions faced by
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of Kate L. Turabian, A 
Manual fo r Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 6h ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1996).
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national governments then becomes how to address new and diverse defense needs in an 
age of increasingly limited resources.
This study will examine multinational military integration as one possible 
approach whereby national governments can limit defense spending and still maintain 
military capabilities to meet the contemporary security threats faced by the nationstates 
o f the continent. The first three chapters of the work will explore the broad patterns of 
change in the international system which have propelled states to both reexamine how 
they define the functions and interests of the state. The second group of three chapters 
will discuss the new security issues facing Europe. The final three chapters will present 
specific case studies which illustrate the trend toward integration. In the end, it can be 
demonstrated that the convergence of factors, the evolution of the nationstate, the change 
in contemporary security perceptions, fiscal constraints and the established progress in 
multilateral military cooperation, will continue to propel European military integration.
This study will attempt to bridge a minor gap in the otherwise rich and diverse 
literature on post-Cold War European security. Previous works have concentrated on the 
transatlantic relationship or the intra-European dimension o f the effort to create 
autonomous defense capacities or the ramifications o f the changed defense market for 
arms manufacturers. This study will combine these themes and subjects, and integrate 
them against the backdrop of the current scholarly debate over international relations by 
examining the changing nature of sovereignty and the evolution of the nationstate.
In general, the literature on European security can be divided into three broad 
categories: first, those works which use Cold War and post-Cold War European history 
to explain advances in institutionalism; second, those studies which examine various
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
facets of the transatlantic alliance; third, and finally, pieces which explore the intra- 
European dynamics o f security on the continent. Theoretical works on European 
security tend to focus on the existing structures as a means demonstrate the validity of 
institutionalism and regime theory. Works that deal with Transatlanticism focus on 
either bi- or multilateral themes and concentrate on the relationships between individual 
European states and the United States or on the broader context o f the transatlantic 
alliance as it is manifested in NATO and the other institutions that form the framework 
of Europe’s security architecture. Finally, intra-European studies also highlight bi- and 
multilateral relations, albeit between Europe’s powers.
The literature can be further divided into the pre- and post-Cold War literature. 
Many of the seminal works that outline the main features of the transatlantic alliance 
were written before the end of the Cold War, yet their influence remains significant.
One of the most influential works on the founding of NATO remains Robert Osgood’s 
NA TO: The Entangling Alliance.1 Similarly, Timothy Ireland’s Creating the Atlantic 
Alliance has yet to be surpassed by any contemporary works on the subject.2 On the 
effort to establish a multilateral military force for Europe, the seminal work remains 
Edward Furdson’s The European Defense Community: A History which traces the 
struggle to reintegrate West Germany into the security architecture o f the West and
'Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University o f 
Chicago, 1962).
2See, Timothy Ireland, Creating the Atlantic Alliance: The Origins o f  the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport: Greenwood, 1981).
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assemble a “European” army.3 The dean of French scholars in the United States, Stanley 
Hoffman, confronted the changing status o f nationstates long before Maastricht.4 In 
1968, Simon Serfaty laid out the main tenets o f French policy toward integration that 
marked the immediate post-World War H years, but also served as the foundation for 
later policy.5 The burdensharing debate the eventual reassessment of the U.S. role in 
European security formed the central theme of David P. Calleo’s Beyond American 
Hegemony and foreshadowed the continuing controversy of the late 1980s and early 
1990s.6 This work followed Calleo’s earlier criticisms of the transatlantic alliance and 
highlighted many o f the inconsistencies in transatlantic relations.7
The Cold War literature on bilateral relations between the United States and 
various European states is also rich and diverse. Marvin R. Zahniser examined the 
foundation of Franco-American relations during the Cold War and Michael Harrison 
captured the essence of Franco-American relations in his book The Reluctant Ally.9,
3Edward Furdson, The European Defense Community: A History (London: 
Macmillan, 1980).
4See Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and 
the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus {1966).
5Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy o f  the Fourth and 
Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968).
6David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future o f  the Western 
Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
7A 1 so  see, David P. Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970).
8Marvin R. Zahniser, Uncertain Friendship: American-French Diplomatic 
Relations Through the Cold War (New York: Wiley,1975); Michael Harrison, The 
Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981).
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Likewise, Wolfram Heinreider’s Germany, America, Europe-Forty Years o f  German 
Foreign Policy offers a rich account of the U.S.-German relations in the Cold War era.9 
The Soviet “problem” and the U.S. reactions to the German policy of Ostpoiitik form the 
basis for a number of works, including a rich edited piece by Uwe Nerlich and James A. 
Thomson.10 The foundation and evolution of the Anglo-American “special relationship” 
has been the basis for a number of very good works through the years. Ritchie 
Ovendale’s The English-Speaking Alliance traces the ultimate intertwining of U.S. and 
British goals in the period immediately following the end o f the second World War.11 
Meanwhile Victor RothwelFs Britain and the Cold War, 1941-19-47 focuses on the 
difficult transition made by British policy makers as they accepted U.S. primacy and 
leadership.12
Much of the literature that examines intra-European relations and their impact on 
the establishment of the continent’s security architecture was also written before the end 
of the Cold War. Franco-German relations, the driving force of European
9Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe-Forty Years o f  German 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University, 1989.
l0Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., The Soviet Problem in American- 
German Relations (New York: Crane Rusak, 1985). On Ostpoiitik and its impact on 
both U.S.-German relations and Germany’s bilateral relations with its West European 
allies, see William E. Griffith, The Ostpoiitik o f  the Federal Republic o f  Germany 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1978); Kenneth Myers, Ostpoiitik and American SecurityJnterests in 
Europe (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University, 1972); and Roger Tilford, ed., 
Ostpoiitik and Political Change in West Germany (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975).
“Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, 
the Dominions, and the Cold War, 1945-1951 (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985).
I2Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (London: Cape Books,
1982).
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institutionalism, was addressed by F. Roy Willis in France, Germany and the New 
Europe.u Franco-German relations were also covered in detail in Simonian Haig’s 
work The Privileged Partnership which detailed bilateral relations between the two 
nations and the impact o f the partnership on the development o f the European 
Community.14 John W. Young examined the often contentious relationship between 
France and Great Britain in Britain, France and the Unity o f  Europe.15
The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of debate over the future of 
European security. This debate extended to international relations theory as scholars 
questions the discipline’s inability to predict the end of the bipolar system. Adam 
Bronstone’s European Union-United States Security Relations uses various Cold War 
examples to question the main tenets of Realism/Neorealism.16 Fred Chemoff, extends 
this line of reasoning further and contends that none of the major international relations 
theories, including neorealism, institutionalism or cybernetic theory, adequately explains 
alliance behavior in the pre- or post-Cold War era.17 Perhaps some the most notable
l3F. Roy Willis, France Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (Stanford: 
Stanford University, 1965).
14Simonian Haig, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the 
European Community, 1969-1984 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).
l5John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity o f  Europe, 1945-1951 
(Leicester: University o f Leicester, 1984).
l6Adam Bronstone, European Union—United Slates Security Relations: 
Transatlantic Tensions and the Theory o f  International Relations (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1997).
17Chemoff uses 21 examples to support his contentions and to test the key 
variables; Fred Chemoff, After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories o f  
Cooperation and the Future o f  the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1994).
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works to address the end of the Cold War was written by the noted historian John Lewis 
Gaddis. Gaddis roundly criticized international relations scholars for their failure to 
predict or foresee the end of the Cold War.18 In his work, The United States and the End 
o f  the Cold War, Gaddis offers new interpretations about the end o f the Cold War and 
the origins of such policies as containment and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).19 
Gaddis’s work builds on his monograph. The Long Peace, which develops the theme that 
subsystems of the bipolar system helped ensure the stability o f the era and examines the 
length to which both superpowers went to ensure that their rivalry remained in check.20
Much of the debate over post-Cold War European security has centered around 
the role that NATO will play in the future. George W. Downs’s edited piece, Collective 
Security Beyond the Cold War, presents a variety of essays that examine collective 
security writ large and both the theoretical roots of such security systems and case 
studies that probe the future of collective security.21 In addition, Michael Hogan edited 
a significant piece which presents a variety o f views on the influences of the bipolar
lsJohn Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold 
Wax,” International Studies 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992).
l9Gaddis’s work also serves as a companion to his original piece, The United 
States and the Origins o f  the Cold War. Taken together, the two books serve to trace the 
evolution of Cold War scholarship and diplomatic history. See, John Lewis Gaddis, The 
United States and the End o f  the Cold War (New York: Oxford University, 1992); and 
John Lewis Gaddis, The United Stales and the Origins o f  the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New 
York: Columbia University, 1972).
20John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquires into the History o f  the Cold War 
(New York: Oxford University, 1989). Gaddis expands on his earlier work by
incorporating newly released data and archival sources in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now 
Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University, 1998).
2'George W. Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1994).
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struggle on the United States and the broader ramifications of the conflict on institutions 
and ideology.22 Works such as Simon Duke’s The New European Security Disorder 
(1994) argued that, in light o f the “new” security threats faced by Europe, NATO should 
be gradually phased out in favor of a pan-European security system.23 One such 
institution was the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).24 A 
number of other contemporary studies examine the recasting of Europe’s security system 
in light of the continuing influence of the transatlantic alliance. The debate over NATO 
expansion provided particular fodder for proponents of a reduced U.S. role in European 
security. Barbara Conry’s and Ted Galen Carpenter’s edited piece, NATO Enlargement: 
Illusions and Reality offers no less than 18 essays which are critical of expansion and 
contend that enlargement would create new security divides in Europe and pledge the 
U.S. to undertake commitments that it cannot afford.2S This theme is echoed by Hall 
Gardner who centers his opposition to expansion on the potential reaction of Russia and
"Michael J. Hogan, ed., The End o f  the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications 
(New York: Cambridge University, 1992).
^Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1994); and David G. Haglund, ed., From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European 
Security After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview 1993).
240n  the view of institutions such as the OSCE at the end of the Cold War, see, 
Hans Van den Broek, Transatlantic Relations in the 1990s: The Emergence o f  New 
Security Architectures (London: Brassey’s, 1992); Christoph Bluth, Emil Kirchnerand 
James Sperling, eds., The Future o f  European Security (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995).
25Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., NATO Enlargement: Illusions 
and Reality (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1998). For an overview of the current 
debates, see also Michael E. Brown, European Security: The Defining Debates 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1998).
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those Central European states which are not granted full membership.26 Christoph 
Bertram reinforces Gardner’s contentions by asserting that Russia formed the main bond 
that unified the transatlantic states and without an expansionistic for, the institutions of 
the West need to be recalculated in order to be more inclusive.27
However, other authors including James Goodby, argue that expansion can 
actually improve relations between Russia and the West by establishing a new “logic of 
peace” which would provide innovative rules and norms to regulate Russo-European 
relations.28 In this way, the transatlantic alliance could serve as a means to incorporate 
Russia into the broader security framework o f the West and thereby alleviate the 
potential security threat to both Russia and the West posed by a revisionist Moscow. 
Jonathan Dean’s Ending Europe's Wars promotes this line of argument and effectively 
uses the historical record to demonstrate the practicality of the West’s institutionalism to
26HaI Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future o f  NA TO 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1997); Jeffrey Simon also presents a good overview o f the 
various factors impacting NATO enlargement and presents specific views from those 
associate states which are not likely to join the alliance; Jeffrey Simon, NATO 
Enlargement (New York: New York University, 1997).
27Bertram suggests the development of a “variety” of institutions that would 
match the “diversity” of interests held by the major European powers and the United 
States; Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold 
War (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1995).
28See James Goodby, Europe Undivided: The New Logic o f  Peace in U.S.- 
Russian Relations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998); Sean Kay, NATO 
and the Future o f  European Security (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Colin 
Mclnnes, ed., Security and Strategy in the New Europe (New York: Routledge 1992); 
and Mary M. McKenzie and Peter H. Loedel, The Promise and Reality o f  European 
Security Cooperation (New York: Praeger, 1995).
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counter past threats, but also champions the need to further develop new methods to 
contain emerging threats.29
Transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era form the basis for a variety of 
works which examine Euro-American relations in general and more specifically, security 
relations. A number of pieces combine the economic and security aspects of 
transatlantic relations in order to explain or predict trends.30 Certain works offer 
innovative means to further strengthen Euro-American relations through the 
establishment of deeper institutional ties.31
Studies that examine institutionalism in Europe abound. One the first post-Cold 
War efforts was also one of the most significant: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and 
Stanley Hoffman’s edited work After the Cold War: International Institutions and State 
Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991.32 This work offered a collection of essays which 
examined the role o f nationstates and institutions in post-Cold War Europe, and the 
constraints and benefits that each actor provides to the other. The broader issues of 
nationstate-institutional cooperation and competition are explored in Maastricht and
29Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and 
Security (New York: Priority, 1995).
30See Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock, Redefining the U.S.-EC 
Relationship (New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 1993).
3‘For instance, see the proposal for a NATO-EU Action Committee to coordinate 
the expansion of both institutions; Simon Serfaty, Stay the Course: European Unity and 
Atlantic Solidarity (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1997).
32Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffman, eds., After the Cold 
War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1993).
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Beyond: Building the European Union?3 Meanwhile the interplay between Europe’s 
institutional framework and the individual nationstates of the West is the subject of Alan 
Milward’s The European Rescue o f  the Nation-State.34 The issue of state sovereignty in 
the European Union (EU) is further examined in a work by Michael Newman which 
analyses the impact of supranational structures on democracy and warns of the potential 
dangers inherent in surrendering elements o f national governance to the bureaucracy of 
Brussels.35 Terrence Guay similarly criticizes the EU for its role in European defense- 
industrial consolidation. Guay traces the need for restructuring of the EU’s defense 
industries, but then suggests that Brussels needs to ‘"broaden” its policy making agenda 
to develop strategies that will encourage the sector to become more competitive.36 
However, James Sperling and Emil Kirchner take a much more positive view of the role 
o f institutions in promoting both security and economic cooperation and suggest that 
these structures are the most significant aspects of the West in its relations with the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe.37 This theme is echoed in works that analyze EU
33 Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Pryce, eds., Maastricht and Beyond: 
Building the European Union (New York: Routledge, 1994).
34 Alan Milward, The European Rescue o f  the Nation-Stale (Berkeley: University 
of California, 1992).
35Michael Newman, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1996). See also, Stephen Wood, Germany, Europe and the 
Persistence o f  Nations: Transformation, Interests and Identity, 1989-1996 (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998).
36Terrence Guay, At Arm's Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence 
Industry (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997).
37James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Security Order: 
Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation (Europe in Change} (Manchester: 
Manchester University, 1997).
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relations with the East on a broader level, including the expansion of the Union to 
specific states o f the former Warsaw bloc.38
Security relations between the United States and Europe has also been the 
subject o f numerous works in the post-Cold War period as scholars have endeavored to 
understand the implications inherent in the era. Michael Brenner edited a work that 
presented national perspectives o f the major powers on multilateral efforts to ensure 
European security.39 The U.S. military drawdown prompted many to call for increased 
and autonomous European security capabilities to compensate for the lower U.S. 
military presence, and in preparation for a possible U.S. withdrawal.40 The issue also 
resurrected the burdensharing debate o f the 1980s.41 The European Union and WEU 
became the preferred vehicles with which to achieve an independent European Security
380 n  EU expansion, see Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement o f  
the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998). On the role of institutions 
in facilitating expansion, see Christopher Hill, ed., The Actors in Europe's Foreign 
Policy (New York: Routledge, 1996).
39Michael Brenner, ed., Multilateralism and Western Security (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1995).
40Holly Wyatt-Walker argues that pressure for an autonomous European security 
system cam from a general sense of dissatisfaction with U.S. leadership in NATO, and 
the desire of Europeanist states, mainly France, to assume a leadership role in 
continental security; Holly Wyatt-Walker, European Community and the Security 
Dilemma, 1972-92 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997).
4‘This issue is examined by Simon Duke, who identifies the main sources of 
contention among the allies and more significantly traces the methodologies used by 
each side in the debate over the proportionality of defense spending by the United States 
and its major Western allies; Simon Duke, The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1993).
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and Defense Identity (ESDI).42 G. Wyn Rees presents a thorough examination of the 
WEU and the major interests of powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany.
The work also assesses the current capabilities and potential future operational 
capacities of the organization.43 Kim Edward Spiezio calls for an even greater 
recalculation of the current security system because of what he contends are the 
domestic constraints which prevent the successful implementation of a collective 
security regime on the continent.44 Michael Mandelbaum also examines the durability 
of the transatlantic alliance and the U.S. commitment to Europe, and concludes that the 
post-Cold War transition has not yet been completed and that there needs to be further 
institutional development in order to complete the “common security order” sought by 
the members of the alliance and Europe in general.45
Meanwhile, bilateral dealings between the U.S. and various European states also 
provide insight into the main issues o f contemporary Euro-American relations.
Changing German policies toward NATO and the U.S. are examined by Joyce M. 
Mushaben who uses the amorphous “German Question” as the basis for an analysis of 
the willingness of the nation’s political leadership and its populace to take on a role
42There are a number of works on ESDI and the WEU written in immediate post- 
Cold War era. See, for instance, Werner J. Feld, The Future o f  European Security and 
Defense Policy (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1993); and Robert Jackson, ed., Europe in 
Transition: The Management o f  Security After the Cold War (New York: Praeger, 1992).
43Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans- 
Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder: Westport, 1998).
44Kim Edward Spiezio, Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security 
(Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1995).
4SMichael Mandelbaum, The Dawn o f  Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth- 
Century Fund, 1996).
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more in line with Germany’s capabilities.'16 Timothy Garton Ash’s colossal work, In 
Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continents overs deep insights into 
Germany’s relations with its neighbors and on Germany policy toward Europe.47 
Gregory Treverton adds a transatlantic dimension to these questions by incorporating 
U.S.-German relations into a broader study of Germany’s place and role in the new 
Europe.48
Franco-German relations have formed the basis of not only the economic 
integration of Europe,49 but also efforts to develop intra-European security structures.
The history of the relationship is traced with great insight in Julius Friend’s work, The 
Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990.2,0 The efforts at developing joint or 
European-wide security structures are examined in works by Philip Gordon and David 
Flaglund who both conclude that Franco-German cooperation served as a means of
46Joyce M. Mushaben, From Post-War to Post-Wall Generations: Changing 
Altitudes Towards the National Question and NATO in the Federal Republic o f  Germany 
(Boulder: Westview, 1997).
47Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent 
(New York: Random House, 1993). On German policies toward integration in general, 
see David Marsh, Germany and Europe (London: Heineman, 1994); Heinz Kurz, ed., 
United Germany and the New Europe (Brookfield, VT: Edwards Elgar, 1993); and Paul 
Stares, The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1992).
48Gregory Treverton, America, Germany, and the Future o f  Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 1992).
49See Collette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and 
Negotiations to Create the European Union (New York: Garland, 1997).
50Julius Friend, The Linchpin: Franco-German Relations, 1950-1990 (New York: 
Praeger, 1991). On Franco-German cooperation at all levels, see also Patrick McCarthy, 
ed., France-Germany, 1983-1993: The Struggle to Cooperate (New York: St. Martin’s
1993).
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maintaining French involvement in the transatlantic alliance, albeit one step-removed 
from integration with NATO.51 The transformation of French foreign policy has also 
been the subject of a number of works that examine the impact o f the end of the Cold 
War and German reunification on the Gaullist legacy and French foreign policy in 
general.52
One of the keys to European security, however, continues to be the bilateral 
relationship between France and the United States. The election of Jacques Chirac as 
President of France ushered in a era o f increasing cooperation between the two nations. 
However, the initial promises of French reintegration into NATO and closes security ties 
between Washington and Paris have dissipated somewhat as the French have undergone 
painful defense reductions and reforms, while their self-perceived “status” has not been 
accorded the consideration by Washington that many in Paris had initially hoped. The 
perceived reduced importance of France led Steven P. Kramer to examine the subject in 
Does France Still Count?33 Other works also stress the continuing, albeit changed, 
relevance of the Franco-American relationship to European security.54
5lPhiIip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (Boulder: 
Westview, 1995); and David G. Haglund, Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German 
Military Cooperation and the European Pillar o f  Defense (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
i2See Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea o f  France (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); 
or Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics o f  Continuity and 
Change (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995).
53Kramer concludes that, yes, France remains vitally important to the future 
success of any European security system; Steven P. Kramer, Does France Still Count?: 
The Role o f  France in the New Europe (Westport: Praeger, 1994).
^See Robert P. Grant, The Changing Franco-American Security Relationship: 
New Directions for NATO and European Defense Cooperation (Arlington, VA: US- 
Crest, 1993); and Philip H. Gordon, French Security Policy After the Cold War:
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Great Britain’s relationship with the United States continues to differ from that of 
its continental neighbors. John W. Young examines the initial British polices toward 
integration and then traced the evolution of policy through the Cold War.55 Modem 
British policy toward the EU is debated in an edited work by Jonathon Bradley and John 
Mawson.56 A diverse overview of Anglo-American relations since 1939 is presented in 
an edited work by John Baylis,57 while the changes in British policy toward the U.S. 
since the election of the Labour Party are examined in a book by Peter Jones/8
The opening section of this study delves into current theoretical debates over the 
place and role of the nation state in the changed global community. The second chapter 
begins with an overview of the two main schools of international relations theory:
Realism and Institutionalism. The realist school o f international relations theory places 
the nationstate as the primary actor in the international system. However, the 
proliferation and increasing strength of international organizations and institutions has 
caused some loss of the individual state’s power. Liberal Institutionalists contend that 
this loss of sovereignty has been significant and that states musty now share the global
Continuity, Change, and Implications for the United Slates (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1992).
35John W. Young, Britain and European Integration, 1945-1992 (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1993).
’"Jonathon Kingsley and John Mawson, British Regionalism and Devolution: The 
Challenges o f  State Reform and European Integration (London: Kingsley, 1997).
37John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1997).
58Peter Jones, America and the British Labour Party: The “Special Relationship ” 
at Work (New York: Taurus Academic Studies, 1997).
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arena with non-state actors such as international organizations (10s) and non­
governmental organizations (NGOs). Not all IOs and NGOs have had a detrimental 
impact on the nationstate. Institutions and regimes facilitated the augmentation of power 
by small and medium states through practices such as bandwagoning and coalition- 
membership with powerful states.59 States have found it practical to pool their 
sovereignty, even if it has meant some reduction in sovereignty in certain areas, as a 
means to reenforce sovereignty in other areas. This has led to the proliferation of 
regimes in the current international system. In spite of this proliferation, realists assert 
that nationstates remain the central actors in international relations since states avoid 
regimes that are not in their best interests. Instead, IOs and regimes act to reinforce 
behavior that states would utilize under certain given circumstances. The chapter will 
examine the central questions over IOs and regimes. Such questions include: What is the 
true role of supranational organizations in the current global system? Are IOs and 
international regimes supplanting the role traditionally associated with the nationstate?
Or does the nationstate remain the sole significant actor in world politics?
In the third chapter the period of predominance by nationstates is examined. The 
increasing political centralization and the institutionalization o f public authority is 
shown to be one of the characteristics of the period as nationstates eclipsed multinational 
political organizations such as the church or multiethnic empires to dominant world 
politics.60 Nonetheless, the proliferation and enhanced influence o f IOs and regimes
S9Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 
International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 225-41.
^Robert Keohane, ed.. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University, 1986), 143.
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have challenged the accepted concepts of sovereignty associated with the nationstate. 
The chapter concentrates on the broad transformations o f sovereignty and the power of 
the nationstate in the post-World War II era by addressing five broad themes. First, the 
rise of the nationstate is set against the backdrop of the formation o f the global system 
which reinforced the primacy o f that unit in international relations. Second, the 
formation of the “trading state” will be examined as nationstates endeavored to adjust to 
the changing global market.61 Third, the newfound political power o f domestic 
constituents has led to the development of “two-level” games in developed democracies 
as statesmen have recognized the necessity of building domestic support in foreign 
policy.62 Fourth, the ever-increasing mobility of capital and labor have created what 
Richard Rosecrance terms the “virtual state, ”63 which has, in turn, created a new 
concept of national sovereignty and the role of the nationstate. Fifth, and finally, the 
transformations of sovereignty as a result of the increased power of IOs has led to the 
development of the “memberstate” as a means to access collective sovereignty’.
Chapter IV examines collective security on a broad level, and the existing 
security regime in Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
6‘See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State: Commerce and 
Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
62Robert Putnam argues that existing state-centric theories o f international 
politics fail to satisfactorily explain the linkages between foreign and domestic policy 
agendas. He argues that the two areas are closely linked, especially in terms of the 
increasing necessity to win ratification of foreign policy goals in national legislatures; 
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, “ 
International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 427-61.
63Richard Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 
(July/August 1996): 46.
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and the Western European Union (WEU) are judged to form the basis of a security 
regime for the nationstates o f the region. The evolution of the regime coincided with the 
development of patterns o f  cooperation which have become institutionalized. Hence, 
there has been a reduced impetus for the pursuit of unilateral security policies. The rules 
and norms of the regime have become internalized.64 This has resulted in an 
amelioration of traditional security threats by extending the public good of security to all 
of the memberstates.65 This has freed states to concentrate on economic pursuits, and 
given rise first to the trading state, and then to the virtual- and memberstate. West 
European states have increasingly combined their security policies with their economic 
policies through actions such as weapons sales and arms transfers so that the line 
between economic and strategic interests has been significantly diminished. There has 
also developed a regional society of states. Hedley Bull asserts that an international 
society (or a society of states) “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain 
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions.”66 This society o f states has a level of 
cooperation and interdependence that is unmatched elsewhere. This chapter will 
examine the main features that form the foundation of the current system o f security in
“ Harald Muller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by 
Governments: The Case o f Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International 
Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Oxford University, 1993), 383.
65For the Western European states, this has meant the decline of a direct military 
invasion by neighboring states.
“ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University, 1977), 13.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
20
Europe, and what impact this regime has on the security policies of nationstates. 
Specifically, the major tenets of security regimes and the attributes of a collective 
security system, will be evaluated against the current security regime of the West. In 
addition, the role of the United States will be explored in its impact on European 
integration. The chapter concludes by examining the impact of the current system in 
light of the restraints and advantages that nationstates gain from the system.
The next section of this work provides and overview of the most pressing ‘‘new” 
security threats to Europe. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar era 
disrupted the accepted consensus over national security. Furthermore, a nation's 
economic stature became joined with issues of national security. This reconfiguration of 
security priorities transpired as new challenges to traditional security have confronted 
policy makers. Among these new concerns as factors such as the re-appearance of 
nationalism and ethnic strife on the European continent itself; the potential 
destabilization of Europe’s southern flank; and proliferation issues, including both the 
spread, and possible spread, of weapons of mass destruction .
Nationalism reemerged as a security concern for Western Europe for a variety o f 
reasons. Chapter V examines the potential threats posed by nationalism’s new rise. In 
general, these new nationalistic challenges can be divided into two broad categories: 
ethno- and religious nationalism; and a renationalization of Russia. Initially, the end o f 
the Cold War prompted some to assert that the end o f the bipolar system would lead a 
renationalization of West European states as the unifying threat to the West dissipated 
and a reunified, and potentially resurgent, Germany would force other states to 
renationalize security policies in order to counter hegemony. Western European faced a
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much more significant threat from the emergence of nationalism in Eastern and Central 
Europe since few o f the emerging states of the region have homogenous populations and 
accepted borders-at a time when nationalism has increasingly been defined along ethnic 
and religious lines. Ethno- and religious nationalism has caused minority problems 
associated with self-determination movements.67 The states of the former Eastern bloc, 
including those o f  the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have numerous 
minority problems that range from armed strife as in the case of the former Yugoslavia 
to questions o f citizenship and status as in the Baltic states.68 The as of yet unsettled 
nature of the majority of these minority questions and the geographic proximity of a 
number of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe necessitate that the West must 
develop a mechanism to deal with future Bosnias or Chechnyas. Western Europe must 
also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence o f Russian nationalism and the 
potential spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian 
Federation. West European nations must develop policies that maintain deterrence 
against a revisionist Russia, yet do not risk alienation o f the former superpower. This 
chapter asserts that the means with which to accomplish these goals is the present 
security framework of Western Europe.
Chapter VT examines the potential threats emanating from Europe’s southern 
flank Political and economic instability in the Maghreb region and the broader Middle 
East have led to increased levels of immigration and refugee movement to Europe. High
67Duke, Security Disorder, 57.
68Stephen [wan Griffiths, "Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe,” in 
Security and Strategy in the New Europe, ed. Colin Mclnnes (New York: Routledge, 
1992), 64-65
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levels o f unemployment throughout much of Europe has caused immigration to become 
an increasingly factious political matter. Southern Europe, including France and Italy, 
have also faced periodic outbreaks of terrorism affiliated with regional conflicts in the 
Mediterranean. The most significant source of such unrest has been Algeria, but the 
potential for instability exists in a number of other states in the broader context of the 
Middle East region, including the Persian Gulf. Tensions have been exacerbated by the 
proliferation of advanced weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
Southern European states, including France, Spain and Italy, have called for increased or 
new security structures to counter these threats, especially in light of the militarization of 
the region. In addition to the proliferation of WMDs, the Middle East continues to be 
the largest arms market in the world.69 This chapter examines European interests in the 
region, and the potential threats to such interests posed by national and subnational 
forces in the Mediterranean basin, the Persian Gulf, and the broader region of the Middle 
East.
The seventh chapter provides an overview of the potential threats to Europe 
posed by WMDs,70 especially in light of the militarization of the Middle East and North 
Africa. For much o f the Cold War era, and to a greater degree afterwards, a series of 
international regimes emerged which were designed to constrain the development of, 
and more importantly, prevent the use of WMDs. With the demise of the Soviet Union, 
however, questions arose over the capability of the Russian Federation to control its
69See, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 
1997/98 (London: Oxford, 1998).
70WMDs are traditionally defined as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.
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nuclear hardware and the expertise capable of producing WMDs. These issues have 
become prominent as several states with less than stable or questionable political 
regimes have embarked on WMD programs. The efforts o f these “rogue” or “pariah” 
states, including Libya and Iraq, to develop nuclear weapons or other WMDs have 
occurred simultaneously with several well-publicized efforts by international terrorist 
groups to attain WMDs. This chapter will examine the main proliferation threats faced 
by Western Europe: I ) The control and maintenance o f the infrastructure of the WMDs 
of the former Soviet Union; 2) the acquisition of WMDs and the development of 
indigenous means of production of these weapons by pariah states; and finally, 3) the 
transfer of WMD technology, principally the sale o f delivery systems, capable of 
targeting Western Europe, but also the trade in dual-use technology to produce WMDs.
In response to economic pressures caused by the continuing stagnant European 
economy and the drive and implementation of European Monetary Union, and in an 
recognition of the reconfigurations security and national interests, European states have 
engaged in a variety of ad hoc endeavors to preserve or augment their defense 
capabilities by combining national security assets and developing joint capacities. The 
majority o f these efforts are bilateral and extend to both the uniformed services and to 
nations's defense-industrial complexes. However, increasingly, nations are attempting to 
develop multilateral institutions and structures to augment national defense. The final 
section of the work examines specific efforts at integration on both the military and 
defense-industrial level.
In Chapter VHI, the effort to generate a multinational, European army, the 
European Defense Community (EDC) is traced against the backdrop of the
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contemporary balance of power system during the early Cold War era. During this 
period, a balance of power system emerged between the Western and the Soviet blocs.
A notable feature of bipolarity was the stability that it produced. This period of 
equilibrium encouraged the development of the institutional framework that marked 
Western Europe. U.S. economic and military primacy compelled the European states to 
adopt policies that reflected American preferences for integration and collaborative 
engagement.71 This integration and the later economic interdependence of the states of 
the region may have abraded aspects of state sovereignty, however, they have also 
augmented the nationstate’s access to public goods generated by the global economy. 
Integration has also increased the security of individual nationstates.72 Consequently, 
the bipolar balance of power system and American primacy combined to establish a 
framework which stimulated and sustained patterns of cooperation on security issues in 
Western Europe. This in turn led to the dramatic growth and proliferation of institutions 
and regimes. Although the EDC failed, it set the stage for the later successes of 
institutionalism on the continent.
The failure of the EDC marked a temporary pause in the drive for European 
military integration that was quickly overcome by the resurrection of the Western 
European Union (WEU). The enhanced Transatlantic Alliance that materialized from 
the ashes of the EDC was the means by which the states of West developed a
7lOn this theme see John G. Ruggie, ‘Third Try At World Order? America and 
Multilateralism After the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, 109 (Fall 1994): 553- 
70.
72See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2d. 
ed., (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), especially 245-57.
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sophisticated security regime. This regime both developed and enforced the rules and 
norms that allowed for the denationalization of borders and the amelioration of the 
security dilemma between the nationstates of the region. By the 1980s, there was a 
renewed drive for the Europeanization of the Transatlantic Alliance. In order to obtain 
an autonomous European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the Europeans have 
worked along two tracks: 1) the establishment of increased capabilities through the 
WEU; and 2) the development of an integrated defense market through the Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG). Chapter EX examines the post-Cold War 
development of these security structures in Europe. The chapter traces the evolution of 
the efforts to more fully develop the WEU into an operational organization, as well as 
the bid to have the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assume 
a larger role in European security. It also demonstrates the need for continued U.S. 
involvement, and the centrality of NATO, in European security.
Chapter X outlines the effort to foster a unified defense market in Western 
Europe. There have been intermittent efforts toward this goal since the 1950s,73 however 
defense cutbacks and declining arms transfers have added impetus to the development o f 
such a market during this period of consolidation and excess capacity for the major 
European defense manufacturers.74 In an effort to lessen reliance on American products
73In October 1953, France (F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (N), Belgium (BE) and 
Luxembourg (L) formed FINBEL which promoted consultation and coordination among 
the member states, including the standardization of equipment.
74In overall terms, defense outlays declined by an average of twelve percent 
between 1989 and 1994. In addition, between 1984 and 1992, some 410,000 defense 
related jobs were lost (out a total of just over a million), and it is expected that the West 
European defense industry will continue to lose some 30,000 jobs a year for the 
foreseeable future; WEU, Assembly o f the WEU, WEAG: The Course to be Followed,
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and preserve national industries, as well as to establish autonomous capabilities for the 
next generation o f sophisticated weaponry, the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG) was formed in 1992 as part of the WEU.73 Impetus for increased cooperation 
has occurred as the European states have lagged behind the United States in their 
transition to defense production in the post-Cold War era. This chapter will also review 
the contemporary directions in the defense industry and the impact of downsizing on 
European arms manufacturers. The growing influence of the private sector will be 
presented against the response of the Europeans to constraints on arms manufacture and 
the consequent multilateralism. The U.S. and France will be used to demonstrate the 
divergent responses to the changed environment in the defense sector as a means to 
demonstrate the contradictory approaches taken to adopt to the post-Cold War global 
arms market.76 Finally, strategies to preserve Europe’s defense-industrial base will be 
examined in light of the continuing constriction on the sector and the renewed bi- and 
multilateralism of the market.
The conclusion of this study will demonstrate that the changing nature of the 
nationstate, new definitions of national security, and economic pressures on individual
WEU Document 1483 (6 November 1995).
75The purposes o f WEAG include "the reduction of national research, 
development and production costs which overlap";"creation of conditions for an 
integrated, rationalized and competitive European defense industry:" and "identification 
of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more 
competitive approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;" Ibid., 13.
76France and the United Kingdom are Europe’s leading arms producers, and in 
1997, France ranked second only to the United States in total arms sales. In addition, 
France has become the leading supplier o f arms to developing nations. More 
significantly, France has pursued a very different strategy toward defense-industrial 
restructuring than has the United States.
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states will drive further efforts at military integration in Europe. Most significantly, 
present attempts at collaborative military ventures are proving much more successful as 
the end-goals are significantly lower than past attempts, and thereby more attainable. 
Furthermore, the Cold War experiences of members of the transatlantic Alliance has 
fostered a culture of cooperation which has demonstrated the practical benefits gained 
through cooperation. Most significantly, there is a convergence around the utility of 
integrated military units. With reduced and changed security threats, there is no longer a 
need for large conventional armies. The new threats to European security are those that 
can best be met through collective responses. Ln addition, the economic realities have 
forced reductions in both equipment and standing troop strength. The policy pursued by 
European nations is the policy pursued during the Cold War, collective security through 
multilateral military structures and continued military integration.




This chapter begins an examination o f the current theoretical debate over the 
place and role of the nationstate by contrasting the two main lines of international 
relations theory-real ism and liberal institutionalism. While the realist school 
emphasizes the nationstate as the primary actor in the international system, the liberal 
institutionalist school asserts that the proliferation and increasing strength of 
international organizations and institutions have eroded a significant degree o f the 
individual state's power. Yet, these institutions and regimes have also allowed smaller 
and medium states to augment their power through the practice o f bandwagoning or 
through coalition-membership with more powerful states.1 Hence, some states have 
found it practical to pool their sovereignty, even if it has meant some reduction in certain 
areas of sovereignty. These states have used collective structures as a means to actually 
increase their power and status in other spheres. This phenomenon has contributed to 
the growth and spread o f international organizations (IOs) and regimes in the current 
international system. Nonetheless, realists contend that the nationstate remains the 
central actor in world politics, and that states rarely join or comply with regimes that are 
not in their best interests. Thus, realists contend, IOs and regimes merely reinforce 
behavior that states would adopt anyhow. In the midst of this debate, basic questions 
over the exact nature of the IOs and regimes remain: What is the true role of
'Walt, “Alliance Formation,” 231.
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supranational organizations in the current global system? Are IOs and international 
regimes supplanting the role traditionally associated with the nationstate? Or does the 
nationstate remain the sole significant actor in world politics? In order to gain some 
insight into the possible answers of these questions, a review of the current debate in 
international relations theory is necessary.
The realist school o f international relations theory has its roots in antiquity and 
can trace its modem form back to the post-World War I era where the failure of the 
League of Nations to deter or punish state aggression and the collapse of the world 
economic regime marked a retreat from the idealism prevalent at the war’s end.2 In 
ancient Greece, Thucydides laid-out the basic premises of realism in his treatise on the 
causes o f the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides made three major assertions about the 
international system. First, that states (in the case of Thucydides, city-states) are the 
primary actors in the world’s political system.3 Second, that states seek power as a 
means and as an end to ensure their survival in an anarchical world. In this context, 
power is defined in terms o f the allocation of resources among the actors in the world’s 
political system.4 The more resources an actor possesses, the more power it has, and this
2On the chronological shifts between realism and liberalism, see William C.
Olson and A. J. R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in 
Interpretation (London: Harper Collins, 1991).
3Early realists, such as Thucydides or Machiavelli, were less state-centric in their 
works than later proponents o f realism; however, both recognized that city-states or 
feudal kingdoms were the dominant actors in international politics. The difference is 
tied to the distinctions between those political units that were prevalent in earlier times 
and the modem nationstate; R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as 
Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), 65-66.
4Power can also be defined “as the ability of an actor to get others to do 
something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor);”
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leads actors to attempt to maintain their relative resource ranking.5 Third, states are 
rational actors, with ordered sets of preferences.6 As rational actors, states engage in 
cost-benefit analysis before initiating actions, and thus their actions are easily 
comprehensible by other actors in the international system.7 The Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648, marked the emergence of the nationstate as the key political unit in the 
international system and realism held sway as the dominant philosophy in international 
politics until the end o f the nineteenth century.8
The rapid diffusion of technology across Europe prevented any one state from 
having notable military advantages over another. This, combined with the geography of 
Europe, made political unification of the continent nearly impossible. The essentially 
simultaneous development of several nationstates prevented any one from gaining 
ascendency over its neighbors, as balance o f power systems developed. As a result,
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 11. For a deeper analysis of the 
fungibility of power, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory o f  International 
Politics'. A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University, 1986), 333-34.
5Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non- 
Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1990), 10, 39-40.
6R. Harrison Wagner, “Deterrence and Bargaining,” The Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 335-36.
7Robert 0 . Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University, 
1986), 7.
8Thomas Hobbes was one of the first scholars to emphasize the importance of the 
new nationstates. For a discussion o f the differences between Hobbes and earlier 
writers, see Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 
(June 1995): 143-45.
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attempts to unify Europe during this time period came to naught.9 With the emergence 
of the nationstate, political realism became the dominant paradigm in international 
relations, and efforts by authors such as Immanuel Kant10 to promote international law 
failed to gain significant support as balance of power politics and the emergence of the 
Concert of Europe confirmed the primacy of realist politics.11
By the end o f the nineteenth century there was a broad movement to supplant 
political realism as the dominant theme of international relations. Efforts such as the 
Hague Conferences or the Pan-American Congresses, were demonstrative of the belief 
that international law and supranational organizations could be established so as to 
restrain the power politics of the nationstate. However the onset of World War I dashed 
these hopes as power politics dominated the calculations surrounding the outbreak of the 
war.12 Idealism, the attempt to apply legal and moral standards to state conduct, as 
exemplified by Wilson’s proposals at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, briefly resurfaced in the 1920s, but was again eclipsed by realism 
as international law and the League of Nations failed to deter aggressor states, and the
9Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University, 1981), 121.
10Kant is usually placed in opposition to Hobbes; he is said to have written about 
the way things ought to be, rather than the way they actually were. As a result, his works 
were less useful to leaders engaged in power politics; Jean Bartelson, “The Trial of 
Judgement: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of Internationalism,” International 
Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 263.
“See Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International 
Systemf  World Politics, 28 (January 1976): 159-63; and more generally; Robert 
Axelrod, The Emergence o f  Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
12James JolL The Origins o f  the First World V/ar (New York: Longmans, 1984),
154-57.
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prelude to World War II began.13
The events surrounding the outbreak of World War II and the break up of the 
Allied coalition at the end of the war that was marked by the onset o f the U.S.-Soviet 
rivalry reinforced the dominance o f political realism, even as new efforts, mainly 
through the establishment of the United Nations (UN), were being made to develop 
international law and institutions to constrain the worst excesses o f state behavior. The 
postwar era also witnessed the emergence o f a new class of scholars who further codified 
and developed the realist school. Attempts were made to develop realism into a science 
that could be applied to the study o f international relations.14 Traditional realists 
emphasized the role of the nationstate and asserted that security and power are at the 
core o f state behavior and that all other issues (economic prosperity, human rights, 
environmental problems, and so forth) are secondary to the pursuit o f these twin goals.
To these principals Hans Morgenthau further delineated international politics as a 
struggle for power that was marked by the rise and fall of great powers.13 History is a 
recurring struggle for wealth and power among nations, and is thus cyclical. Morgenthau 
also emphasized the balance o f power in international relations. For him, stability in the
I3The 1920s were an era in which the major powers embarked on an ambitious 
course of disarmament and reliance on international law. Besides the League of Nations 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, other instances of the confidence in international treaties 
include the Nine Power Act, and the Washington Naval Treaties.
I4Modem realism is based mainly on three seminal works; E.H. Carr, The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, I 919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations 
(London: MacMillan, 1939; reprint London: MacMillan, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948); 
and Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory o f  International Relations (Malabar: 
Robert E. Krieger, 1966).
15Morgenthau, 5.
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international system is created when equilibrium among competing states, or competing 
groups o f states, was reached. This balance of power naturally occurred as states sought 
to prevent dominance by any single state or coalition, and thereby shifted allegiances and 
alliances in an effort to forestall such primacy.16
Kenneth N. Waltz expanded on traditional realism through the development o f a 
theory that became known as neorealism or structural realism.17 For neorealists, the 
world is an anarchical, self-help system with no effective government above the level of 
the nationstate, and no real system of norms or laws.18 For Waltz the optimum method 
for a state to ensure its own survival is to “drive for universal domination.”19 To classic 
realism, Waltz added an emphasis on the structure of the international system or the 
world’s distribution of power, as a means to determine state conduct. Thus, states in a 
unipolar system would act differently than states in a bi- or multipolar system since 
diverse global systems tend to reward or punish states in different manners. For 
example, a unipolar system, with a hegemonic power, would tend to reward state
I6Ibid., 161; other early works that more clearly defined the concept of the 
balance of power include; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics 
(New York: Wiles, 1957); Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: 
International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); and Stanley 
Hoffman, The State o f  War (New York: Praeger, 1965).
I7See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New 
York: Columbia University, 1959); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Theory o f International 
Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979).
l8Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi define anarchy as “the absence of any hierarchy of 
authority” in the international system; Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds., International 
Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan, 1993), 48.
l9Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in Neorealism its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 117.
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cooperation, while in a multipolar system, states might find that cooperation merely aids 
other states in their attempts to gain power20. The four main structural elements that 
determine an international system include: 1) number of great powers in the system; 2) 
the allocation of capabilities in the system; 3) the number o f alliances; and 4) the scale 
o f polarization of competing alliances.21 The lack of an effective supranational body 
with the capabilities to develop and enforce codes of conduct on individual states, makes 
cooperation unusual, and means that [Os and regimes are meaningless since powerful 
states can ignore or even change the rules of the 10 or regime if those rules do not suit 
the powerful state.
Furthermore, although states always seek to improve their own security and 
power, they essentially only have two broad strategies to enhance their security, internal 
and external: “States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use 
the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two 
categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military 
strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and 
enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opponent one).”22 Internal 
methods, then, involve bolstering a state’s own capabilities, both in terms of economic 
and military power. Internal efforts to improve security, however, often result in a
20For realists, cooperation can best be defined as “both formal and informal 
reciprocated restraint;” Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self- 
Help,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994): 378.
21Patrick James, “Structural Realism and the Causes of War,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 39, no. 2 (October 1995): 183.
“ Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 115-16.
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“security dilemma’-a  phenomenon in which states attempts to bolster their own security 
leads other states to respond with improvements in their military capabilities.23 This 
often leads to arms races or at least increased tensions. As a result, the first state not 
only does not see increased security, but often is left with a net loss in overall security.24 
This is because both offensive and defensive military preparations have the same results. 
A nation’s efforts to improve its defensive military capabilities, in order to protect itself 
from potential aggression, may be perceived as a potential offensive build-up by another 
state.25 In addition, since defensive capabilities enjoy an advantage over offensive 
capabilities in terms of required resources, the offense-defense balance becomes crucial 
in the calculation of state power. Defensive military preparations can thus be just as 
threatening to other states as offensive preparations, since significant defensive 
capabilities require even greater offensive capabilities in order to maintain a threat
230ne of the original, and best, definitions of the security dilemma is that of John 
Herz, who asserted that actors must be “concerned about their security from being 
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving 
to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in 
order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more 
insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely 
secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious 
circle of security and power accumulation is on;” John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism 
and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 2 (1950): 157.
24This circumstance was first noted by John Herz, who termed the phenomenon 
“the security and power dilemma;” John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951).
25This phenomenon, offense-defense distinguishability, is examined at length in 
George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: JohnWiley 
& Sons, 1977).
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potential.26
External endeavors to increase security involve coalition or alliance formation 
and moves to either enhance the power of one’s own group or weaken other groups. 
These efforts can lead to “power-balancing” as opposing coalitions or alliances achieve 
rough parity or equivalence (balance of power systems) or they can just as easily lead to 
war. In general, states form alliances or coalitions for either balancing purposes or 
bandwagoning. States tend to balance against another power when they perceive that 
power to be gaining hegemonic potential. Waltz describes balancing tendencies in the 
following manner: “In international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive 
accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of 
others.”27 States usually balance in order to preserve power and relative shares of 
resources. Hence, balancing is most likely to occur in the face of an external threat. 
Bandwagoning, however, takes the opposite track of balancing: nothing succeeds like 
success. States join coalitions with more powerful states to gain a share of perceived 
relative gains by an expansionist power. The goal of bandwagoning, then, is usually self­
extension. As Randall L. Schweller describes it, “balancing is driven by the desire to 
avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. The presence of a significant 
external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to
26Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30, 
no. 2 (January 1978): 188.
27Robert I. Rotberrg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention o f  
Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), 49.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
37
bandwagon.”28 Stephen Walt concludes that states usually balance and seldom 
bandwagon.29 Alliance choices are driven by threat imbalances, not power capabilities. 
When one state or coalition is perceived to be particularly expansionistic, states tend to 
balance against that power, even if it is not the most powerful actor in a given system in 
terms of its relative resource capabilities.30
The formation of a balance o f power system can lead to cooperation as states 
work together to restrain potential hegemonic powers. For a balance of power system to 
develop, several criteria must be met. There must be at least two states of roughly equal 
power which seek to enhance their status. The actors within the system must not be 
constrained from switching sides by ideology. The system must work to ensure the 
survival of the major powers while at the same time preventing hegemony over the 
system by any one power.31 Furthermore, war should be seen as a legitimate instrument 
o f policy.32
Through coalition building and alliance formation, realism recognizes the
28Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back In,” International Security, 19 (Summer 1994): 73.
29Kenneth Waltz takes the opposite track and asserts that states often bandwagon, 
but only up to a certain point. If it becomes likely that a powerful state will achieve 
hegemony, even bandwagoning states will balance against it; Waltz, Theory o f  
International Politics, 123-38.
30Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1987),
263-65.
3IEdward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance o f Power (Washington, D.C.: 
AHA, 1955), 3-29.
32Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation,” World Politics, 38, no. I (October 1985): 60.
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possibility o f cooperation in the global system. Cooperation often occurs under the 
auspices o f a hegemon. Robert O. Keohane’s work on hegemonic stability theory is an 
effort to explain such cooperation.33 Keohane argued “that hegemonic structures of 
power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development o f strong 
international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed.”34 The 
hegemon is necessary to both set and enforce the rules surrounding cooperation and to 
ensure the fair distribution of public goods, such as security and economic prosperity, in 
order to maintain satisfaction with the organization or regime.
Some scholars contend that states automatically balance against the hegemon.35 
They assert that since states seek power to ensure their own survival, they will constantly 
attempt to augment their power at the expense of the hegemon. In an anarchic world 
states must always be aware that other states and especially hegemonal powers might use 
superior capabilities against them. Consequently, states always seek to gain relative 
power which gives them a "double payoff'—increased security and more options in the
33Hegemonic stability theory is the view that “concentration of power in one 
dominant state facilitates the development of strong regimes, and that fragmentation of 
power is associated with regime collapse;” Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for 
International Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 1983), 142.
^Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in 
International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977,” in Change in the International System, 
ed. Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview, 1980).
35Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will 
Arise," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 1-41; Kenneth Waltz, "The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 3 (Fall 
1993): 44-79.
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international arena.36 The appeal of this payoff leads states to constantly seek 
improvements in their security which, in tum, leads to hegemonic decline as these states 
constantly seek to gain relative advantages and the hegemon consistently strives to 
maintain its own relative advantages.
Because states constantly seek to improve their security, international institutions 
are unable to develop truly meaningful capabilities, since states are unwilling to 
surrender power and therefore jeopardize their security. Instead, international 
organizations are more likely to simply reflect the distribution of power and the 
preferences of the great powers o f  the day. Hence, institutions are often created by the 
great powers simply as a means to either preserve or enhance their share of power in the 
world. What is important is the balance of power-which states or coalitions possess the 
most power, which states possess the least. The balance or distribution of power in the 
international system is the key to determining state behavior. For neorealists, “the 
balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an 
intervening variable in the process.”37
In addition to the realist conception of international politics with its emphasis on 
the anarchical nature of world politics and its dismal outlook for international 
cooperation is institutionalism.38 From the 1960s onward, many have asserted that new
36Gilpin, War, 86-87.
37Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils 
o f Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), 
340.
38See David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate (New York: Columbia University, 1993).
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actors in the world have begun to exert an increasing amount o f  power in world 
politics.39 Furthermore, scholars have asserted that many international institutions have 
become, in various ways, as important as nationstates in the international system.'10 
Other critics have challenged the realist contention that states are unitary and rational 
actors.41 Still others have pointed to the dramatic increase in interdependence created by 
the increasingly global economy as evidence that the realist emphasis on anarchy is 
overdone.
The liberal institutionalist school emerged in the early 1980s as a hybrid which 
accepted the main tenets o f realism, including the anarchical nature of the international 
system and the primacy o f the nationstate, but which asserted that international 
institutions and regimes could promote lasting cooperation, even without the oversight of 
a hegemon.42 The key to lasting cooperation is institutions. IOs bolster cooperation in a
39For liberal institutionalists, power is defined broadly: ‘‘power is more than 
military strength. It depends at least as much on economic strength, the attractiveness of 
one’s ideas and economic system, and one’s willingness to spend resources on foreign 
policy. For many purposes-securing cooperation from other advanced societies, 
ensuring growth in the world economy, cleaning the global environment-military 
strength is not very important at all;” Robert O. Keohane, “The Diplomacy of Structural 
Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies,” in America and Europe in an Era 
o f  Change, ed. Helga Haftendom and Christian Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 
44-45.
40See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International 
Organization (Stanford: Stanford University, 1964).
4‘For instance, state leaders often inaccurately judge the actions of other world 
leaders, and often engage in what might be termed “irrational” behavior at the 
international level in order to satisfy domestic audiences, see Robert Jervis, Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976).
42For liberal institutionalists, cooperation can best be defined as “goal-directed 
behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than 
they would otherwise be;” Helen Milner, “International Theories o f Cooperation Among
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number of ways. They increase the flow of information and the transparency o f states. 
They provide peaceful forums for conflict resolution. They also help states identify 
common interests.43
As a whole, neoliberal institutionalism accepts the basic tenets of realism. States 
are acknowledged to be “crucial actors” in international politics.44 Anarchy in the 
international system and its ability to constrain cooperation is also recognized.43 
Furthermore, states are also seen to be rational actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis 
and act only to further their interests. Participation in regimes and IOs results from 
states’ perception that these institutions can further their interests. If involvement in 
international institutions produces relative gains for states, those states will continue and 
even expand participation in such organizations.46 Realism also accords some room for 
the role of international institutions. Joseph M. Grieco points out that “International 
institutions do matter for states as they attempt to cooperate. Indeed realists would argue 
that the problem with neoliberal institutionalism is not that it stresses the importance of 
institutions but that it understates the range of functions that institutions must perform to
Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 468.
43Peter Van Ham, “Can Institutions Hold Europe Together?” in Redefining 
Europe: New Patterns o f Conflict and Cooperation, ed. Hugh Miall (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 189.
44Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University, 1984), 25.
45Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. 
Oye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), 226.
46Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist- 
Neoliberal Debate,” International Organization 48, (1994): 3 18.
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help state work together.”47 Thus, realists will concede that IOs can facilitate 
cooperation, but in order to be successful, these institutions must be able to produce 
gains for all states involved, and not unbalanced gains whereby only certain states 
benefit from a regime. Furthermore, since regimes and institutions only reflect state 
preferences, realists contend that they are not "‘an independent force facilitating 
cooperation/’48
However, the main difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism 
centers around the relationship of states with one another. For neorealists, states 
measure their status both in terms of their absolute as well as their relative gains or 
losses. Relative gains by another state are perceived as dangerous. For the 
neoliberalists, states’ “utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain 
or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others.’̂ 9 Hence, for the 
neoliberals, cooperation is possible because the relative gains of one state do not 
automatically translate into relative losses by another.
For liberal institutionalists the keys to the international system are regimes and 
IOs. The consensus definition of regimes is that they are "sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations."50 Institutions are
47Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, 233.
48Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, (1988): 494.
49Keohane, After Hegemony, 27.
30Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables,”in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell
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formalized versions of regimes.SI One of the most significant differences between 
regimes and institutions is that regimes do not have the ability to act since they are made 
up of norms and principles.52 Instead, regimes rely on institutions to carry-out 
enforcement measures.53 For instance, the complex issue of free trade has developed 
into a regime in Europe, with tacit and explicit rules, which is characterized by 
institutions that formalize rules and employ multilateral decision making processes.'4 
Institutions can be defined more narrowly as “persistent and connected sets of rules and 
principles that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations/’35
University,l983), 2.
5ICharles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in Collective Security 
Beyond the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 
48.
32Andreas Hansenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, “ Interests, Power, 
Knowledge: The Study o f International Regimes,” Mershon International Studies Review 
40, no. 2 (October 1996): 179.
53Robert O. Keohane combines principles, norms and rules into a single category 
with his definition of regimes: “institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations;” Robert 
O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,” in 
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 4. However, Keohane’s narrow 
definition has been subject to much criticism, especially over its inability to account for 
the relationships between the factors within a regime.
34In addition, this regime has allowed for non-security expansion, or economic 
augmentation, for nation-states, which has ameliorated the security dilemma, and hence 
prevented security rivalries by channeling economic competition through regime norms; 
Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” 
Security Studies, Special Issue, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, 5, no. 3 (Spring 
1996): 92.
33Robert O. Keohane, Peter Haas, and Marc Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: 
Sources o f Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: MIT, 1993),. 
4-5.
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Norms are the “standards o f behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations:” 
Common international norms include sovereignty, collective security, and free trade.56 
Hence, norms are about behavior, not ideals.37
In the international system, norms serve four significant functions. First, they 
demarcate boundaries. They not only delineate a nationstate’s territory, but establish 
buffer zones and spheres o f influence.58 Examples of norms being used in this type of 
function include the 1885 Congress of Vienna which established spheres of influence in 
Africa or the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 in which the United States and Japan 
recognized each other’s possessions in the Pacific.59 Since territorial disputes are the 
primary cause of war, these norms can help promote peace. Second, norms can 
discourage cheating on international agreements by clearly signaling under which 
circumstances other actors are prepared to act.60 Modem examples of this type of norm
36Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions 
Matter? The Domestic Impact o f International Rules and Norms,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 452.
57Andrew Farkas, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 3 (September, 1996): 362.
58Gregory A. Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International 
Norms,” Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 2 (November 1997): 214.
590n the Root-Takahira Agreement, see Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 
The Military and Colonial Policy o f  the United States, Addresses and Reports by Elihu 
Root (Cambridge: Harvard, 1916).
60Norms can determine prearranged courses of action for transgressions of 
international agreements: if  state A violates agreement B, then the other signatories to B 
pledge that C course of action will result.
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include the various global treaties on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC).61 
Third, norms codify the procedures for international transactions. This has been 
especially apparent in the realm of global economics. Arrangements such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have significantly reduced the cost of “doing 
business” for individual nations.62 Fourth, norms provide incentives for collective 
action. They provide justification for states to act as a group for implementation 
purposes.63 Rules are the application of individual norms to specific circumstances. 
Examples of rules include practices established under GATT to outlaw certain subsidies, 
product dumping and other discriminatory economic policies.
While liberal institutionalists accept international anarchy, they argue that such 
anarchy can be alleviated by IOs and regimes which help states work toward common 
interests and share information and develop habits of cooperation, all the while 
providing means to peacefully settle disputes. In general, liberal institutionalism rests on 
three broad assumptions. First, it is more difficult to establish IOs and regimes than it is
6'For instance, these treaties provide mechanisms that prompt multilateral action 
against violators of the norms, as well as encourage compliance through incentive 
programs. U.S., Department of Defense, Weapons o f Mass Destruction: Reducing the 
Threat From the Former Soviet Union, NSLAD-95-7 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995); 
U.S., House of Representatives, C. Bruce Tarter, testimony, “Stemming the Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Department o f  
Energy's Budget Request fo r F Y1996: Hearing o f  the Subcommittee on Military 
Procurement (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 1.
62As an example, the Tokyo round of the GATT negotiations in the mid-1980s, 
linked trade and monetary policy in such a way as encourage exports to the United States 
following a decision by the Reagan administration to weaken the dollar; Charles Pearson 
and Nils Johnson, The New GAM' Trade Round, FPl Case Studies, no. 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 22-23.
63For examples of this type of behavior see Axelrod, Cooperation.
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to maintain them, since, once established, these organizations often take on a life of their 
own. Thus, contrary to realism, liberal institutionalism maintains that cooperation can 
continue and even flourish without hegemonic compulsion. Second, IOs and regimes 
encourage cooperation between nationstates that extends beyond the original mandate of 
the organization. Once patterns of collaboration and interaction are established between 
governments, these linkages facilitate further bargaining. In addition, nationstates have 
fewer incentives to attempt to “cheat,”64 or gain unlawful advantages because of the 
“shadow of the future”-that is knowledge that nations will have to interact with other 
states again and again over time.63 Finally, while institutions may not be able to force 
policies on nationstates, they do provide a forum for states to pursue their national 
interests by working with other states. Hence, nations are less likely to adopt unilateral 
policies that may undermine the institution since that “institution may be required again 
in the future, and destroying them because of short-term changes may be very costly in 
the long run. Institutional maintenance is not, then, a function of a waiving calculation; 
it becomes a factor in the decision calculus that keeps short-term calculations from 
becoming decisive.”60
In his seminal work, After Hegemony, Robert Keohane presents a detailed probe
‘’■’Cheating implies either observed or unobserved non-compliance with a 
regime’s norms or rules; it can thus be considered a “breach of promise.” In most 
institutionalist literature, defection, is the term used to describe cheating; John J. 
Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 
19 (Winter 1994), 344.
63Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in Cooperation Under 
Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), 14-15.
66Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in 
International Relations (London; Cornell University, 1990), 52.
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of the effect that regimes and IOs have on cooperation, and how cooperation can be 
organized in the world political economy. He also examines whether or not such 
cooperation can take place without a hegemon. Keohane uses a case study of postwar 
American practices to arrive at his conclusions. He deduces that cooperation can take 
place without a hegemon, if  IOs and regimes are able to step-in and fill the role of the 
declining hegemon in maintaining that cooperation.67 Consequently, as the world grows 
more interdependent and IOs become increasingly strengthened, hegemons will be less 
important in providing stability in the world.
This theme o f interdependence and the lessening need for hegemons to provide 
stability is more deeply and fundamentally examined in Keohane's collaboration with 
Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence. This work rebuts many of the traditional 
realist arguments about power by focusing on the growing importance of economic 
interdependence which they define as mutual dependence.68 From this mutual 
dependence in given area-issues, there has now evolved complex interdependence. 
Complex interdependence “refers to a situation among a number o f countries in which 
multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize these 
contacts); there is no hierarchy of issues; and military force is not used by governments 
toward one another.69 It also presupposes the presence of transnational and 
transgovemmental actors in international relations. In practical terms, interdependence
67Keohane, After Hegemony, 24, 39.
68More specifically, they define interdependence in international relations as 
“situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries;” Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 8.
69Ibid„ 24-35.
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means that all states, even great powers, cannot act on their own.
Keohane and Nye present a persuasive case about how smaller states can gain on 
more powerful states through the use of "linkage strategies" and by using IOs to set their 
own agendas and form coalitions.70 In this way, IOs serve as platforms for smaller states 
to pool their resources and power, often at the expense of the more powerful states. IOs 
also serve as vehicles for smaller states to gain the world media stage and make their 
views known. Hence, hegemons may be necessary for initiating cooperation, but not for 
continuing cooperation. The hegemon is needed to set international "rules" and reward or 
punish states by those rules. It initially distributes public goods such as security or free 
trade. But, cooperation can survive and even strengthen as a hegemon declines. Indeed, 
once formalized in a regime or 10, patterns of cooperation may compel compliance even 
by great powers. As Keohane notes “interdependence means that even great powers 
cannot act effectively on their own. To regain some influence over events, governments 
and firms have to collaborate with one another; they have to sacrifice their unilateral 
freedom of action for some degree of mastery over transnational flows of goods, capital, 
technology, ideas, and people.”71
Most important, regimes and IOs contribute to the preservation of state power for 
small and medium nations. First, regimes facilitate burden-sharing. This allows for the 
aforementioned distribution of public goods. In this way, regimes and IOs allow states 
to husband their resources. Second, regimes aid the transfer of information between 
states. In a broad sense this fosters cooperation and discourages states from acting
70Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 35-36.
7‘Keohane, “Diplomacy,” 48.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
49
unilaterally, thus helping nations maintain stability. Third, international institutions can 
actually limit the ability o f states to form linkage strategies by enforcing uniform rules 
and preventing varied interests from getting in each other’s way. Perhaps, most 
important, the international system forces the democracies to act with some self- 
discipline in foreign affairs. By tying itself to regimes, the national government can 
prevent domestic constraints from exerting undue influences.72 By aiding continuity in 
international affairs, IOs and regimes facilitate the formation of broad, transnational 
coalitions over issues such as free trade or democratization.73
A regime’s effectiveness is measured in several ways. To begin with, a regime is 
considered to be effective if its members abide by its rules and norms. In addition, to be 
considered effective in the long term, a regime must achieve the goals and objectives for 
which it was created.74 If nothing else, a regime must reinforce states’ ability to 
cooperate in a given area.75 A regime’s potency is further measured by its resilience or 
robustness. This is the regime’s staying power; its ability to survive in the face of either 
external or internal threats. It is also a measure of the extent to which '‘institutional 
history matters’-whether or not previous choices can constrain collective behavior in the
72Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 271-72.
73Joseph S. Nye, "Patrons and Clients: New Roles in the Post Cold War Order," 
in America and Europe in an Era o f  Change, ed. Helga Hafitendom and Christian 
Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 102.
740ran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1994), 72-77.
75Arild Underdal, “The Concept of ‘Regime Effectiveness’,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 27 (Fall 1992): 227-240.
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future.76
Nationstates can gain three other major benefits from multilateralism in the form 
of participation in international organizations: it can lessen the transaction costs 
between states; it can parry challenges from potential rival states; and it can help 
maintain stability during periods of relative power change.77 Few would dispute the 
assertion that multilateral institutions lower the costs of transactions between states. As 
previously mentioned, IOs can serve as forums to cut tariffs or to facilitate information 
sharing. IOs also expedite coordination among states. These factors allow the 
nationstate to spend fewer resources in its interactions with other states.
The relationship between nationstates and regimes is not ‘'unidirectional,” that is 
power and constraints do not simply flow from the state to the 10. Instead, there is a 
mutual exchange. Membership in an international institution presents a significant 
factor for the development and implementation of domestic policies. Multilateral 
organizations provide support and opportunities for national policymakers. For instance, 
in the United States, membership in the GATT-based trade regime has served as the 
basis for the nation’s trade policies. Most foreign economic legislation has either 
initiated negotiations dealing with GATT or has centered around the implementation of 
GATT proposals. In this manner, IOs and regimes provide legitimacy for the policies of 
national governments.
For individual states, membership in regimes amplifies the impact of decisions
76Powell, “Anarchy,” 341.
77John G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f  an 
Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University, 1993), 109.
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because the norms, rules and principles of a regime do not apply to a single case, but are 
spread over a number o f particular actions or cases. In addition, individual regimes are 
joined with or encompassed by larger regimes, thus creating a broad framework of 
principles and norms, and linkages between specific issues. Hence, violations of a 
particular norm, can have impacts far beyond that issue, and can impact the actor’s 
ability to achieve goals in other issue-areas.78 In this way, regimes have reputational 
effects. They “help to assess others’ reputations by providing standards of behavior 
against which performance can be measured, by linking these standards to specific 
issues, and by providing forums, often through international organizations, in which 
these evaluations can be made.”79 Hence, regimes increase the cost o f  noncompliance by 
shaping the reputations o f member-states. Actors that are perceived as trustworthy are 
more likely to be chosen as partners by other actors. While regimes cannot ensure 
compliance based on reputational effects, rational actors, sensitive to the long-term 
opportunities of conformity, are much more likely to comply with a regime’s norms and 
principles than to violate them.
Furthermore, institutions can actually reinforce state sovereignty. Although 
institutions may modify and constrain state’s autonomy, they also tend to reinforce 
legitimacy in the international arena. Here it is important to differentiate between legal 
and operational sovereignty. Keohane, Haas and Levy assert that while some degree of 
autonomy may be lost on specific issues, in overall terms, the formal sovereignty of 
nationstates is bolstered since the nationstate is “validated” as the sole legitimate
78Axelrod and Keohane, 234.
79Keohane, After Hegemony, 106.
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members of IOs and regimes.80 In addition, functional sovereignty is also strengthened 
as the single nationstate gains access to greater capabilities through the 10 or regime. 
Participation in international organizations also tends to legitimize the current regime in 
a particular nationstate.
Multilateralism in the form of IOs can also legitimize the status quo in global 
politics if the hegemon is willing to divert some o f the decision making to the 
organization. Such a diffusion of power empowers lesser states and partially ties them to 
the future of the IO (and by extension, to the continuation of the status quo). This 
diffusion of power usually leads to a more balanced distribution o f gains which benefits 
both the dominant power and the lesser states. Hegemons can create a semi-voluntary 
allegiance which, over time, strengthens the stake that states have in the preservation of 
the present order, and thus, lessens the amount of resources the hegemon must use to 
maintain that order. At the same time, lesser states gain more than they otherwise could 
expect. This combination of benefits promotes stability in the system. It helps preserve 
the primary power, while at the same time it offers incentives for weaker powers to 
remain compliant. A good example of this behavior is the European compliance on the 
status quo in regards to security arrangements. The transatlantic alliance, with its 
institutions, NATO and the WEU, form Western Europe’s security regime and provide to 
its member-states the various benefits outlined. As the regime has evolved and patterns 
of cooperation have been institutionalized, there has consequently been less need for 
states to pursue their own unilateral security policies. States have internalized not only
80ICeohane, Haas, and Levy, 415-17.
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the specific rules of the regime, but also the regime’s norms.81
Realism emphasizes the presence of anarchy in the international system and the 
primacy of the nationstate as the main actor in international relations. However, in the 
post World War II era there has been a proliferation of institutions and regimes which 
have become increasingly important in global politics. Liberal institutionalism accepts 
the basic premises of realism, anarchy and the importance of individual states, but then 
incorporates the presence of international institutions and regimes into a synthesis that 
more accurately reflects the current world system. Nationstates remain the prime actors 
in international relations, but IOs and regimes have been formed which reflect the 
preferences of these actors and which allow' nationstates to extend their interests through 
collective actions. In this manner, IOs and regimes temper global anarchy.
International regimes and institutions have proved beneficial to both great powers 
and to small states. For the great powers, IOs and regimes offer a means to preserve 
resources and to institutionalize the norms and principles of the primary powers. For 
small and medium states, IOs and regimes give access to greater capabilities and help 
maintain influence through the phenomenons o f linkage strategies and coalition- 
building. For all states, IOs and regimes facilitate cooperation by increasing the relative 
gains for actors participating in the institutions, and promoting current cooperation in 
order to participate in future gains. In addition, IOs and regimes create a broad 
framework for implementing or maintaining international rules and norms, since these 
principles do not apply to a specific case, or a specific country, but are employed over a
8‘Muller, “Internalization,” 383.
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number of cases and a number of states.
IOs and regimes can reinforce individual state sovereignty in a period of 
increased multinational actors. They legitimize domestic policies that comply with 
international norms and rules. Also, participation in international institutions can help 
legitimize a government. Externally, these organizations strengthen state sovereignty by 
legitimizing the status quo and reinforcing the authenticity of national governments 
within the international community. For small or medium states, participation in 
international institutions provides them access to greater resources and to collective 
capabilities, all the while lessening the transaction costs associated with international 
interactions and reinforcing cooperative behavior. Regimes can also be used for the 
pursuit of a nation’s idiosyncratic goals, even if those goals run counter to the interests 
of other states. They then become a means for reconciling divergent interests. Hence, 
the gains provided by international institutions provide incentives for continued 
cooperation and interdependence that create a self-perpetuating international system in 
which nationstates learn that participation in such organizations and collaboration with 
other states augments potential gains while reinforcing the power of individual states.
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CHAPTER III
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MODERN NATIONSTATE
The period o f predominance by nationstates in the modem international system 
began with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The rise of the nationstate was marked by 
increasing political centralization and the institutionalization of public authority.1 
Nationstates eclipsed multinational political organizations such as the church and 
various multiethnic empires to become the central actors in world politics for much of 
the past three hundred years. However, the proliferation and increasing influence of 
international organizations (IOs) and regimes have begun to challenge the traditional 
notions of power and sovereignty associated with the individual nationstate. The realist 
school of international relations maintains that nationstates remain the primary actors in 
the global system and that international institutions are little more than “window 
dressing"’ that reflect the preferences of the great powers of the day.2 Nonetheless, 
nationstates are increasingly constrained in the individualistic pursuit o f policy 
objectives by the spread o f IOs and regimes and the internalization of international
‘John G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a 
Neorealist Synthesis,”in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: 
Columbia, 1986), 143.
2For instance, Susan Strange suggests that the current debate over the power of 
regimes is “a rehash of old academic debates under a new and jazzier name—a sort of 
intellectual mutton dressed up as lambs-so that the pushy new professors of the 1980s 
can have the same old arguments as their elders but can flatter themselves that they are 
breaking new ground by using a new jargon; Susan Strange, “Cave! Hie Dragones: A 
Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane 
(New York: Columbia, 1986), 341.
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norms and rules.3 This is especially true in light o f the proliferation and spread of IOs 
and regimes.
This chapter will examine the broad transformations of sovereignty and the 
power of the nationstate in the post-World War II era. First, the development of the 
modem nationstate will be appraised in conjunction with the formation of the global 
system which reinforced the primacy of that unit in international relations. Second, the 
evolution of the nationstate in its efforts to adjust to a rapidly changing market economy 
will be shown to lead to the formation of the “trading state.”4 Third, traditional notions 
of state sovereignty have undergone significant transformations as nationstates have 
matured and domestic politics have increasingly impacted on foreign policy. The 
growing political power of the middle class in developed nationstates has subsequently 
led to the development of “two-level” games as national leaders have been forced to 
recognize the necessity of securing domestic support for foreign agendas.5 Fourth, the 
combination of the increased power of international regimes and domestic forces, when 
combined with the increased mobility of capital and labor which have led to the 
formation of what Richard Rosecrance terms the “virtual state, ”6 has created a new 
concept of national sovereignty, and a new role for the modem nationstate.
3On this theme, see Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
4See Rosecrance, Rise o f  the Trading State.
5Robert Putnam argues that existing state-centric theories o f international politics 
fail to satisfactorily explain the linkages between foreign and domestic policy agendas.
He argues that the two areas are closely linked, especially in terms of the increasing 
necessity to win ratification o f foreign policy goals in national legislatures; Putnam, 
“Diplomacy,” 427-61.
6Rosecrance, “Rise o f the Virtual State,” 46.
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The formation of the nationstate as the primary political unit in the global system 
has been the most significant feature o f modem international relations.7 Before the 
Treaty of Westphalia and the emergence of nationstate as the principle actor in 
international affairs, the world was dominated by multiethnic empires, city-states, tribes, 
and various feudal organizations, such as fiefs or principalities. Each of these entities 
had varying degrees of political control and legitimacy. They consisted of “chains of 
lord-vassal” relationships, based on a combination of dependent property and private 
political authority.8 Property was dependent on the fulfillment o f feudal obligations and 
political authority was based on the individual ruler. This system was further 
complicated by the multiple allegiances that many rulers had, with fidelity often owed to 
multiple kings and princes. The result was “a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete 
rights of government.”9 This system proved to be international by its very nature since 
the distinctions between internal and external politics were meaningless in light of the 
transborder power structure.10 Absolute rulers of one area might find themselves vassals 
of another ruler in other lands that they held title to. As Joseph R. Strayer recounts, the 
king of France “might send letters on the same day to the count o f Flanders, who was 
definitely his vassal, but a very independent and unruly one, to the count of Luxembourg, 
who was a prince of the Empire but who held a money-fief (a regular, annual pension) of
7The modem nationstate was originally a European phenomenon, hence this 
study will concentrate on developments on the European continent.
8Ruggie, “Continuity,” 142.
’Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins o f  the Modern State (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 1970), 115.
l0Ruggie, “Continuity,” 142-43.
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the king of France, and to the king of Sicily, who was certainly a ruler of a sovereign 
state but also a prince of the French royal house.”11 Hence the concept o f national 
boundaries was of little use in an era in which political authority often spread across 
geographic space with little regard to individual political units.
The medieval system contained an even higher degree of anarchy than modem 
politics since political structures had fewer capabilities.12 However, As Hedley Bull 
points out, the most significant difference between the Medieval period and the modem 
era had less to do with differentiations between the political units and more to do with 
the principles of organization of these units.13 While there was commonality in the form 
of customs and religion, the variations in political institutions precluded the development 
of a single coherent political unit which could bind its citizenry to the state.
Before the Treaty of Westphalia, multiethnic empires, city-states, tribes, and 
various feudal organizations, were the principal actors in world politics. Each of these 
entities faced significant problems. Empires were able to develop considerable military 
power, but were only able to maintain the loyalty of a small fraction of the empire’s 
population. Over time, the failure of an empire’s citizens to identify with the empire 
caused weaknesses in the face of either internal revolts or external pressure, since
“Strayer, 83.
12WaItz, International Politics, 88.
“Bull asserts that the “fundamental constitutive principle or criterion of 
membership was clearly enunciated. When the conception of the state as the common 
political form of all kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and republics of modem Europe 
was itself not yet established, the idea of a society made up of principally or exclusively 
o f a single kind of political entity called ‘states’ could not take shape,” Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, 29.
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citizens were often unwilling to sacrifice private objectives for the greater political body. 
This was also true o f feudal systems. On the other hand, city states were able to develop 
strong bonds o f loyalty among their citizens, but they were not able to project power. 
They could not acquire new territories or populations without weakening the bonds of 
loyalty. Hence, city states often either became the foundation for an empire (such as 
Rome) or were overrun by empires (Athens) since they could not match an empire’s 
military capabilities.14 In addition, the military innovations and the emergence o f a 
market economy between 1100 and 1700, increased the necessary size of political units. 
Small feudal systems could not generate the resources needed to take advantage o f the 
revolution in military technology since these systems were unable to compete with 
market economies, and were thus at a relative disadvantage against emerging large states 
such as France or Prussia.^
The modem nationstate solved these problems by establishing a means with 
which to reconcile scale and loyalty. The nationstate was able to secure a population 
large enough to project significant military power, and the means with which to 
incorporate new land and peoples into the framework o f the political unit. Furthermore, 
the nationstate was able to secure the loyalty of its citizenry and to take advantage of the
14Strayer, 11-12.
l5Joseph Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” International Economic 
Papers no. 4, (London: Macmillan, 1954), 4; Schumpeter later expanded on this 
theme; see Joseph Schumpeter, The History o f Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford 
University, 1954).
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new economic systems.16 Hence the nationstate was able to combine large scale and 
loyalty for the
states which emerged after 1100 combined, to some extent, the strengths 
o f both the empires and the city-states. They were large enough to have 
excellent chances for survival—some o f them are approaching the 
thousand-year mark, which is a respectable age for any human 
organization. At the same time they managed to get a large proportion of 
their people involved in, or at least concerned with the political process, 
and they succeeded in creating some sense of common identity among 
local communities. They got more out o f their people, both in the way of 
political and social activity and in loyalty than the ancient empires had 
done, even if they fell short o f the full participation had marked a city 
such as Athens.17
Geography and economics propelled the development of the nationstate in 
Europe. The continent’s broken geography precluded the establishment of a unified 
empire.18 Instead small feudal systems developed. These smaller systems were better 
able to secure and maintain the loyalty of their citizenry.19 However, attempts to acquire 
new territories or populations usually weakened these bonds and prevented significant 
hegemonal bids by the feudal powers of Medieval Europe.
16Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise o f the Western World-A 
Mew Economic History (New York: Cambridge University, 1973), 17.
l7Strayer, 12.
18A s  Paul Kennedy notes about Europe, “there were no enormous plains over 
which an empire o f horsemen could impose its swift dominion; nor were there broad and 
fertile river zones like those around the Ganges, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Yellow, and 
Yangtze, providing the food for masses of toiling and easily conquerable peasants. 
Europe’s landscape was much more fractured, with mountain ranges and large forests 
separating the scattered population centers in the valleys; and its climate altered 
considerably from North to South and West to East;” Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  
the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New 
York: Random House, 1987), 17.
19Strayer, 11-12.
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Interstate rivalry also propelled continuous advancements in military technology, 
which were in turn propelled by the development of market economies and the resultant 
technological advances that the market mandated. The diverse geography o f Europe led 
to the cultivation o f diverse products. These products were easily transported by the 
immense system o f navigatable waterways and sealanes in and around Europe.20 Regular 
exchanges of goods and products led to the development of credit and banking practices 
which set the stage for the market economy by establishing a '‘predictability” in trade 
that was unmatched elsewhere in the world. These patterns of trade were relatively 
unchecked by governmental interference or suppression, since local rulers usually 
profited well from trade, and those who exploited merchants too greatly found that trade 
routes often moved outside o f their control, thereby increasing the incentives to at least 
tolerate a merchant class. Over time, a symbiotic relationship developed between the 
political units o f Europe and the market economy. These regimes provided a stable 
domestic order and the rudiments o f a nondiscriminatory legal system for merchants in 
exchange for a share of the profits garnered by trade.21
The nationstate proved to be the ideal unit for political organization against the 
evolving military and economic condition of Europe. Most important, the nationstate 
solved the financial crisis of feudalism since the nationstate was large enough to take 
advantage of the economic growth of the era to collect the revenues necessary to acquire
20See, Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and
Economy, 1000-1700, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994).
2‘Kennedy, 19-20.
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and field the new military technologies.22 The modem nationstate, unlike its 
predecessors, is integrated and organized internally in a manner that allows it to increase 
its power externally. As Robert Gilpin points out, “through its taxation and conscription 
policies, the modem state has the capacity to mobilize the wealth and services of its 
citizenry to advance the power and interests of the state.”23 In addition, the modem 
nationstate is distinguishable from its predecessors in three significant ways. First, 
authority is centralized and is distinct from other social institutions. This central 
authority exercises power over a defined territorial space and has a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force within the society.24 Second, the nationstate is characterized by 
an intricate class structure that extends beyond a ruling elite and a vassal or peasant 
class. Third there is a cohesion among the populace and intense loyalty to the state that 
is a result of nationalism and self-identification by the citizens of the state.25
The most distinguishing characteristic o f the modem nationstate however, is that 
it is a geographic construct. The overriding function o f the nationstate is the 
organization of space.26 The nationstate exerts its control over populations and 
economic actors through its exclusive control of territory. As John Ruggie contends,
“the distinctive feature o f the modem system of rule is that it has differentiated its
“ Schumpeter, “Crisis,” 14.
■^Gilpin, War and Change, 122.
24Bull, The Anarchical Society, 57.
25Gilpin, War and Change, 121-22.
26Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End o f  Sovereignty? (Hants, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 1992), 238.
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subject collectively into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of 
legitimate dominion. As such, it appears to be unique in human history.”27
The triumph of the nationstate as the world’s primary political organization has 
been the most significant feature o f the modem international system. However, during 
the height o f Cold War bipolarity, the nationstates of western Europe developed a series 
of economic, political and security relationships that can be termed an institutional 
complex.28 The growth of this complex was a result o f two factors. The Soviet threat 
spurred nations to put aside their historical disputes in order to work together in an 
alliance against the Soviet bloc. In addition, American primacy worked to propel 
European integration in order to forestall a recurrence of past conflicts. Concurrently, 
the American willingness to bear a significant proportion of the burden of European 
defense, allowed states to devote more resources to economic growth. Hence, external 
factors encouraged cooperation to a degree not thought possible in the past.29
One of the most significant features of the institutional complex in Europe has 
been the relative stabilization of territorial borders. West European states do not seek 
power aggrandizement through territorial expansion. This marks a momentous break 
with the past. The proliferation of regimes and IOs has reduced the need for nationstates 
to seek unilateral means to ensure security and promote national interests. States have 
increasingly begun to measure their well-being in economic rather than geopolitical
27John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations,” International Organization A1 (Winter 1993): 151.
28Van Ham, “Institutions,” 190.
29Ibid., 191.
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terms. Historical means for the advancement of the state, mainly through territorial 
conquest, gave given way to attempts to augment wealth through control of an increasing 
share of the world’s wealth. As goods became more mobile than capital or labor, the 
trading state arose.30 Germany and Japan were the best illustrations of the trading state, 
nations whose power was measured in economic importance, rather than in traditional 
geo-military terms. Hence economic policy supplants or at least rivals security policy, 
especially in states that have no or very few, direct military threats.31
The trading state has several important characteristics. To begin with, the trading 
state does not seek power through military conquests, but through economic 
development centered around foreign trade. As Richard Rosecrance points out, in the 
past “it was cheaper to seize another state’s territory by force than to develop the 
sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial 
exchange with it.”32 Now the reverse has become true. The costs associated with the use 
of force in the modem world have increased dramatically. Nuclear escalation, the 
proliferation of modem weapons and the potential for the use of force to disrupt 
economic systems, all have combined with increased resistence by domestic audiences to 
costs associated with conflict.33 Furthermore, these states seek economic development
30On the rise o f  the trading state, see Rosecrance, Rise o f  the Trading State.
31 See Aaron Friedberg, “The Changing Relationship Between Economics and 
Security,” Political Science Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 256-276; and Richard 
Rosecrance, Cooperation in A World Without Enemies: Solving the Public Goods 
Problem, Working Paper, no. 2 (Berkeley: University o f California, 1992).
32Rosecrance, Rise o f  the Trading State, 160.
33Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 246.
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based on free market principles and not on the mercantilist model with its emphasis on 
trade and balance of payments surplus.34 As a result, trading states have adjusted their 
domestic markets and structures to conform to the international market.3* The rise o f the 
market in Europe led to a fundamental shift in state authority, and “redefined” the role of 
the state in regards to the economy. Increasingly, the function of the state became to 
organize and protect the “self-regulating” market.36 In liberal democracies, where the 
welfare of the consumer and autonomy in the market are valued, the role of the state is 
usually minor, but the main responsibility of the central authority is perceived to be that 
o f providing public goods and rectifying market failures, all the while, promoting 
economic growth and stability.37 Over time, this led trading states to develop different 
political and economic interests than traditional nationstates. By concentrating on trade 
rather than military expansion, trading states can devote more resources to the 
development and manufacture of new products and achieve a higher level of relative 
gains in the international marketplace. Conversely, states which concentrate their 
energies and resources on military power and territorial expansion, generally constrain
34Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 309.
35For an exploration of this process, see Peter Katzenstein, Small States and 
World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1985).
36John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen 
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 202.
37Robert Gilpin, “Economic Evolution o f National Systems,” International 
Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 415.
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their economic growth.38 Those states that are most fully immersed in the global market 
have experienced remarkable economic growth, no matter how scarce their natural 
resources. Singapore and Taiwan provide examples of this. Conversely, states that have 
pursued autarky, no matter what their resource base, have lagged behind those 
connected to the global economy. The Soviet Union was the prime example of this.39 
Most significantly, trading states are much more likely to cooperate and collaborate with 
each other and thereby produce institutions and regimes which temper international 
anarchy. This is because trade alone cannot ensure cooperation or a mutuality of 
interest, especially if there are other markets for a state’s goods. Trading states also 
acquire interests in the economic success and well-being o f their trading partners.40 
These interests develop as states invest significant resources in the form of direct foreign 
investments (DFI) within the territory o f another. Since these DFI are often in the form 
of infrastructure improvements, that is factories or manufacturing plants, they are 
illiquid and cannot be easily sold in the local market. Studies have shown a correlation 
in cooperation between nations with significant DFI in each other.41 The greater the DFI
38See Kennedy, especially pages 444-46; also see Robert DeGrasse, Jr., Military 
Expansion, Economic Decline (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1983).
39Robert Putnam, “Two-Level Games: The Impact of Domestic Politics on 
Transatlantic Bargaining,” in America and Europe in an Era o f  Change, ed. Helga 
Hafitendom and Christian Tuschoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 77.
40Richard N. Rosecrance, “The U.S.—Japan Trading Relationship and Its Effects,” 
Global Legal Studies Journal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 6.
41Rosecrance cites two studies, Brian Healy, “Economic Power Transition in the 
International System: The Translation of Economic Power into Political Leverage in the 
International Monetary System” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973); and William 
Gutowitz, “The Interrelationship of Economic Factors and Political Relations Among 
Nations: A Quantitative Analysis” (M.A. thes., Cornell University, 1978).
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one state has in another, the greater the cooperation offered to it. This reinforces the 
need for states to work for relative gains that can be shared by all partners within a 
system.
The phenomenon through which nationstates moved from the observance of 
international reciprocal economic obligations, such as recognition of the most favored 
nation status and commitments to agreed upon exchange rates, to the acknowledgment 
that national economic policies could impact other states, and thus the effects o f such 
policies have to be taken into account before they are adopted was dubbed “policy 
harmonization” by Robert W. Cox. Cox contends that not only do states attempt to 
harmonize economic policies so as not to negatively impact trading partners, but that 
states are willing to accept short-term losses as a trading partner adjusts to new 
policies.42 In this manner, cooperation becomes both institutionalized at the domestic 
level and internationalized.
This emphasis on cooperation by trading states is a result of three major factors. 
First, by their very nature, trading states rely on an open international trading system. 
Impediments to trade, such as tariffs, quotas or price supports are an anathema to such a 
system. Instead, the system must have free and open trade and provide for the free 
movement of capital. This allows states to invest in each other’s markets and profit.43 
Second, trading states seek security through collective efforts, not autarky. The states of
42Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: 
Columbia, 1986), 231.
43Richard N. Rosecrance, “Trading States in a New Concert of Europe,” in 
America and Europe in an Era o f  Change, ed. Helga Haffendom and Christian 
Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 128-29.
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Western Europe over the past forty years have been able to economize on defense efforts 
because no one single nation had to prepare for the entire range of military threats by 
itself Instead, these nations developed collective responses to security threats. Third, 
trading states recognize that in an interdependent world, they are unable to withdraw 
from IOs and regimes they have participated in without serious economic and political 
damages. As Rosecrance contends, “full independence and freedom o f action is not a 
realistic possibility for trading states in international politics."44
Instead these nations are constrained by the evolution of “settled norms" in 
international relations. Settled norms are those which require special justification to 
violate. In the international market economy, Gregory A. Raymond cites the norms, 
“contracts ought to be kept,” and “debts ought to be paid," as settled norms.45 These 
norms are accepted voluntarily by actors that perceive the norms and rules o f regimes as 
the optimum means by which to accomplish goals. If states can achieve their goals 
individualistically, with little costs, they avoid involvement in regimes.46 Hence the 
payoffs for acceptance of the constraints imposed by regimes must be considerable.
The results o f trading state cooperation are strengthened trade relations in 
Western Europe. In 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, 37 per cent of the 
exports of the European Union at twelve (EU 12) were intra-EU. By 1970 that 
percentage had risen to 53 per cent; and by 1991, it stood at 61 per cent. In addition,
44 Ibid., 129.
45Raymond, “Problems and Prospects,” 224.
46Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic 
World,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 117.
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since 1980, while the GDP of EU 12 states has risen some 2 .1 per cent per year, and 
growth for export outside the region has risen 1.1 per cent, intra-EU trade has increased 
at a rate of 4.2 per cent.47 Most significantly, through economics, the EU has managed to 
accomplish what it set out to do politically: “bury war.”48 Yet, these accomplishments 
have come with a price: increased constraints on autonomy.
Modem states derive their sovereignty in the international system from other 
states. Hence, “sovereignty is not an attribute of the state, but is attributed to the state 
by other states or state rulers.”49 Hedley Bull asserts that the principles of sovereignty 
rest on “the rule of non-intervention, the rule of the equality of states in respect of their 
basic rights, and the rights of states to domestic jurisdiction.”50 The modem 
international system is unique in that all states are recognized as having equal degrees of 
sovereignty. In the past, most international systems revolved around hegemons and 
client states. However, in the current system, despite differences in size, military power 
or economic capabilities, all states are granted exclusive authority to use coercion within
47Vincent Cable, “Key Trends in the European Economy and Future Scenarios,” 
in Redefining Europe'. Mew Patterns o f  Conflict and Cooperation, ed. Hugh Miali 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 90.
48Ibid.
49Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the 
Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 
(June 1995): 219; see also R. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International 
Organization 38 (1984): 225-286; and J. Miller, “Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for 
the State,” Review o f  International Studies 12 (1986): 284-301.
50Bull, The Anarchical Society, 37.
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territorial borders.51 As such, state sovereignty can be defined as ‘"the recognition by both 
internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene 
coercively in activities within its territory.'"52
State sovereignty in the modem era has two components; an internal element and 
an external element. The internal component o f sovereignty refers to the relationship 
between the state and civil society.53 It is the legitimation o f the central authority against 
competing domestic claimants. It gives the state a practical monopoly over the use of 
coercion and force over a specific territory and a given population. The state has “the 
undisputed right to determine the framework o f rules, regulations and policies within a 
given territory and to govern accordingly.”54 A government has internal sovereignty if  it 
has a monopoly of power over a range of social interactions, including the internal 
components of the state’s economy. This monopoly o f power is expressed through the 
domestic political structures that develop and enforce public policy. In economic terms,
5‘Thomson, 219.
52Ibid..
53Arthur A. Stein cites the internal dynamics and relationships o f a nationstate as 
the most common form of regime: “A regime exists when the interaction between the 
parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent decision making. Domestic 
society constitutes the most common regime. Even the freest and most open societies do 
not allow individualism and market forces full play; people are not free to choose from
among every conceivable option-their choice set is constrained Domestic society,
characterized by the agreement of individuals to eschew the use of force in settling 
disputes, constitutes a regime precisely because it constrains the behavior of its citizens; 
Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, 117.
54David Held and Anthony Mcgrew, “Globalization and the Liberal Democratic 
State,” Government and Opposition 28, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 265.
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internal sovereignty is expressed through state actions such as the collection of taxes or 
the regulation of the private sector.55
External sovereignty centers around the recognition of a state by other actors in 
the international system. Tt is based on delineated territory and mutual respect and 
recognition of other’s territory. As such, it centers around the relationships between 
actors in the international system. In an anarchical system, these relationships are 
defined by the absence o f a central authority and any effective governmental structure 
above the level of the nationstate. Realists concentrate on the environmental dimensions 
of anarchy and contend that this absence of international authority means that there is 
“no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of 
violence, to dominate or even destroy them.”36 Liberal institutionalists concentrate on the 
process of international relations as the context for interpreting interests and state 
behavior. As Keohane notes, realism “fails to pay sufficient attention to the institutions 
and patterns of interaction created by humans beings that help to shape perceptions and 
expectations, and therefore alter the patterns o f behavior that take place within a given 
structure.”57 Hence, the existence of anarchy does not entail “a denial that an
55Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “Global Public Policy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 
(November/December 1997): 129.
56Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, 38.
57Robert 0 , Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in The Economic 
Limits to Modern Politics, ed. J. Dunn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990), 175.
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international society-albeit a fragmented one~exists,” since “clearly, many international 
relationships continue over time, and engender stable expectations about behaviour.”58
External sovereignty is expressed in economic terms by the collection o f  tariffs 
and the manipulation of exchange rates/9 It can also be expressed through the use of 
economic coercion.60 Interdependence constrains the economic component of external 
sovereignty. As states become interdependent, they “recognize that the attempt to 
provide every service and fulfill every function o f statehood on an independent and 
autonomous basis is extremely inefficient, and they prefer a situation which provides for 
specialization and divisions o f labor among nations.”61 However, this division of labor 
among nations also increases the dependency of states, just as it dampens unilateralism. 
This reinforces state preferences for cooperation, and overtime, states pursue policies 
that increase cooperation. State preferences for cooperation, in turn, reinforce and 
propagate interdependence, so that the system moves closer to integration.
Over the past few years, an impressive body o f literature has surfaced which 
challenges the neorealist notion that states are unitary actors. These works assert that 
domestic considerations affect foreign policy decisions, and that the two are often
38Axelrod and Keohane, 226.
“ Reinicke, 129-30.
“ Economic coercion can be defined as “the imposition of economic pain by one 
government on another in order to attain some political goal. It is implemented, or at 
least initiated, by political authorities who thus intervene in the ‘normal’ operation of 
economic relations (whether those involve market, centrally planned, or mixed 
economies), and is often, but not always expressed through sanctions on imports or 
exports; Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, eds., Dilemmas o f  Economic Coercion: 
Sanctions in World Politics (New York: Praeger, 1983), 3.
61Rosecrance, Rise o f  the Trading Stale, 24.
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intertwined. Thus, there is an intersection between the manifestation of internal and 
external sovereignty. Peter Katzenstein asserts that “the main purpose of all strategies of 
foreign economic policy is to make domestic policy compatible with the international 
political economy.”62 David A. Baldwin contends that “economic statecraft” or “foreign 
economic policy” has begun to supplant the traditional emphasis on security-based 
diplomacy, as states promote their domestic economic interests.63 Robert Putnam best 
summarized the connections between foreign and domestic economic policy as a “two- 
level” game:
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived 
as a two level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At 
the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be 
ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain 
interdependent, yet sovereign.64
Hence, modem statesmen do not formulate policy in a vacuum. They have been
increasingly constrained in their policy options by domestic groups that can bring
significant political pressures and resources to the promotion of their interests.
Policymakers have also had to balance the potential costs of security policies and
62Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policy 
and Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978), 4.
63David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985),
29-50
^Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434.
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programs in regards to national economies and social spending.65 As a result, actions 
which may appear irrational will occur because endeavors which are rational at the 
international level may be “impolitic” at the domestic level, and thus may not be taken.66
The increasing importance of the global economy and global interdependence, 
combined with the heightened power o f domestic interests have forced developed states 
to abandon territorial expansion and military conquest as a means of accumulating 
relative gains. Instead these trading states have concentrated on increasing their share o f 
the world economy. Only in those states where economic output is based on the 
production of goods from land is territorial ambition still present. In states where 
capital, labor and technology are mobile and where they dominate the economy, market 
share has supplanted territorial acquisition. These states have become “virtual states.”67
The rise of such states is partially attributable to the emerging global economy.
In many industries, the complexity o f technology and both the costs and risks of 
production, have driven the scales o f the markets beyond the scope of a single 
nationstate and thus beyond national borders. The confines of a single nationstate are 
now too small to facilitate the competitive development and production of new 
technologies and new products.68 The scale o f new technologies and the mobility of the
t,5Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power,” 
International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 117.
^Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 436.
67 A virtual state is a “state that has downsized its territorially based production 
capability;” see Rosecrance, “Rise of the Virtual State,” 45- 46.
68Stephen J. Kobrin, “Beyond Symmetry: State Sovereignty in a Networked 
Global Economy,” Carnegie Bosch Institute: Working Paper 95-8 (New York: Carnegie 
Bosch Institute, 1995), 8.
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means of production are consolidating national markets into ever-expanding entities. 
Peter Dicken describes this phenomenon as a global economy which is based on “a 
degree of purpositive functional integration among geographically dispersed activities.”69
For most o f this century, trade was the primary means whereby the international 
economy was integrated. Beginning in the 1960s, the emergence of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) accelerated the rise of the trading state by internationalizing the 
means of production. Increasingly, however, transnational networks have replaced 
MNCs as the mode of organization of international trade.70 These networks are based on 
collective action where actors cease the pursuit of individualistic gain at the expense of 
other actors in exchange for access to collective gains. The linkage between actors in 
the network extends over time and is not based on individual or “spot” transactions.71 
Hence, by their very nature, networks are interdependent and involve some degree of 
loss o f individual control.
The gains from the development of such networks have come at the cost of lost 
autonomy for states. As Keohane and Nye point out, “From the foreign-policy 
standpoint, the problem facing individual governments is how to benefit from
69Peter Dicken, “The Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography. Global-Local 
Tensions: Firms and States in the Global Space-Economy,” Economic Geography 70 
(April 1994): 106.
70These networks usually take the form of corporate alliances or collaborative 
agreements between firms. These arrangements often operate outside o f market forces 
as corporations attract foreign capital through long-term contracts, licensing o f products 
and franchising. The result is an development of an increasingly global economy that 
operates with little regard for national borders. Presently, over 70 per cent of world 
trade is “intra-industry or intra-firm;” Reinicke, 128.
7IKobrin, 6.
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international exchange while maintaining as much autonomy as possible.”72 As these 
states compete to acquire relative gains by taking advantage of the international system, 
a problem arises for the global economic system: How can the international system 
“generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of 
competing efforts by governments (and non-governmental actors) to manipulate the 
system for their own benefit?”73
The relationship between a state’s public and private sectors has been altered by 
the emergence of global networks. Globalization has meant that national governments 
no longer monopolize the legitimate power over territories in which networks operate 
since the networks encompass multiple territories and respond to rules and norms that 
are arrived at a supranational level.74 In order to conduct multilateral trade 
arrangements on a reciprocal basis, states must “harmonize” domestic laws with 
international norms and practices. As such states have increasingly evolved into 
memberstates, in which they have traded traditional concepts o f sovereignty for access to 
greater collective goods through participation in institutions and international regimes. 
The evolution of the memberstate is most pronounced in Europe. As Miles Kahler 
points out, “whether defined as nation-states pooling sovereignty or a proto-federation, 
institution-building in the EU is more advanced than any other regional entity.”75 For
72Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 249.
73Ibid.
74Reinicke, 130.
75MiIes Kahler, Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations, (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 4.
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European states, this has occurred in both the economic and security fields as 
nationstates have subordinated individual autonomy to the pursuit of collective goods 
that national governments perceive can be gained from multilateral institutions.76
The memberstate is one that has subordinated aspects of autonomy to the 
international norms and rules through efforts to harmonize relationships with 
international regimes.77 The drive for harmonization can cause a regime’s norms and 
rules to be internalized by a state. This can occur in one of two ways. First, the lO’s or 
regime’s rules and norms can become fused with the ideals and values of various actors 
within the state.78 Domestic actors can use international norms to justify their own 
actions or to question the actions of another actor. Government’s may also use 
international rules to legitimize an unpopular decision. Second, a regime’s rules and 
norms can become amalgamated with a nation’s domestic political processes by being 
codified in domestic law. For instance, most American trade laws were developed in 
coordination with the evolution o f GATT tenets.79
76Joanne Gowa asserts that trade patterns and economic integration usually 
follow military relationships and alliances; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries and 
International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994).
770n  the ramifications of harmonization, see Axelrod, Emergence o f  
Cooperation, or more recently, Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the 
Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” 
International Organization 48 (Winter 1994): 107-30.
78John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining 
NATO Counter Force Levels,” International Organization 46 (Fall 1992): 838.
79Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “How Do International Institutions 
Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 453.
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The ability of domestic actors to utilize international regimes and norms is but 
one advantage of the memberstate. In exchange for constraints on individual autonomy, 
the state has much greater access to the public goods provided by international 
institutions. Thus, regimes provide incentives to modify behavior.80 In Western Europe, 
the economic regime (the EC/EU) which began as a means to facilitate economic 
cooperation has established norms that have transcended the market and emerged in the 
political, social and security aspects of the memberstates of the organization.81 In 
addition, organizations like the EU have substantially lowered transaction costs for 
individual states, and formalized the methods o f interaction.82 These regimes have also 
increased the amount of information available to all actors, and thus expanded the 
overall transparency of the international system.83 Regimes have also allowed states to 
take issues that were once considered to be domestic matters, such as immigration and 
social policies and internationalize them by establishing system-wide codes of conduct 
and uniform standards.84 Nonetheless, these benefits have come at a cost, and force a
80Farkas, 362.
8IThe EU has allowed for not only economic augmentation for memberstates, but 
it has also ameliorated the security dilemma. In this manner the regime has prevented 
security rivalries by directing economic competition into a set of regime norms; 
Schweller, 92.
82Raymond, 214.
“ Frederick Bonkovsky, International Norms and National Policy (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmens, 1980), 53-79; also Edna Ullmann-Margalit, “The Revision o f Norms,” 
Ethics 100 (July 1990): 756-67.
“ Kahler, 64-65.
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reappraisal of the state’s traditional role. Rosecrance offers a good summation of the
state’s changing role
The flow of international factors of production-technology, capital and 
labor-wili swamp the stock of economic power at home. The state will 
become just one of many players in the international marketplace and will 
have to negotiate directly with foreign factors o f production to solve 
domestic economic problems. Countries must induce foreign capital to 
enter their domain. To keep such investment, national economic 
authorities will need to maintain low inflation, rising productivity, a 
strong currency, and a flexible and trained work force, These demands 
will sometimes conflict with domestic interests that want more 
government spending, larger budget deficits, and more benefits.85
In the post World War II era, nationstates have been increasingly curbed in their 
individualistic pursuit of goals and payoffs by the proliferation o f IOs and regimes and 
the internalization o f international norms and rules into domestic societies. The modem 
nationstate that arose after the Treaty of Westphalia to dominate international relations 
has begun to undergo significant evolutions in purpose and sovereignty. States have 
traditionally been based on territorial factors. Increasingly, however, state participation 
in the global economy has led to integration with that economy and, consequently an 
increased degree o f interdependence among states. The result has been the rise of 
trading states which measure themselves by their relative shares of the global economy 
and not territorial size or military power.
The pervasiveness of economic interdependence has constrained both internal 
and external state sovereignty. States must harmonize internal policies to conform with 
the expectations needed for participation in international institutions and regimes. In 
addition, the growing power of domestic actors has forced decision makers to be more
85Rosecrance, “Rise of the Virtual State,” 60.
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cognizant of the domestic audience, and has led to the phenomenon of two-level games, 
in which domestic considerations impact on international relations and vice-versa.86 At 
the same time, participation in IOs and regimes constrain a state’s external sovereignty 
by limiting policy choices and enforcing compliance with international obligations.
This erosion o f the traditional conceptions of state sovereignty has been 
accelerated by a combination of the increased power of international regimes and 
domestic forces, and the increased mobility of capital and labor. These factors have led 
to the development of what Richard Rosecrance has termed the virtual state.87 Yet even 
as this combination of factors has constrained state sovereignty in several areas, it has 
also augmented the power of the state in other spheres. The memberstate has evolved as 
an enhanced nationstate that has access to greater resources than any political unit had in 
the past, with the exception of the empire. Significantly, unlike the empire, the 
memberstate has the means to retain the loyalty and favor of its citizenry. In addition, 
the memberstate has an enhanced variety of capabilities that it has accrued as a result of 
pooling its sovereignty and resources with other members of international bodies. In 
exchange for the constraints placed upon individual states by international regimes and 
the global economy, states have greater access to private goods, capital and labor, and 
public goods such as the free market. In addition, cooperative or collaborative efforts 
between states produce enhanced capabilities and greater relative gains. The process of
^For example, Italy and Great Britain left the European exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM) in 1992 in response to domestic currency considerations; Peter B. 
Kenen, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving Beyond Maastricht 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995), 6.
87Rosecrance, “Rise of the Virtual State,” 46.
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harmonization between states’ domestic norms and rules and international norms and 
rules, has provided domestic actors with justification to pursue what might otherwise be 
unpopular domestic programs.
In the end, the states that suffer the most in the increasingly interdependent 
global system are those states that attempt to maintain autarky and do not pursue 
multilateralism. These states risk being shutout of a variety of gains, and losing the 
potential benefits accrued by the mobility capital and labor in the global economy. For 
those states integrated in the new economy, the nationstate itself is actually taking on 
increasing importance, albeit in new ways. For it is only the nationstate that has the 
resources and capabilities to set and enforce the policies necessary to attract foreign 
capital and industry or technology. It is also only the nationstate/memberstate that the 
power to pursue favorable economic policies abroad. Through participation in IOs and 
regimes, the nationstate gives a voice in the international economy to domestic interests, 
and can attempts to influence the establishment of rules and norms that benefit those 
interests. Hence, the nationstate continues to occupy a central role in international 
politics, but it is a changing role that requires national governments to more effectively 
combine the internal and external elements of sovereignty in the pursuit of national 
interests.
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CHAPTER IV 
WESTERN EUROPE’S SECURITY REGIME
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European 
Union (WEU) collectively form a security regime in Western Europe. As this regime 
has evolved and patterns of cooperation have been institutionalized, there has 
consequently been less need for states to pursue their own unilateral security policies. 
States have internalized not only the specific rules o f the regime, but also the regime’s 
norms.1 In Western Europe, the existing security' regime has ameliorated traditional 
security threats, that is direct military invasion or attack, by extending the public good of 
security to all of the memberstates. These states have increasingly concentrated on 
economic well-being, to the point that even those states with security interests outside of 
Europe, mainly Great Britain and France, have combined their security policies with 
their economic policies through weapons sales and arms transfers so that the line 
between economic and strategic interests has been significantly diminished. As a result, 
of their economic pursuits, most of the states o f Western Europe have evolved into 
trading states, and begun the transformation into virtual states.
On a collective level, there has also developed a regional society of states.
Hedley Bull asserts that an international society' (or a society of states) "exists when a 
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules
lMuller, “Internalization,” 383.
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in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’*2 
The society of states that developed in Western Europe has created a degree of 
cooperation and interdependence that is unmatched elsewhere in the world. This 
chapter will examine the main features that underlie the current system of collective 
security in Europe, and what impact this regime has on the security policies of 
nationstates. Specifically, the main characteristics of security regimes, such as alliances, 
and the attributes o f a collective security system, will be measured against the current 
security system in Europe. In addition, the role of the United States will be explored in 
its impact on European integration. Finally, the effects of the current system will be 
examined in light o f the constraints and benefits that nationstates gain from membership.
IOs and regimes can temper international anarchy by establishing rules and 
norms which constrain a state’s individualistic pursuit of power by promoting 
cooperation and collaboration.3 This is especially significant in the security sphere.4 In 
an anarchical world, a state's primary goal is survival.5 In order to secure this goal, 
states seek power, both as a means and as an end, and often pursue military' means to
2BulL The Anarchial Society', 13.
3See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 5, 42-47.
4D. Scott Bennett describes security as “the drive for self preservation,” and asserts 
that “true security is obtained by ensuring that the territorial and political boundaries of 
the homeland and ‘vital’ territory cannot be changed by others;” D. Scott Bennett, 
“Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry',” International Studies Quarterly 
40, no. 2 (June 1996): 163.
5See Waltz, International Politics, chapter 4.
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secure or increase relative power and ensure security.6 This pursuit o f security through 
enhancements of power are complicated by the security dilemma. Since it is difficult to 
distinguish between offensive and defensive military preparations, any sort of military 
build-up can be perceived as threatening to neighboring states, thus leading to the 
security dilemma in which improvements in one state's military capabilities prompt 
reciprocal improvements in other state's capabilities causing either a net loss in security 
or at least no real increase, for the original state. This is especially significant if actors 
believe that the key to victory is a first or preemptive strike.' For a security regime to be 
successful, several preconditions must be met. First, the great powers must want it.
Second, mutual security and cooperation must be a value or norm shared by all actors 
involved. Third, actors must not believe that security is best achieved through expansion 
of territory. Fourth, the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.
In addition to the security dilemma, security regimes are especially difficult to 
establish and maintain for several reasons. First, security matters comprise a much 
higher level of competitiveness than do other areas, including economics. In the 
economic realm, one state's gains do not necessarily translate into another state's losses.
In fact, economic gains by one state can prove beneficial to others. In security matters, 
however, one state's gains usually come at the expense of another's, whether it be in 
terms of direct territorial loss or through losses in relative security. Second, as pointed 
out, the inability to effectively distinguish between offensive and defensive motives
6Hedley Bull, ‘"The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs,” in Toward a Just World 
Order, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul Mendlovitz (Boulder: Westview,
1982), 64.
'Jervis, ‘•Cooperation,” ! 86-214.
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leads states to respond to both types o f behavior in the same manner. Third, small error's 
in security matters can have much larger consequences than minor errors in economic or 
geopolitical terms. Fourth, in the security realm, measuring one’s own security and 
detecting what others are doing is difficult. This leads to a much greater sense of 
uncertainty in the security realm. As Robert Jervis asserts, "The primacy of security, its 
competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much 
security the state needs and has, all compound the prisoners’ dilemma and make it 
sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas.’’8
Balance of power systems and military alliances can encourage states to work 
together to achieve common gains, usually either the prevention of, or the maintenance 
of hegemony, or the preservation of the current international system.9 Such cooperation 
usually takes one of two forms: band wagoning or balancing.10 Bandwagoning refers to 
the phenomenon by wliich lesser states ally themselves with potential hegemons if it 
appears these actors will 'Vvin”: hence the lesser powers attempt to acquire a portion of 
the gains. Balancing, is the tendency of states to form alliances to prevent hegemony or 
to "balance” against it.11 By balancing, states are more capable of preventing the
8Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner 
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1983), 175-76.
9See Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in 
Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989); or Alexander 
George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991).
l0SchweUer, 72-73.
“ See Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, chap. 5; John Gerard Ruggie argues that 
states will bandwagon only up to a certain point. If it becomes apparent that a potential 
hegemon will succeed in its hegemonal bid, even bandwagoning states will balance
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emergence o f a hegemonic power. States join or defect to the weaker coalition in order 
to stifle attempts at universal hegemony.12
Alliances are the most common form o f state cooperation on security issues.
They form when states find it in their interests to collaborate for security reasons, and 
there is no external body which can otherwise ameliorate conflict. Alliances permit 
states that have a power or territorial inequality to compensate for that deficiency 
through cooperation. In other words, “security arrangements between states are 
mechanisms for aggregating the capabilities o f states in situations in which individually 
the states have inadequate capability to deal with threats that confront them. In fact, the 
scale required to generate the capability to assure survival often exceeds that o f anyone 
state, so that cooperation becomes necessary."13 As Edward Gulick summarized, “States 
A and B might each be smaller and weaker than C, but allied they might well be equal 
to, or greater than, C."14 Stephen Walt defines alliances as “a formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."15 Glenn 
Snyder refines this definition by describing alliances as “formal associations o f states for
against it to prevent world domination; Ruggie, “Continuity," 42.
l2Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, .Arms 
Control and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 12.
l3Katja Weber, “Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to 
International Security Cooperation," International Studies Quarterly 41. no. 2 (June 
1997): 326.
l4Gulick, 61.
15 Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, 12.
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the use (or non-use) o f military force, intended for either the security aggrandizement of 
their members, against specific other states.”16
What is central to alliance formation and performance is the degree o f external 
threat allayed against the alliance. Alliances focus almost exclusively on external 
security threats. The total security threat balanced against an alliance is known as the 
"threat quotient.”17 This measures the sum total of the threat that the alliance is 
balanced against. Alliances are much more likely to retain cohesion and survive against 
larger threat quotients, than against small or inconsequential threats. In addition, the 
stronger the threat quotient, the more resistant the alliance is to member shifts and 
defections. Alliances which face weak threat quotients are subject to diplomatic 
revolutions which significantly alter the complexion of the alliance, and often the 
balance of power of the international system itself.18
Alliances benefit states in several ways. Robert Jervis argues that states can 
become "positively" linked through participation in an alliance, as opposed to becoming 
“negatively interdependent/'19 Common goals lead these states to cooperate over a wide 
range of issues, and give each state a stake in maintaining the relative well-being o f other
16Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,"’ International Affairs 44 
(Spring 1990): 104.
1 Michael W. Doyle, "Balancing Power Classically: An Alternative to Collective 
Security?” in Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 158.
18Doyle cites as examples, the shifts in the 1750s of alliances between London and 
Vienna to London and Paris, and between Paris and Berlin to Paris and Vienna; Doyle,
159.
19Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” 67.
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states within the alliance. Decision makers may develop significant ties with their 
opposites in alliance memberstates so that they wish their opposites to remain in power 
and, in fact, work towards that goal.20 In addition, transactions between states may 
become institutionalized, thereby lowering transaction costs.21 Most often, this 
cooperation is the result of a successful war against a hegemonic power, and the alliance 
members perceive it to be in their mutual interest to continue cooperation in order to 
ensure that the hegemonic power does not reassert itself.22 Which leads to the most 
significant benefit that alliances provide-they give states the collective ability to check 
hegemony.23
The nature o f alliances, with their focus on external security threats, led these 
types of structures to be relatively short-lived and is subject to simple disruptions.
Individual states begin to value cooperation less and relative gains more and may 
therefore defect from the alliance in order to maximize power. A state may make its 
own hegemonal bid, or may use coercion on weaker partners.24 A state may also be 
tempted to undertake a war of territorial expansion against a former partner. Peter 
Liberman asserts that states may be tempted to engage in a war of aggression because o f
20Jervis describes this as being one form o f ‘'altruism,” through which "each of the 
allies come to value its partners’ well being-not only for the greater contribution to the 
common good, but as an end in itself;” ibid.
2IGilpin, War and Change, 27.
“ Jervis, "From Balance to Concert,” 67.
^Gulick, 61.
240n  the benefits of using coercion to exploit weaker states, see Thomas C. Schelling, 
Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University', 1966): 1-34.
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three factors: 1) increased economic surpluses; 2) modernization has increased the 
coercive resources of states and therefore eases the implementation o f  a centralized 
authority; and 3) repression of modem societies is relatively low cost because of the 
threat of economic losses." In addition, if a state perceives that one or more of its 
alliance partners may defect, that state will often defect first in order to forestall relative 
losses.26
The further a state moves away from autonomy in security matters and the closer 
it moves toward structured relationships with other states, the more restrictive that 
state’s security options become. Katja Weber defines this phenomenon as 
“bindingness”—”the curtailment of sovereignty in exchange for greater 
institutionalization.”27 Bindingness occurs because as states surrender autonomy in 
security matters to a regime, exiting or defecting from that regime becomes increasingly 
costly. Alliances are the security regimes that are least binding, and confederations are
25Liberman uses the German occupation of Europe during World War II and the 
Soviet actions during the Cold War to support his contentions over the potential gains of 
conquest. For instance, Germany was able to extract some 30 percent of French GNP; 
over 40 percent of Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian GNP, and 25 percent o f Czech GNP 
during the war, at a relatively minor cost. In addition, the Soviets were able to extract 
initially 33 percent of East Germany’s GNP, although this figure later fell to 18 percent. 
Even when the costs of maintaining the 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany are 
factored in, the total costs of occupation for the Soviet Union were only one quarter of 
the gains; Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest,” International Security 18, no. 2 
(Fall 1993): 136-39.
“ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane use game theory to probe this issue. They 
conclude that if all states continue cooperation they would be better off, however, if 
defection occurs, the first state to defect gains the most. This creates incentives for 
individual states to be the first to defect if they perceive weaknesses in the structure of 
the alliance; Axelrod and Keohane, 229.
27Weber, 322.
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regimes that are the most binding. Examples o f alliances include ententes and 
nonaggression pacts. An example o f a confederation would be the failed European 
Defense Community (EDC) of the 1950s or the current proposals for a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU. While alliances are "a formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”28 
confederations involve ”a deliberate banding together of states to create a central, 
permanent, statelike political structure that is capable of acting like a state, yet is not a 
single state but a union o f states.”29 The major differences between alliances and 
confederations involve the degree of sovereignty that the individual state is willing to 
relinquish to the security regime. Under both types of regimes, states retain some degree 
of autonomy, but they possess far more in an alliance than they do in a confederation. 
Between the constraints o f the confederation and the looseness of the alliance lies the 
formal alliance. A formal alliance entails the institutionalization of the security regime 
and the implementation o f formal norms and rules. .An example of a formal alliance 
would be NATO or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The range of security 
regimes thus resembles a continuum with alliances at one end, formal alliances in the 
middle, and confederations at the other.30
In order for a security regime of any type to succeed, several preconditions must 
be met. First, the great powers must want to establish it, and then must work to maintain 
the system. This means that the major states must be relatively satisfied with the status
“ See Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, 12.
“ Weber, 322.
30Ibid.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
91
quo. Otherwise the risk of defection increases and often coercion is needed to maintain 
the regime. Second, states must believe that other actors value cooperation and mutual 
security. More often than not, this is not possible because of the tendency o f decision­
makers to overestimate the aggressiveness of other states.31 Third, states must not 
believe that security is best secured through expansion. Fourth, and finally, states must 
perceive that military conflict and the individualistic quest for security is costly, and that 
the most efficient means for securing stability* and preserving the status quo is through 
cooperation.32
These conditions existed in Western Europe during the Cold War and continue to 
be present currently. By the 1950s, the security relationship between the superpowers 
had evolved into a stable system that spurred the creation of a security regime in Western 
Europe that met the security requirements of the individual memberstates and was able 
to withstand a number of crises. Many, led by Kenneth N. Waltz, also point to the 
bipolar nature of the European system during the Cold War as an indicator o f stability. 
Waltz argues that multipolar systems are themselves inherently unstable. Tire greater the 
number of actors within a system, the greater the uncertainty about actors’ intentions.
This uncertainty" increases tensions since states usually assume the worst about others’ 
actions and intentions.33 In addition, Waltz contends that the simplicity" within a bipolar 
system increases cooperation by making it easier for the two blocks to cooperate by
31Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 73-75.
32Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 111-19.
33Kenneth N, Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93 (Summer
1964): 890.
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lessening the complexities of negotiations. By facilitating cooperation, tire simplicity of 
bipolar systems prevents misunderstanding that could potentially lead to conflict.34
However, evidence also demonstrates that multipolar systems are stable. The 
more actors that are in a given system, the greater the ability to shift alliances and form 
counterbalances to potential hegemons. In addition, in a multipolar sy stem, states are 
not locked into two rigid, opposing blocks that may go to system-wide war over minor 
incidents.35 In addition, the uncertainty created by a greater number of actors within a 
given system may actually decrease the potential for conflict since such uncertainty will 
lead to increased caution by all actors.36 In the end, the most significant determinant 
about a system's stability is the degree of relative change over time.3' If there is 
continuity in the system, and states are able to form lasting relationships with other 
states, then the degree of uncertainty- is lessened whether the system is bipolar or 
unipolar.
Hence the European system that evolved after World War II was stable, not 
because it was bipolar, and not solely because of the presence of nuclear weapons, but 
because there was little change among the states within the system.38 In addition, the
34Ibid.
35John Lewis Gaddis uses the First World War to illustrate this point; Gaddis, 23.
36Michael Howard, “1989: A Farewell to Arms?'’ International Affairs 65, no. 3 
(Summer 1988): 412-13.
37Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration 
of War,” The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 22, no. 2 (June 1978): 247.
38Alan James, “The Equity o f States: Contemporary Manifestations o f an Ancient 
Doctrine,” Review o f  International Studies 18, no. 3 (October 1992): 390.
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two rival blocs could be viewed as essentially defensive alliances designed to ensure the 
status quo. The presence of nuclear weapons made both sides risk aversive, hence the 
states involved undertook efforts to preserve the status quo, rather than attempting to 
achieve relative gains through territorial expansion.39
Alliance systems focus almost exclusively on outside threats and concentrate on 
cooperative measures to promote security that external to the members of the alliance.
In contrast to alliances, collective security regimes promote internal security, that is 
security within the regime or system. Collective security can be defined in a number of 
ways, but the consensus definition is ‘‘the collective commitment o f a group to hold its 
members accountable for the maintenance of an internal security norm.*’110 For collective 
security systems, the emphasis is self-regulation. Hence, collective security can also be 
conceptualized thus: “a group o f states attempts to reduce security’ threats by agreeing to 
collectively punish any member state that violates the system’s norms.”41 It rests on the 
principle of all against one and deters aggression by ensuring that states which defect 
form the regime or violate the regime's norms will be met by a coalition that has 
preponderant force."’2 This internal focus of collective security systems is one feature
39For an examination of whether offensive or defensive alliances are more likely to go 
to war, see Ibid., 194-99.
40George \V. Downs, “Beyond the Debate on Collective Security,” in Collective 
Security Beyond the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1994), 2.
41 George W. Downs and Keisuke Iida, “Assessing the Theoretical Case Against 
Collective Security,” in Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 18.
42Kupchan, “Collective Security,” 43.
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that differentiates them from alliances. In addition, alliances are much less likely to 
have self-regulatory measures to prevent conflict among member states. Collective 
security regimes usually have provisions which limit the size o f members’ military 
forces and arms production in an effort to ameliorate the security dilemma and forestall 
conflict within the regime.'13
The failure o f the League of nations to stop Japanese or Italian aggression in the 
1920s and 1930s, cast a pall over the concept o f collective security and led many realist 
critics to dismiss the idea as unworkable.4"1 In general, critics have posited three major 
reasons why collective security organizations cannot work.45 The first major criticism of 
collective security' is that it necessitates a relatively equal distribution of power in a 
system with no hegemon.46 Such diffusion o f power is almost impossible since the 
economic and military' power of states grows at differing rates. As some states gain 
economic and military power, in relative terms, other states lose it. This leads to basic 
realignments within the system, and to the growth of hegemonic powers.4. States that
43Downs and Iida, 18.
"“See, for instance, Betts, 5-43.
45George Downs and Keisuke Iida identify six theoretical arguments against collective 
security: ’T) Collective security requires a substantial diffusion of power; 2) Variation in 
assessment o f threats dramatically limits the range and efficacy of collective security-; 3)
The free-rider problem jeopardizes any collective security agreement; 4) Collective 
security7 cannot survive in the absence of an outside threat; 5) Collective security requires 
states to commit themselves to an inflexible course of action that is insensitive to context 
and self-interest; and 6) The logic of collective security is circular in the sense that its 
establishment requires that its consequence already exist; Downs and Iida, 36.
46Ibid.
47Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion,”10. See also Kennedy, especially the introductory 
chapter.
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gain relative advantages over other states in the system are likely to increase their 
ambitions and attempt to increase their control over their external environment.'48 The 
dynamics of the security dilemma further compound this problem, since relative gains by 
one state can be perceived as potential threats by another.
The second leading criticism of collective security, is that variations in threat 
assessments by different states constrain the effectiveness and range of options of 
collective security systems. Threat disparencies are especially significant since states 
can perceive actions differently. Actions which appear threatening to one state may be 
perceived to be of no consequence to another state. As George Downs points out, ‘‘What 
is a vital interest for one state may be of no concern for another.”49 States which 
perceive a threat to be of significant importance will be willing to undertake much more 
substantial actions than states that perceive a threat to be relatively minor. This 
disparency in threat perception may prevent unanimity' in action, or general agreement 
on action. This is especially crucial since the principle of ”all for one” upon which 
collective security is based, demands that all states consider aggression of the threat of 
aggression as the ultimate transgression, against which all other values and interests are 
overshadowed. However, if states do not value the norms of the regime above their own 
interests, they will be tempted to defect from the regime rather than subsume their 
national interests for the sake of the system. In a moment of truth, states may not line up
48Gilpin, War and Change, 94-95.
49Downs and Iida, 24.
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against an aggressor state, but may instead “bipolarize” and ally themselves with 
whichever state is most likely to afford them relative gains and further their interests.50
The final argument against collective security revolves around the problem of 
free-riders. In a collective security arrangement, states may be inclined to allow other 
states to assume the responsibility, and therefore the costs, o f dealing with or guarding 
against threats and thus "free-riding."51 These states are able to share in tire public good 
of security without incurring the costs associated with producing it.52 Since some states 
tend to overpay to maintain these public goods and the status quo in general, free riders 
are able to devote a higher degree of their resources in the pursuit of individual goals and 
interests. This produces relative gains for the free-riders and may initiate the security 
dilemma, or, if a single powerful state has been responsible for the distribution of public 
goods, it may lead to an "imperial overstretch."53 Paul Kennedy asserts that hegemonic
50 Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe,” Survival 34, no. 1 
(Spring 1992): 39.
51 Michael Hechter summarized the phenomenon of free-riders from a utilitarian 
perspective in the following manner: "Rational self-interest actors will not join large 
organizations to pursue collective goods when they can reap the benefit of other people's 
activity to pursue those ends. This means that the rational actor in the utilitarian model 
will always be a free rider whenever given the opportunity;” Michael Hechter, "Karl 
Polanyf s Social Theory: A Critique,” Politics and Society 10, no. 4 (Falll981): 403.
52Public goods are those commodities that can be consumed on a universal basis 
without individual contributions or control. Paul A. Samuelson defines them as goods 
"which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a 
good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good; ’’Paul 
A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review o f  Economics and 
Statistics 36 (1954): 387. Examples of public goods would include free trade or security*. 
The seminal work on public goods is; Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic o f  Collective Action: 
Public Goods and the Theory o f  Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1965).
53Kennedy, 515.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
97
or primaiy powers inevitably develop an imbalance This theory held that hegemons 
inevitably develop an imbalance between their commitments and capabilities. Since 
hegemons provide the world with stability, they unintentionally allow' other states to rise 
to challenge the dominant power. As these rising states seek to secure their own security 
by enlarging or improving their capabilities, they inevitably gain against the hegemon in 
relative terms because they are not forced to shoulder the same commitments that the 
hegemon does. The result is hegemonic decline. As the hegemon spends more on 
defense, it takes resources away from its economy which causes further relative losses 
versus potential challengers.54 Tire hegemon is doomed to continue its overstretch 
because as it attempts to maintain its lead over its rivals, it continues to spend 
significantly more on defense in order to maintain its dominant world position. The 
result is not only instability within the system or regime, but the potential for break up.
Proponents of collective security refute these arguments and assert that collective 
security offers states far more benefits than other forms of security regimes, including 
alliances and balance of power systems. Collective security systems provide both the 
incentives and the means by which cooperation can take place in an anarchical world. In 
this way, collective security ameliorates the security dilemma, and hence provides 
additional benefits which balancing or bandwagoning do not. To the contention that 
collective security requires a diffusion o f power, Downs and Iida point out that the 
presence o f a hegemonic power, while not meeting the archetypical assumptions of 
collective security, can in fact facilitate the formation and maintenance o f such a
54Ibid., 515.
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system.55 Hegemons improve the outlook for a collective security system because these 
powerful states are able to assume a leadership within the system. Hegemons increase 
the probability that a stale that violates the system’s norms will be punished, and that 
memberstates that refuse to punish violators will themselves be punished.56
While some assert that collective security exists only when it is not needed, that 
when the conditions of a state system are such that cooperation is valued and anarchy is 
mitigated through international norms, collective security systems can in fact aid in the 
formation of the conditions which make its existence iess necessary. .As Charles 
Kupchan contends, “a collective security system, by building on and promoting the 
political compatibility that makes such an institution possible, may perpetuate and make 
more durable a peaceful and desirable international setting.”57 IOs and regimes, 
including collective security systems, foster cooperation by established the norms and 
rules that direct, and in some cases constrain, state behavior, all the while increasing 
collaboration and coordination of policy among states. These institutions also provide 
predictability about other state’s future behavior based on past compliance or 
noncompliance with regime norms. In this way, states develop patterns of cooperation 
because they assume other states will reciprocate.58
55Downs and Iida, 22-23.
56Downs and Iida cite these factors as examples of how hegemonic powers can aid 
collective security systems; Ibid. Their arguments echo Robert O. Keohane’s work on 
hegemonic cooperation and hegemonic stability theory; see Keohane, After Hegemony, 
especially Chapter 8, “Hegemonic Cooperation in the Postwar Era.”
5'Kupchan, 49.
58Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (1985): 234.
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Charles Kupchan, writing about the potential for collective security systems to 
promote cooperation cites four specific ways in which this occurs. First, these systems 
improve the flow of information between memberstates, thereby increasing the 
transparency of the system. By distributing information on individual nations’ military 
forces and structures, collective security systems ameliorate the security dilemma by 
differentiating between defensive and offensive military preparations and by 
encouraging mainly defensive military preparations. Second, institutions intensity- the 
costs of defection from a regime by formalizing the measures that are taken in the event 
of such an action.59 Third, these systems increase the potential for international 
agreements to be reached by providing linkage forums to bring together disparate issues. 
Since IOs and regimes lower the transaction costs of bargaining, they reduce the cost 
associated with future negotiations. Fourth, “institutions hold the potential to promote 
interstate socialization, to transform a “minimum of political solidarity” into an 
international community in which states share similar values and normative 
orientations.”60
Through the promotion of cooperation, collective security- has two main 
advantages over balancing. It strengthens the likelihood a coalition will form to resist 
aggression since states commit themselves to a specified course of action to be
59Kupchan defines defection as taking one of two forms: either an act o f formal 
aggression against another memberstate; or the refusal to engage in collective action 
against aggression. The measure taken in the event of defection are detailed by a 
“punishment regime” which formalizes the responses to defection by outlining the 
specific punishments that defectors face; Kupchan, 50.
“ Ibid, p. 51; see also John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and 
Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44 (1990): 283-316.
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undertaken in the event o f such aggression. Because of punishment regimes and 
developed patterns o f cooperation, states are more likely to fulfill their commitments to 
the regime.61 In this way, regimes can “lock-in cooperation” and intensify the 
cooperative habits that led to their development.62 Hence, collective security reduces the 
uncertainty associated with balancing under anarchy. Collective security’s other major 
advantage over balancing is that is enhances the identification of potential aggressor 
states. Since collective security facilitates transparency, states have much less of an 
ability to develop significant offensive capabilities without being detected.
Furthermore, since collective security systems usually involve some limitations or 
mutually arrived at force limitations, any military build-up could be detected before it 
reached a level by which the aggressor state could overpower the system’s collective 
response.63 This fiirther ameliorates the potential for the development of the security 
dilemma.
In the spectrum o f security regimes, which range from informal alliances to 
confederations, collective security organizations emerge as the institutions which offer 
states the greatest potential benefits, while still maintaining a considerable degree of 
autonomy. When threats emerge in the international system, states usually adopt one of
61Under collective security systems, states have both rewards and potential 
punishments as incentives for cooperation. Punishments are implemented by the 
punishment regime, while rewards come in the form o f payoffs from cooperation and the 
potential for future cooperation: Anatol Rappaport and Albert Chammah, Prisoner's 
Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan,
1965), 235.
“ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” 
International Organization 41 (1987): 385.
“ Kupchan, 45-46.
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three responses: 1) “hiding”-withdrawing into isolation and avoiding confrontation; 2) 
Balancing against the threat by forming alliances or coalitions; and 3) “Co- 
option”-persuading the potential aggressor state to return to the normal pattern of 
behavior or the status quo.64 Hiding is a suboptimal response since a state relinquishes 
any ability to influence future events. Balancing may be the efficient response to direct 
aggression, but after the defeat o f the threat, these coalitions often lose their cohesion. 
Co-option provides a means by which to prevent conflict and promote future 
cooperation, all the while rehabilitating aggressor states into the status quo. Collective 
security provides the most efficient means with which to co-opt states into international 
systems. Some of the more notable examples of co-option include the rehabilitation of 
France after the Napoleonic Wars and the reintegration of the Federal Republic of 
Germany into the West after World War II.65
The current security regime in Western Europe had its genesis in a defensive 
alliance against Germany. It then evolved into a coalition, based on balance of power 
principled and arrayed against an external threat to the continent, and has culminated in 
a collective security system. For West Europe three issues have formed the core of 
security concerns in the Cold War era: 1) The place of Germany in the European state 
system: 2) The Soviet threat; and 3) The role of the United States in European security.
“̂ Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, “Balancing, Stability, and War: The 
Mysterious Case o f the Napoleonic International System,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 480.
65It should be noted that in both cases the co-option o f these states involved the 
“rehabilitation” o f the states after their defeat in hegemonic bids. These efforts were 
undertaken in order to avert future conflict and maintain the relative stability of the 
contemporary system of states.
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The current security system in postwar Europe began with the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947, 
an essentially anti-German, Anglo-French alliance. The formation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization formalized an anti-Soviet transatlantic coalition of the West’s 
democracies. Through the machinations of the European Defense Community (EDC), 
this coalition would evolve into an arrangement which both brought the Federal 
Republic into the fold o f Western Europe and which firmly tied the United States into 
the framework of European security through the West European Union (WEU)/NATO 
relationship.66 By 1955, the central questions of European security, which revolved 
around German rearmament, the potential for Soviet aggression and .America's 
commitment to the continent, had been settled as a result of two institutions, NATO, and 
the WEU which provided the bridge for German entrance into NATO.
European institutionalism also developed along economic lines. Beginning with 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and preceding with the European 
Community (EC), West European nations developed an “economic alliance” to help 
them fend off the external threat posed by Soviet communism, and to manage the 
potential internal threat posed by a resurgent Germany.67 The genesis for European 
economic integration was the Marshall Plan which called for the Europeans to 
collectively develop a thorough recovery plan that was based on shared responsibility. It 
also called for the establishment of permanent institutions to oversee the implementation 
o f the plan. The United States played a coordinating role in these efforts through the
^On the negotiations surrounding the failed EDC and the ramifications o f the 
proposals, see Furdson.
67VanIiam, 191.
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offices of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and its country missions and the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).68 Flence the United States assumed a 
leadership role in prompting European integration, both on the economic and security 
spheres.
In the post-Word War II era, multilateralism has been a consistent feature of 
American foreign policy—a feature that has handsomely rewarded the United States.69 In 
establishing the institutions that laid the framework for postwar multilateralism, the 
United States only pushed for the creation of IOs and regimes which reflected or served 
American interests. Most of the major postwar institutions reflected the U.S. interest in 
either free and open trade or collective security. Moreover, the United States often 
limited the independence of these institutions by giving itself either veto powrer, as in the 
case of the UN, or disproportionate voting power, as in the IMF. '0 Furthermore, these 
postwar IOs helped establish the legitimacy of the .American hegemony. John Dcenberry 
and Charles Kupchan contend that “rightful rule emerges if the hegemon is able to 
induce smaller powers to buy into its vision of international order and to accept as their 
own—in short, to internalize and embrace—the principles and norms espoused by the 
hegemon.*'71 This is exactly what the United States has been able to accomplish in the 
postwar period. American hegemony was in most ways by invitation. With the
^See Charles S. Maier, "Flegemony and Autonomy Within the Western Alliance," in 
The Cold War in Europe, ed. Charles S. Maier (New York: Markus Wiener, 1991), 158.
69Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 28-29.
70Ibid, 25-26.
71 Ikenberry and Kupchan, 151.
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exception o f some very glaring aberrations, most notably in Latin America, the states 
that fell under American hegemony found themselves much better off in comparison to 
those states under Soviet hegemony. This preference for American hegemony was 
reflected by the institutionalization of U.S. interests—again, free trade, democracy and 
collective security.
Through the proliferation of IOs and regimes that reflect its preferences,
American primacy is secure because the United States does not need as much power as it 
did.72 By promoting the pillars of the present major systems in the world, .America has 
made sure its interests coincide in many ways with the broad interests of most major IOs 
and regimes: free trade: democracy: and multilateralism. This offers the United States 
the ability to share some o f its hegemonal burdens without a significant loss o f power.
This is especially true in those international organizations in which the U.S. assumes a 
large proportion of the costs o f the body.73
In fact, the current strength and diversity of international organizations are a 
direct result o f U.S. foreign policy choices at the end of World War EL American 
choices reflected an attempt to limit the anarchical nature o f international relations by 
prodding the world to be more like the United States.7*1 Americans have always 
associated democracy and free trade with peace; consequently, after containment, the
^Henry Nau, The Myth o f  America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 
1990s (New York: Oxford University, 1990), 9-10.
^On the tendency for states which earn' a large percentage of the burdens of an 
international institution to press their strategic preferences and use the organizations to 
their advantage, see Snyder, 113.
7i,See Maier.
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three broad goals of American foreign policy in tire postwar era were the promotion of 
free trade, democracy and collective security.75 These were seen originally as means to 
prevent a third world war and to promote stability. The pursuit o f this stability opened 
up vast markets for U.S. products at the same time that it provided economic benefits for 
the states that fell under America's sway. All of the states that embraced the main U.S. 
tenants of free trade, democracy and collective security' experienced phenomenal 
economic growth during the Cold-War period. 16
At the same time, America allows considerable leeway in its hegemony. Simply 
examine the case of Franco-American relations during the Cold War. The United States 
allowed France to gain considerable benefits from the U.S. security- presence in Europe, 
without the French from 1963 on, having to “pay” the costs associated with this 
hegemony through participation in NATO’s integrated military' structures. The United 
States also accepted France’s considerable autonomy' in conducting an independent 
foreign policy which often worked against .American foreign policy goals, especially in 
the third world. Even during NATO's supreme test, the potential defection o f one of its 
members, the Untied States continued to play the role of the benevolent hegemon.
Instead of "punishing" France, the United States patiently' "waited-out de Gaulle."77 In 
fact, France’s withdrawal from NATO was actually more an issue o f free-riding, than a 
full defection. France merely exploited the willingness of the United States to allow
75Richard J. Kerry, The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image o f  Itself and the 
World (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 14.
76Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Consolidating Capitalism," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 53.
"Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: the Cold War Alliance Since 
World War II  (New York: Twayne, 1992), 126.
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free-riders. She adopted a "privileged position and an ungrateful stand" under de 
Gaulle.78 Even during this period French forces continued to be involved in joint 
programs with NATO. De Gaulle's successors even returned France, more or less, back 
into the folds of NATO.79 One can find numerous other examples in which the United 
States has allowed nations to work at cross-purposes with American interests if the costs 
to the United States are relatively minor. The United States has been able to play the 
benevolent hegemon by acting more as “a senior partner, rather than as an adversary," in 
IOs.80 The United States operates out o f the assumption that public goods such as free 
trade or security are not zero-sum variables. One state's gain in the economic arena does 
not necessarily entail a relative loss by another state since "the amount of wealth is not 
fixed, so that all nations can prosper simultaneously."81
By assuming a leadership role, the United States has ensured the credibility' of 
regime and allowed the development of a broad collective security" system. NATO was 
formed as an alliance with the Soviet Union as its external threat. However, with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has lost its original raison d'etre, yet it still 
survives as a viable military organization. The continued existence o f NATO qualifies it 
as an iterated game which makes future cooperation all the more likely. There is no 
doubt that the member states will continue to "play" the game in the near future. The
,8Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins, 1981), 115.
79Ibid., 170; Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future o f  French 
Security Policy. McNair Papers, no. 43 (Washington, D.C.: ENSS, 1995).
80Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation, ”102.
81 Stein, 120.
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Alliance increases confidence among member states that others will not defect, and the 
lengthy nature of the relationships among NATO’s memberstates also increases the 
ability of states to form linkage strategies.82 This is important because the stronger, and 
more complex the interdependence that can be forged between nations the less likely 
that single issues can break those nations apart—even if the single issue is the original 
reason behind the formation of the alliance. Thus, the longer that NATO survives, the 
stronger the organization becomes, and the more likely that it will assume functions 
outside of its original mandate as separate issues become increasingly intertwined.
The nationstates of Western Europe have internalized the patterns of cooperation 
and collaboration that have marked their interactions in the post World War H era. On 
both the economic and security levels, cooperation through formal institutions has 
become the preferred and most accepted means by which individual states pursue goals. 
States have been willing to trade a certain amount of legal freedom of action in exchange 
for a greater degree of realistic influence over the polices of partner states.83 As Peter 
van Ham contends: “Consensus has gradually been built that the “New' Europe” will be 
based on many institutions, of which the EU and NATO are likely to become the main 
pillars. Tire WEU, as the organization responsible for defence within the EU, is to
^Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 36.
^Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” 
Review o f International Studies 21, no. 4 (October 1995): 336-37. While states have 
engaged in multilateralism in order to reinforce state power, the “institutional 
enmeshment” may constrain some elements of state sovereignty as regionalism rises; see 
Mark W. Zacher, “The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for 
Order and Governance,” in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1992).
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function as the bridge between both organizations. Over time, WEU may develop into a 
fully fledged European defence organization taking responsibility for handling some 
problems Europeans can no longer expect the United States to solve for them (either 
directly or working through NATO). Institutions like the United Nations, the CSCE and 
the Council of Europe will, o f course, remain essential frameworks for preserving 
international peace and security, managing essential European and global problems, and 
-  perhaps most importantly -  for developing a regional society based on law which can 
be monitored and enforced.8'1
For the states of Western Europe, integration and regional cooperation has 
provided a number of benefits to individual states. During the Cold War, the security 
regime served as a means o f coordinating responses to the external challenge of the 
Soviet Union. It also served as a mechanism through which regional interests could be 
promoted with the enhanced capabilities o f IOs. The regime also led to the 
establishment of confidence-building measures between the states and established a 
forum to address issues arising from increased interdependence. The regime was also 
instrumental in furthering regional cohesion and de-nationalizing public policy on a 
number of issues including control o f borders and certain aspects of social and economic 
policy.8*
84Van Ham, 197.
85 Andrew Hurrell asserts that regional cohesion occurs if two conditions are met: “(a) 
when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other major 
actors) of that region and the rest of the world; and (b) when the region forms the 
organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues; Hurrell, 337.
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The major European and transatlantic security organizations, NATO and the 
WEU, form a security regime that encompasses the states of Western Europe. Under the 
hegemonic leadership of the United States, this regime has ameliorated the security 
dilemma among individual states by extending the public good o f security to all 
memberstates and ensuring the survival o f individual states. The regime has also 
increased the transparency and the level o f communication and integration among all the 
memberstates. The regime has also effectively dealt with the issue of free riders, 
because of the willingness of the United States to assume a leadership role.
The regime has been able to accomplish these feats by incorporating and 
implementing the main elements o f a collective security system on the continent. 
Specifically, the regime served to rehabilitate Germany into the society of states, while 
providing an alliance structure against the external Soviet threat, and providing a forum 
for American participation (and leadersliip) in European security.
The evolution of the European security' regime has occurred concurrently with 
the broader growth of institutionalism and multilateralism. The external threat of the 
Soviet Union and the hegemonic leadership of the United States helped create the 
conditions favorable to creation o f the institutional framework that has come to 
symbolize Western Europe. As NATO has served as the pillar o f regional security 
cooperation, the EU has developed into the pillar of economic and political integration. 
Through the pursuit and internalization o f institutionalism, the states of Western Europe 
have developed a degree of integration and interdependence that is unequaled elsewhere 
in the global system, and cultivated a society of states which is unmatched by any other 
region of the world at this point.
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Significantly, the memberstates have internalized the system’s norms and rules, 
thereby lessening the potential for future conflict. For the individual nationstates, the 
present system has provided a means to augment their security capabilities and produced 
gains that could be shared by all without a corresponding increase in the threat potential, 
and without profound costs. In this way, the regime has provided incentives for 
continued cooperation and integration and has facilitated the potential for further 
integration and collaboration.
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CHAPTER V
NATIONALISM ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
The end of the Cold War effectively removed the immediate risk of a direct, 
large scale, military attack on Western Europe. There was also a corresponding decline 
in the risk of a massive nuclear exchange on the continent. Yet even as the hard military 
threats of the bipolar rivalry diminished, there was a recognition that Europe still faced a 
host of security concerns, some o f which had been overshadowed by the Cold War and 
others that were created by the very* end of the conflict. Nationalism emerged as a 
security concern for Western Europe for a variety of reasons. There was concern that the 
end of the Cold War would lead to a renationalization of West European states as the 
conformity forced by the bipolar system evaporated and the reunified German}' would 
attempt to assert itself in security matters which would force other states to renationalize 
defense policy in response. To the East, the post-Cold War emergence of nationalism is 
of particular concern to the West since few of the emerging states of Central and Eastern 
Europe have homogenous populations and settled borders, and nationalism has 
increasingly been defined along religious or ethnic lines which often cross national 
borders. The result of such ethno- and religious nationalism has been wide scale 
minority' problems associated with self-determination movements.1 For example, by 
1991, all of the states o f the former Eastern bloc, including those of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), had pressing minority problems that ranged from armed
lDuke, Security Disorder. 57.
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strife as in the case o f the former Yugoslavia to questions of citizenship and status as in 
the Baltic states.2
This chapter will examine the most significant challenges posed by resurgent 
nationalism to Western Europe. These challenges can be categorized into two broad 
areas: 1) Ethnic and religious strife and the breakdown of national states: and 2) 
potential threats from a renationalized, expansionistic Russia. The as of yet unsettled 
nature of the majority of the minority questions and the geographic proximity of a 
number of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe necessitate that the West must 
develop mechanisms to deal with future Bosnias or Chechnvas. Concurrent with the 
continuing ethnic and religious strife on the European continent, the community of 
Western European states must also maintain security7 guarantees that will enable them to 
effectively manage either a renationalization of Russia or further fragmentation of the 
former Soviet Union. What links these issues is that they present broad threats that 
cannot be effectively addressed by single states. With growing constraints on the 
defense outlays of individual nations, and because o f the norms of cooperation already 
established, the states o f Western Europe are increasingly willing to use tire established 
security framework to deal with broad matters of national security that used to be the 
domain of the nationstate. These states are also increasingly amenable to relinquishing 
decision-making authority in order to avoid the necessity of unilateral action. In the end.
2Stephan Iwan Griffiths, "Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe," in 
Security and Strategy in the New Europe, ed. Colin Mclnnes (New York: Routledge. 
1992), 64-65.
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the multiplicity of these threats can only be effectively addressed through collective 
action by the existing security structures in Europe.
The end o f the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact effectively removed 
tire restraints that had constrained numerous conflicts throughout the continent. The 
collapse of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied by an 
outbreak of ethnic violence which tore apart even supposedly cosmopolitan and 
multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia. One of the most striking features of the post-Cold 
War era has been that internal conflicts vastly outnumber external conflicts. O f the 
thirty contemporary conflicts around the world none can be classified as a major war 
where battle deaths exceed 1.000 per annum.3 Many of these conflicts were exacerbated 
by the failure of multinational organizations, including the UN and the EU, to effectively 
manage third party intervention efforts. Even in nations that managed to avoid outright 
bloodshed, tensions between ethnic minorities continue to simmer, and have resulted in 
events such as the "velvet divorce" between the Czechs and Slovaks.-1 Even in this 
overall amicable break up, the EU found it necessary to eventually intercede and mediate 
the split.
3Camegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict: Second Progress Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation. 
1996), 2.
“'This relatively tranquil split did little to enhance regional stability and presented a 
number of problems for both of the new nations. The effort to maintain a common 
currency quickly faltered, with notable consequences for both economies. The split also 
heightened tensions between the new state of Slovakia and Hungary over the rights of the 
substantial Hungarian minority. That the Czech Republic will be in the first wave of 
NATO expansion has also added to tensions between the two states.
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The factors that contribute to the outbreak of ethnic conflict are many and varied, 
but in general five there are main determinants responsible for most internal strife.5 The 
first of these factors is demographic pressure, especially the wide scale movement of 
refugees or rapid increases in ethnic populations due to higher birthrates. The second 
determinant is uneven economic development along ethnic lines where one or more 
ethnic groups perceives itself to be shut out of a state's economic gains. The third cause 
of strife is a legacy of vengeance seeking behavior. The fourth factor is the 
criminalization of the regime which occurs when segments of the population are able to 
exploit minority or ethnic groups with the support of the government. The fifth and final 
underlying cause for ethnic conflict is the collapse of the regime accompanied by a 
suspension of the rule of law6.
As the states of Central and Eastern Europe have democratized, many of the old 
ethnic disputes have reemerged as ethnic minority parties, long-suppressed under 
communist rule, have come to play an increasingly important part in national politics.
In addition, as these states have emerged from under the shadow of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw bloc, nationalistic themes have reasserted themselves. Such themes include
5The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) cites only three determinants to 
forecast potential conflicts: “a) Minority populations in b) economically depressed areas 
along c) borders with kin states"; Carnegie Commission. Second Progress Report, 4.
6Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, “State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward 
a Predictive Model,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 19-31.
'This is especially true as market reforms have failed in many cases to meet public 
expectations about the free market and nationalist and former communist parties have 
gained increased political ground in Central Europe; Wojiech Gebicki and Anna Marta 
Gebicka, “Central Europe: A Shift to the Left?” Survival 37. no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 136- 
38.
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the expansion of territory to include ethnic nationals presently outside of national 
borders and the redrawing of borders to reflect historical precedents. Hence, the rise in 
nationalism has the potential to lead to both internal and external conflicts in the region.
The ramifications of internal strife in the form of ethnic and religious conflict can 
spread beyond the borders of any one state and thus become a security concern even for 
those Western states that lack contiguous borders with strife-torn areas. With the end of 
the Cold War, human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European 
security as the rise in ethnic conflict has led to larger numbers of refugees.8 In response 
to the number of conflicts and rise in refugees, European security' institutions such as 
NATO and the WEU have been called upon to conduct an ever expanding number o f 
humanitarian operations. From Bosnia to Iraq, Alliance forces have been deployed in a 
wide range of peace-keeping and peace- enforcement operations. In general, the states of 
Western Europe have three principal concerns for preventing ethnic and religious strife. 
First, internal conflicts can prompt the wide scale movement of refugees. This issue is 
especially significant in Europe at a time of increasing anti-immigrant sentiments in 
several countries, most noticeably France, Germany' and Italy. For France, the ongoing 
strife in Algeria has prompted a wave of immigration that brings with it the possibility 
for increased terrorism and social unrest.9 Unemployment among .Arabs and North
8In 1983, there were approximately twelve million refugees and displaced persons in 
the world. By 1994, that figure had risen to over forty million; Lionel A. Rosenblatt and 
Larry Thompson "Humanitarian Emergencies: Saving Lives and Resources," SM S  
Review 15, no.2 (Summer 1995): 92.
9In France, immigrants make up some 6.3 % of the total population, and of these, 
some 40% are from North Africa. O f this number, some 600,000 are Algerians who have 
migrated to France since 1990, bringing France’s Algerian population to some 800,000: 
William Drozdiak, “Fleeing Kurds Cause Alarm in Europe,” Washington Post (7 January'
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Africans living in France is close to 33 per cent and has been accompanied by increased 
tensions among the immigrant community. In 1997, France experienced more than 
15,800 incidents of urban violence, with several significant periods of rioting in French 
suburbs during December o f 1997 and January' of 1998 after police killed two youths of 
North African descent.10 Partially as a result o f the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
Germany now accounts for some 3 per cent o f the world's total asylum seekers.11 It is 
estimated that there are some 7.3 million foreign residents in Germany or approximately 
9 per cent of the nation's total population.12 Germany is home to approximately 70 per 
cent of the refugees from the former Yugoslavia and has spent over DM 17 billion on 
their care.13 The resettlement of refugees has been a major priority o f Germany and the 
EU in general, especially in light of the large number of refugees that remain in the 
states of the former Yugoslavia.1'1 The collapse of the government of Berisha regime in
1998). O f France's immigrant population. The Economist states, "A formidable number 
of black and brown people, mostly of North African origin, mostly without qualifications 
and many of them unemployed, are growing up not as Frenchmen but as a sullen, 
excluded minority;" The Economist. France Survey (November 25,1995), 11.
10“France, Belgium: Suburbs , Algeria," Migration News 5, no. 2 (February 1998).
“ U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 199~ (Washington, D.C.: 
Immigration and Refugees Services of America, 1997), 4-5.
12While Germany is home to approximately 350,000 refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia, the fastest growing segment o f the nation’s foreign population come from 
states such as Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq: ‘‘Germany: Data, Ethnic Germans, Asylum," 
Migration News 5, no. 5 (February' 1998).
“ Helmut Kohl, “Security in Tomorrow’s World," speech at the 34th Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, 7 February 1998.
“ The EU estimates that some 200,000 refugees remain unsettled in tire territory' of the 
former Yugoslavia; European Commission, Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid, 1995 
(Brussels: European Commission, 1996), 3-4.
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Albania prompted the exodus of thousands of refugees from that country to neighboring 
Italy.15
Immigration is especially contentious in Europe because of the ELTs liberal 
freedom of movement laws. For instance, Article 48 gives EU nationals the right to seek 
work anywhere in the Union on an equal basis with natives. However, both Germany 
and Austria have called for lengthy transition periods before foreign workers can enjoy 
such benefits.16 The two EU members are especially interested in preventing the citizens 
of new EU states such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia from gaining the 
freedom to move and acquire jobs at a time of rising unemployment among German and 
Austrian nationals.17 Hence the possibility that refugees can acquire the right to compete 
with EU nationals has led to calls for even tighter restrictions.18 Even as former German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac called for the lifting of 
internal restrictions on EU citizens, they also called for increased controls on the EU's 
external borders to prevent illegal workers from entering the EU.19
l5Italy had for some time already been faced with large numbers of Albanian refugees 
seeking economic opportunities and the internal strife surrounding the collapse of the 
Berisha government accelerated this trend; Human Rights Watch, Democracy’ Derailed: 
Violations in the May 26, 1996Albanian Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1996), 10-15; Andrea Stefani, "Gazeta Shqiptare,” in Balkan Media and Policy Monitor 
3 (July 1997): 18.
16Michael Specter, “Population Implosion Worries a Graying Europe,” New York 
Times (10 July 1998).
17"Europe," Migration News, vol. 5, no. 8 (August 1998).
18For instance, the Christian Social Union Party in Germany has called for increasing 
the waiting period for workers from seven years to fifteen years; Specter.
19Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, letter to John Bruton, 13 December 1996, Press 
Release, Office of Information and Press, Federal Republic of Germany.
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The second major concern o f the European states in preventing or ameliorating 
internal conflicts is economics. The demise of the Soviet bloc and the resultant collapse 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) led to a dismantling o f the 
system which had given artificial preferences for goods from other CMEA states.20 .As a 
result. EU exports to the states o f the former Soviet bloc have increased by some 50 per 
cent so that they now make up some 10 per cent of the EU's total exports.21 The EU 
remains the main trading partner for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Some 37 per cent of the CIS’s exports and 46 per cent of its imports came from the EU. 
and the Union has a trade surplus with the region of some S10.3 billion.22 EU imports 
from the states of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding the states of the former Soviet 
Union) continue to increase each year, rising some 8.9 percent in 1998.23
20"Trade at administered CMEA prices expressed in non-convertible monetary units 
was replaced by trade at world prices expressed in convertible currencies, which put an 
end to the discrimination against non CMEA Markets;" EU, Commission of the 
European Communities, “EC Trade with Central and Eastern Europe,” The European 
Economy (Brussels: OOPEC, 1993), 27-45.
21EU exports to the region have risen from 5.7 per cent of total EU exports in 1987 to 
10.7 in 1995; EU, European Commission, 1997Annual Economic Report, COM(97)27, 
(Brussels: OOPEC, 1997), 38.
22The Union’s main trading partners with the CIS were Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain; EU, “EU the Main CIS Trading Partner,” Eurostat, no. 
998 (May 1998), 2.
23EU, 1997 Annual Economic Report, 38.
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In addition, trade between the EU and the Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland) now accounts for almost half o f these countries total foreign trade.2'1 EU 
nations have also placed a large amount of direct foreign investment (DFI) into specific 
nations. For instance, Italy has some 400 companies operating in .Albania and employs 
some 30,000 .Albanian workers.25
The third major concern for West European states involves the potential for 
internal conflicts to spread. With Central and Eastern Europe’s diversity and mix of 
ethnic populations, the potential for ethnic violence to cross national borders is 
immense. For instance, in the Balkan region there exist some 6 million ethnic 
Albanians. Of this number, only 3.5 million actually live in .Albania. Tliis is especially 
significant in areas such as the Serb controlled Kosova region in which .Albanians make 
up over 40 per cent of the region’s total population, while Serbs only make up 2 per 
cent.26
At present there are a number o f states that face underlying problems that bear 
the potential of escalating into either intrastate or interstate conflict. The three most 
explosive potential intrastate conflicts in Europe are the well-publicized disputes
21 In the Czech Republic and Hungary, EU imports now account for approximately 40 
per cent of each nation's total imports. In Poland, EU imports account for over 50 per
cent of total imports. Meanwhile, exports to the EU account for approximately 50 per
cent of total exports from the Czech Republic and Hungaiy, and some 58 per cent of 
Poland's total exports; EU, CEC, The Czech Republic's Foreign Trade, Statistics in 
Focus: External Trade, no. 7 (Brussels: OOPEC, 1997); EU, CEC, Hungarian Foreign
Trade. Statistics in Focus: External Trade, no. 5 (Brussels: OOPEC, 1997).
“ Marcella Favretto and Tasos Kokkinides, "Anarchy in Albania: Collapse of 
European Collective Security,’' Basic Paper, no. 21 (June 1997), 4.
2<sGazmend Pula, "Self-Determination: A Non-Confrontational Option for the Kosova 
Crisis," Balkan Forum, 4, no. 3 (September 1996): 202-3.
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between Greece and Turkey, Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia and Serbia.27 However, a 
number of other potential conflicts also exist. Romanian nationalists have called for a 
“Greater Romania” that would include areas now populated by Romanian minorities and 
a reunification with Moldova. Serb attempts to develop a “Greater Serbia” have been at 
the heart of the Yugoslav crisis. Calls for territorial expansion and a redrawing of 
Balkan frontiers have come from nationalists in states such as Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Russia. In addition, both Slovakia and Romania contain large ethnic Hungarian 
minorities (10.8°o and 8.996 respectively).28
The most significant source for potential conflict in eastern Europe remains the 
troubled Balkans. The large ethnic Albanian population in the Kosova region, and as 
well as in Sanjak and Tetovo have prompted .Albanian calls for a “Greater Albania."
Ethnic conflict has once again engulfed Serbia over the largely .Albanian province of 
Kosovo. Conflict will continue in the region especially in light of Serb treatment of 
ethnic .Albanians in Kosova.29 .Already the conflict in Kosovo has produced 100,000 
displaced persons and 20,000 external refugees since the Serbian launched their major
27Camegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), 27.
^One of the preconditions for Hungarian membership in NATO was the settlement of 
minority issues with Slovakia and Romania through bilateral treaties. Despite these 
treaties, however, there remain a number of contentious issues between Elungaiy and 
these two nations over minority rights; .Alistair Millar and Tasos Kokkinides, “NATO 
Expansion and the Excluded Countries: A New Division of Europe?” Basic Notes (July
1997), 2.
^Serbian atrocities in Kosovo have been well documented and reported and have 
escalated as the fighting as increased in the region. See for instance, Amnesty 
International, Crisis Report: Kosovo, EUR70/48/98 (21 July 98).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
121
effort to suppress the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).30 In addition, Serbian actions 
mirror those undertaken in the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the Bosnian conflict.31 
Meanwhile, the KLA refuses to participate in peace negotiations with the Serbs.32 The 
possibility of the conflict spreading is exacerbated by the willingness of Albania to come 
to the aid of the ethnic rebels and to supply groups like the KLA with weapons.33 Serb 
atrocities also threaten to prompt NATO retaliatory action.3'1 Even Germany has pledged 
military support for such an action.35
While Kosovo provides an example of the potential ethnic and nationalist 
conflict in Europe, multilateral efforts elsewhere demonstrate means to prevent such 
outbreaks of violence. With its combination of internal minority' problems and external 
threats, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is illustrative of the 
potential dangers facing the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe.
After it declared its independence from Yugoslavia in September of 1991, the FYROM
30Fred Abrahams. “The West Winks at Serbia Atrocities in Kosovo,” International 
Herald Tribune (5 August 1998).
3lMaiy Robinson, Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights On the Situation in Kosovo HR/98/14 (9 June 1998).
32“KLA Guerillas Elect to Stay Out of Kosovan Talks," The Irish Times (14 August 
1998).
33For instance, the Albanians have allowed KLA soldiers to seek sanctuary in Albania 
and there have been minor border clashes between Serbian and Albanian troops on the 
border between the two nations; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Hundreds Flee Kosovo Fighting," The 
Washington Post (14 August 1998), A27.
34“Serbs Said to Commit 2 Massacres in Kosovo,” International Herald Tribune (1 
October 1998).
35Andrew Crimson, “Germany Will Send Jets to Kosovo,” Daily Telegraph (1 October
1998).
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faced four significant sources of likely conflict. Externally, the FYROM was threatened 
by both Greece and Serbia, both of whom refused to recognize the new state.36 In 
addition, the nation faced the potential of a spillover of the conflict in the Kosova where 
Serb repression of ethnic Albanians sparked a civil war and a resumption of the ethnic 
cleansing tactics previously witnessed in Bosnia.37 Internally, the FYROM faced 
considerable interethnic problems because of its large .Albanian minority which 
constituted some 23 per cent of the population.38 Ethnic Albanians demanded greater 
autonomy, especially in terms of politics and education. The FYROM also faced severe 
economic problems as a result of the embargo on the states of the former Yugoslavia and 
an ongoing Greek embargo.39 The Greek embargo forced the FYROM to trade with 
Yugoslavia, in spite of the international embargo against that nation. A WEU report 
concluded that "considering that the trade embargo Greece has imposed on the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is placing this country in such a difficult economic 
situation that, in order to survive, it is forced to maintain some commercial relations 
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in violation of United Nations sanctions against
36Greece refused to recognize the state because of name, Macedonia, which was also 
the name of a Greek province, and Athens cited this name choice as evidence of possible 
territorial ambitions. Serbia refused to recognize the state because it wished to retain the 
territory as part of Yugoslavia.
3,See, for instance, Philip Smucker, "Serb Forces in Kosovo Tortured and Shot' 
Villagers,1' Daily Telegraph (1 October 1998).
3SPula, 202.
39Alice Ackerman and Antonio Pala, “From Peacekeeping to Preventative 
Deployment: A Study of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,” European Security 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 84.
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the latter/’40 The external trade o f the FYROM was reduced by some 60 per cent 
because of the two embargos.41
In spite of the likelihood of conflict in the FYROM, actions taken by the 
international community helped forestall strife and, hence, demonstrated the potential 
for preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in the region. In 1992, tire Secretary General 
o f the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept of preventive diplomacy to UN 
operations. Preventive diplomacy was designed to fulfill four main objectives: 1) 
prevention of armed conflicts; 2) prevention of conflict escalation; 3) containment of 
conflicts; and 4) the amelioration of the underlying sources of potential conflicts.42 He 
called for the implementation of five specific means to accomplish these objectives: 1) 
confidence-building measures, including cultural and military exchanges; 2) fact-finding 
missions: 3) the establishment of early warning networks through UN of regional 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); 4) preventive diplomacy to forestall conflicts; 
and 5) the formation of demilitarized zones between potential combatants.43
The year that Boutros-Ghali issued his report, the UN authorized the deployment 
o f military observers and a battalion of peacekeepers to monitor the border between the 
FYROM and Yugoslavia. In 1993, the Security Council approved the deployment of
40WEU, International Secretariat, The Situation in the Former Yugoslavia. WEU 1467 
(Brussels: WEU, 1995).
41U.S., Department of State, “Country Reports: The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,’" Implementation o f  the Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35 th OSCE 
Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 8.
42Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New Y’ork: UN, 1992), 11-13.
43Ibid.
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1,000 additional American troops. These troops were originally deployed under the 
auspices of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the UN peacekeeping mission to the 
former Yugoslavia. However, in 1995, the FYROM requested that the UN mission be 
separated from UNPROFOR. The Security Council accepted this request and on March 
31, 1995, through Security Council Resolution 983, the UN renamed its contingent in the 
FYROM as the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEF). By the end of March 
1995, UNPREDEF numbered some 540 American troops, 556 troops from a Nordic 
peacekeeping battalion and 53 other observers.44
The deployment of UNPREDEF marked the first successful use of preventative 
peacekeeping. The relatively small size of the ethnic Serbian population, combined with 
the presence of American peacekeeping troops prevented an outbreak of the sort of 
ethnic violence seen elsewhere in the states of the former Yugoslavia.45 Despite minor 
border clashes, and internal disputes between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian 
majority. UNPREDEF served as a framework for the sort of preventative diplomacy 
envisioned by Boutros-Ghali. Under the auspices o f the OSCE, negotiations between the 
Greeks and Macedonians led to the signing of an interim accord in 1995, and the 
exchange of liaison offices in January of 1996. With the subsequent removal of its
44 UN. Report o f  the Secretary-General o f  the United Nations, S/1995/222'Corr. 1 (29 
March 1995).
45The ethnic Serb population of the FYROM only accounts for some 2.2 per cent of 
the total population, while ethnic Albanians make up some 23 per cent, and ethnic 
Macedonians comprise 67 per cent of the total, with the remaining population made up 
of ethnic Turks, Vlachs and gypsies; Ibid.
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embargo on the FYROM, Greece has now become the primary investor in the nation.16 
In addition, the UN continues to sponsor negotiations between the two nations over the 
name issue. The FYROM is now a member of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
The success of the UN mission in the FYROM and mirrors smaller, but 
nonetheless equally successful OSCE preventative diplomatic missions in Moldova and 
Georgia. In Moldova, an eight-member OSCE team mediated the crisis in the 
Transnistria and negotiated a constitutional settlement of the dispute. The OSCE also 
negotiated the terms of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.4' In Georgia, 
an eighteen-member OSCE team was involved in monitoring and mediating a dispute in 
Southern Ossetia. Tire OSCE team also helped draft a new constitution for Georgia.
Tire OSCE has also been instrumental in negotiating the Chechnyan crisis in Russia and 
drafting a new constitution for Tajikistan, all the while maintaining missions throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the OSCE played a key role in the .Albanian
* * J Rcrisis.
Tire Carnegie Commission offers four keys for successful conflict prevention: 1) 
a key player to provide leadership: 2) a coherent political-military approach; 3) adequate
46U.S., Department o f State, ‘"Macedonia,” 7.
4'Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Chairman's
Summary>: Decisions o f  the Budapest Ministerial Council Meeting (Vienna: OSCE,
1996), 2.
48For an overview o f the OSCE's efforts in Albania, see Favretlo and Kokkinides.
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resources for a settlement; and 4) a plan for the restoration of host authority/9 The 
OSCE provides a forum to fulfill all o f these criteria. The OSCE provides both 
leadership and a comprehensive framework for negotiations which can address both 
political and military concerns. The OSCE also brings with it resources in the form of 
international aid. Finally, OSCE missions work to either support the host nation's 
national authority or to oversee elections to transition to a legitimate government.
In those areas where the OSCE has been successful there are several key 
characteristics. First, the OSCE uses small teams of international professional diplomats 
who are familiar with the region and peoples in conflict. Second, the OSCE deploys its 
missions to the conflict area, and does not attempt to mediate settlements at international 
conference centers. Third, these missions are long term and do not attempt to pressure 
factions into quick settlements. Fourth, the OSCE negotiators have a broad mandate and 
far-reaching powers. Fifth, and finally, the OSCE missions have the weight of the 
international community beliind them and come with the promise of increased 
international aid or assistance.50
In tills manner, the OSCE provides a unique mechanism for conflict resolution 
and prevention that supplements the capabilities of Europe’s main security organization, 
NATO, and the more diffuse diplomatic abilities of the UN. Because of its broad 
geographic mandate, and the fact that it lacks the Cold War legacy of NATO, the OSCE 
provides an inclusive forum to address the wider ethnic and internal disputes in areas of
■^Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict, xtx.
50Hans-Ulrich Seidt, “Lessons Leamt From the Crisis in the Balkans,” European 
Security 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 70.
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the former Soviet Union that are clearly outside o f the framework of NATO. In addition, 
that all states have equal participatory rights gives the OSCE a greater degree of 
legitimacy to groups that might otherwise perceive bias in international organizations. 
Finally, the absence of a "rigid" legal structure allows the OSCE to respond quickly and 
with a greater degree of flexibility than other security organizations.51
Significantly, the OSCE has been the principle security organization that has 
established a visible presence in the states o f the former Soviet Union. While the states 
of Western Europe must find a means with which to practice effective conflict 
management and prevention when dealing with the states of the former Soviet bloc, on a 
broader level, the West also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian 
nationalism—to the point that Moscow would attempt to reassert itself as a potential 
hegemon on the European continent.52 Concurrently, the West must also be prepared for 
any spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian Federation 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The sheer size of the Russian nuclear 
and conventional forces demands a measure of respect from the West Europeans, 
especially in an era of dramatic cuts in defense expenditures. This is not to suggest that 
the West should risk alienating the Russians by condemning them to be a perpetual 
enemy, but it is clear that the presence of Russia on the Eurasian continent requires an 
equal military counterweight as the best guarantee for future stability, and that at the
51Miriam Sapiro, "The OSCE: An Essential Component of European Security,"
Insight 15 (March 1997), 2-3.
52For a good overview of the effort by Russia to reassert itself as a global power, 
especially on issues such as arms control, NATO and the Russian pursuit of "balance" in 
international relations, see Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and the West: Towards a Renewed 
Geopolitical Rivalry?” Survival 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 104-125.
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very least, Russia needs to be included on a consultative basis in the evolution of 
Europe's security architecture. The need for collaboration between the West and Russia 
is especially important as many of the states of Central and Eastern Europe find 
themselves pressured to choose between a reorientation to the West or the maintenance 
of traditional ties with Russia as the former hegemon attempts to retain what elements of 
its former sphere o f influence it can.
Russia has undertaken a number of steps to attempt to maintain its influence in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This is partially a result of economics. With few markets 
for Russian products, Moscow has attempted to rely on arms sales as a means of securing 
foreign currency. Russia has been one of the world's major arms exporters, but since the 
end of the Cold War, the nation has seen its share of the world's arms market and the 
total value of its arms exports dramatically decline. Nonetheless, while Russia's share of 
world arms exports fell from some 32 per cent in 1984 to 6 per cent in 1994, Russia was 
able to dominate weapons sales to Eastern Europe with 69 per cent of the market share 
(for a total of some SI.3 billion in 1994).3 With the reality o f NATO expansion or at 
the veiy least closer ties to the West by those states not in the first round of expansion, 
many states which were large consumers of Russian products have demonstrated a desire 
to replace aging Soviet hardware with Western equipment. In one recent example 
Finland decided to replace its MiG-21s with 64 F-18 fighters in 1995. Analysts in the 
Russian defense sector interpreted this as Western encroachment on one of their 
traditional markets.
53 U.S., Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 16-19.
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This comes at a time when Russian foreign policy formally encourages arms 
exports as a means to accomplish a variety of goals. Russia needs the hard currency of 
weapons exports to pay for the conversion of defense industries and the dismantlement 
existing weapons systems. Even under the revised Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE) limits that were approved in June, Russia still has to drastically reduce the number 
of weapons systems in its flank areas.54 In addition, exports would both pay for further 
military research and for the development of new weapons systems. Finally, Moscow 
believes weapons exports are necessary in order to maintain the capabilities and means 
of production of existing systems and to maintain the "social guarantees" for Russians 
involved in weapons production.55
In an effort to increase weapons sales, Russia has reorganized its defense industry 
by combining the three agencies that had formerly managed arms exports into a single 
entity—Rosvoomzhenie. The relative price advantages of Russian weapons and more 
aggressive marketing have doubled sales since 1994.56 Russia's share of the world's arms 
market fell from 35.3 per cent in 1989 (worth some S18.9 billion) to 11.7 per cent in
54For instance, Russia has to reduce the number of tanks from 1,897 to 1,300; the 
number of armored vehicles from 4,397 to 1,380; and the number o f artillery' pieces from 
2,422 to 1,640; Sarah Walkling, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved." Jane's 
Intelligence Review & Sentinel Pointer (August 1996), 3.
55Charles Dick, "Russian Military Doctrine," Jane's Intelligence Review—Special 
Report (January 1994), 12.
56Edwin Bacon, "Russian Arms Exports--A Triumph for Marketing?" Jane's 
Intelligence Review 6, no. 6 (June 1994), 268; Sarah Walkling, "U.S. Arms Sales 
Continue Decline, Russia Top Exporter in 1995," Arms Control Today 26, no. 6 (August
1996), 33.
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1994 (SI.5 billion) and then rebounded to 31.6 per cent (some S3.1 billion) in 1995.57 In 
particular. Russian sales to Central and Eastern Europe have continued for three main 
reasoas: 1) Russian equipment is less expensive; 2) it is interoperable with existing 
weapons; and 3) Russia has used arms exports as a means to address its debts with states 
in the region.
Since the end of the Cold War. "arms-for-debt" agreements have made up the 
overwhelming majority o f  Russian arms deliveries within the region. Through 1996. of 
the ten arms agreements in effect between Russia and states in the region, six were arms 
for debt arrangements and one was financed by German military assistance in an effort to 
shed former East German equipment.58 As debt issues are settled through arms transfers. 
Moscow has worked to maintain its market share so that it can eventually have access to 
hard currency, especially as the pace of economic reform accelerates in many of the 
states of the region. The emphasis on interoperability for potential NATO members is 
particularly troubling for Russian arms manufacturers as these states buy or contemplate 
purchases of Western equipment and consequently close markets to the Russians.
In addition to its interest in the arms trade. Moscow also has significant 
economic interests in the Central Asian republics. For instance, in Azerbaijan, foreign 
companies have signed five offshore oil deals worth some SI8 billion.59 Russia hopes to
5'Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-1995 
(Washington, D.C.: CRS, 1996), 80-81.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1996/97 (London: 
USS, 1997), 47-48.
59U.S., Department o f  State, "Country Reports: Azerbaijan," in Implementation o f  the 
Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35th OSCE Report to the Congress (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1997), 6.
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reap some of the profits from these deals since the Azerbaijan government has decided 
that one of the two pipelines that will initially carry oil from the first o f these offshore 
fields will go to the north through Russia. This pipeline is expected to carry' some 5 
million tons of Azeri oil per year.60 In order to further strengthen its relationship with 
Azerbaijan, Russia has also signed a series o f bilateral cooperation agreements with the 
country, which range from economic cooperation to military collaboration.61 Azerbaijan 
also provides a good example of Russia’s strategic problems in the area. Russia 
considers Armenia its closest ally in the region and Russian support for Armenia in the 
ongoing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
has soured relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, and prevented closer ties.62
Besides economic interests, Moscow also has geopolitical interests in 
maintaining influence in the region. Many of the states of the former Soviet Union have 
developed a Western orientation that is particularly troubling for Moscow since it has 
prevented Russian designs for a greater institutionalization of the CIS. By 1993. only 
seven of the original eleven members o f the CIS were willing to ratify the Charter o f the
60Robert Corzine. “Relief as Oil Shipment Deal Signed in BAKU,” Financial Times 
(17 February 1996), 2.
61Elmira Akhundova, “Caspian Becomes Stormy Sea of Differences Between Russia 
and Azerbaijan,” Current Digest o f  the Post-Soviet Press, no. 21 (21 February 1996).
62While Armenia was able to quickly capture the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 1993,
Azerbaijan has been joined by Turkey in a blockade of the country and only the presence 
of a large Russian military force has prevented the Azeris from resuming the war, 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Azerbaijan and Armenia,” Report 
on Armenia’s Parliamentary Elections and Constitutional Referendum (Washington, 
D.C.: CSCE, 1995).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
132
CIS.63 Most troubling for Moscow was Ukraine’s attempt to formalize closer ties with 
the West. Moscow responded by attempting to shore up its influence in Central Asia 
with a series of bilateral military agreements and promoting the development o f the CIS 
at variable speeds in order to satisfy the concerns of the organization’s individual states.
In addition, Moscow maintains a large troop deployment in and around the central Asian 
states, including sizable deployments in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan.6-'
Since the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia had consistently pushed for the right to 
protect its citizens in the “Near Abroad,” and Moscow has pressed the West for 
endorsement of a special role for Russian peacekeeping forces in the region.65
The expansion of Western influence in the region in general, and NATO 
expansion in particular, seem to confirm the worst post-Cold War fears of Russian 
policymakers. These fears revolve around the movement o f what is perceived as an anti- 
Russian alliance closer to Russia's borders. As Yevgeny Primakov wrote in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “we are, of course, far from [believing] that the widening of 
NATO is especially designed for a strike at Russia . . . .  However, we firmly proceed 
from the fact that the moving of NATO’s infrastructure closer to Russia's territory
“ The four states that dropped out were Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine, although Azerbaijan would later rejoin the Commonwealth.
“ Russia has some 4,300 troops in .Armenia (including a squadron of Mig-23s); 8,500 
troops in Georgia; 6,400 in Moldova; and 18,000 in Tajikistan (including 6,000 "border 
guards"); ESS, Military’ Balance, 1997/98, 115.
65Buszynski, 121.
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worsens both the purely military and geopolitical situations as far as we are 
concerned/'66
NATO expansion is seen as duplicity on the part of the West. When Moscow agreed to 
withdraw its troops from East Germany. NATO pledged not to station troops on East 
German territory. Now. however, through expansion NATO will "leapfrog" Germany 
and move some 500 miles closer to Russia.6, The fact that NATO expansion would 
place NATO ground troops within striking distance of Russia is a historical first that has 
not gone unnoticed by Moscow'. NATO pledges to not station nuclear weapons on the 
territory of new members are seen by many Russian policymakers, including the former 
Minister of Defense Igor Rodinov, as being temporary and vague.68
Moscow fears that NATO expansion will not stop with the Visegrad states, but 
might ultimately bring the Baltic states and Ukraine within the sphere o f influence of the 
West. This is especially troublesome to the Russians since NATO refuses to exclude any 
state from future expansion plans. The presence of 25 million ethnic Russians in the 
near abroad and the nation's own troubled history propel policymakers in Moscow to 
maintain a firm sphere of influence in the region. Russian primacy in the region is not 
interpreted as "imperialistic" by state leaders, but as legitimate defense of Russia against 
a variety of potential threats, including radical Islam and the potential spread of ethnic
“ Quoted in Viktoria Tripolskaya-Mitlyng, "Eastern Cheers, Russian Jeers, American 
Silence," Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 1 (January 1997): 5
67Anatol Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain," The Atlantic Monthly 277, no. 1 (January
1996): 20-25.
“ .Aleksei Pushkov, Vladimir Abainov, Leonid Gankin, Vasily Safronchuk, Mikhail 
Pogorely and Tomas Kolesnichenko, "Russia vs. NATO Expansion: The Latest Round," 
Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press 48, no. 51 (January 15,1997): 1-5.
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conflicts along Russia’s borders. In addition, Moscow fears a renewal of the Russo- 
Turkish rivalry for influence with the states of Central Asia. Russian elites point to the 
Monroe Doctrine or the preservation of French influence in Africa through the 
Francophone system as justification for their concerns.69
NATO expansion could thus sow the seeds of instability' in the region in several 
ways. Expansion of the .Alliance is likely to gamer further support for Russian 
ultranationalists and hardliners who argue both for the preservation of Russian influence 
and the protection of Russian minorities abroad.70 This would, in turn, make matters 
more difficult for Russian reformers. Inclusion of Poland in NATO might prompt a pre­
emptive bid to preserve its influence in the region by reintegrating Ukraine or other areas 
into the Federation. Outside of Russia, insecurity in the region would promote instability' 
in several ways. First, those states that were not included in the first wave of expansion 
risk being defined as outside of the institutional framework that has come to be Europe.
This is especially true of states such as Ukraine which might be propelled to seek closer 
ties to Russia in order to compensate for perceived exclusion from the West. The 
Romanian Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu has hinted that if Romania is not 
admitted at the same time as Hungary, it might propel Romania closer to Russia.71 
Second, states that are not in the first round, such as Bulgaria, can attempt to extract the 
maximum advantages from both Moscow and Brussels. A recent quote from a Bulgarian
69Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain," 20.
/0John Gerald Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's 
Future," The Washington Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 109-125.
71 Adrian Severin, "America! America! (Romania: Article Examines Turn' in U.S.
Policy)," FBIS: EEU  (August 22, 1996), 34.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
135
deputy is telling, "Our country must utilize the dividends it has in the ping-pong game 
with Moscow and Brussels."72 Third, and perhaps most significantly, expansion has also 
led to disputes between states who are "in" on the first round, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, and those who were not invited to join the Alliance in this round of 
enlargement. For instance, the Slovaks lobbied hard to be included either in the initial 
expansion, or at the very least, to obstruct Czech entry into NATO (the Slovaks claim 
that the Czechs refuse to discuss outstanding issues between the two states and have thus 
not settled their territorial and ethnic issues as required by NATO before inclusion).73
Nonetheless, enmeshment in the West’s web of institutions provides the most 
efficient means for binding Russia and the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the 
broad society of states of Western Europe and ensuring compliance with the norms of 
the West’s security system. While Russia opposes a broad expansion of NATO, it has 
formally accepted the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the .Alliance 
in exchange for a number of concessions from the West. In mid-May of 1997, NATO 
Secretaiy-General Javier Solana was able to negotiate an agreement between Russia and 
the .Alliance which cleared the way for NATO enlargement by offering a number o f 
concessions to the Russians.7-4 First, Russia would be included in the Alliance through a 
"NATO Russian Permanent Joint Council," which is to be jointly chaired by the NATO
^Quoted in Ivo Indzhev, "Bulgaria: Country's Position Between NATO, Russia,"
FBIS: EEU  (August 23, 1996), 8.
^Vincent Boland, "Slovaks Object to Czech NATO Entrv," Financial Times (April 4
1997), 2.
74Javier Solana, “Preparing for the Madrid Summit,” MATO Review, vol. 45, no. 2 
(March 1997): 3.
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Secretary-General, a Russian envoy and a NATO ambassador. This body would be 
tasked to study and coordinate action on issues such as peacekeeping, terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, and so forth. Significantly, the council would have some decision-making 
authority, but would lack the power to enforce decisions against the will of either NATO 
or the Russian Federation.'5 Second, NATO declared that it had "no intention, no plan, 
and no reason" to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor to 
deploy substantial numbers of combat units. Third, Russian concessions over NATO 
expansion have been repaid by .American support for inclusion of Russia in the G-7, with 
an immediate reformulation of the group at the Denver meeting as the "Summit of the 
Eight.” President Bill Clinton also pledged both American support for Russian inclusion 
in other international economic bodies such as the World Trade Organization and 
increased .American economic assistance in exchange for reforms in the Russian tax 
system. Fourth, Russia was given an additional four years, until 2007, to complete 
dismantling of missile systems covered under the START II Treaty, and Clinton pledged 
not to develop or deploy space-based missile systems.6 Finally, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin was promised .American support in accelerating the ongoing negotiations over 
amending the CFE Treaty to allow for greater Russian troop deployment than was
,5Specifically, the Act states the "provisions of this Act do not provide Russia or 
NATO, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe 
upon or restrict the rights of Russia or NATO to independent decision-making and 
action;" NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels (1997).
76Casper Weinberger, "The Helsinki Summit: Fact vs. Fiction," Forbes 159, no. 9 (5
May 1997): 37.
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initially agreed upon, especially in regards to limits in the so-called "flank areas."77 
Thus, Yeltsin was able to extract a number of significant concessions for acquiescing to 
a process that the United States had claimed would proceed by 1999, with or without 
Russian consent. Cooperation in Bosnia also demonstrates the easing of tensions 
between Russia and the Alliance. The joint mission to Bosnia did not subordinate 
Russian troops to NATO officially, but it did establish a unit}' of command whereby the 
Russian contingent served under NATO's supreme commander o f the mission.78 In 
addition, NATO has developed a structure, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in order to increase 
cooperation among the .Alliance and its partners to “a qualitatively new' level."79 This 
was followed by an agreement to establish a NATO military liaison mission in 
Moscow.80
While Russian support or approval for NATO is tenuous at best. Russia had been 
extremely supportive of the OSCE. In 1990, in an effort to contain several conflicts in 
the states of the former Soviet bloc, European states, including Russia, attempted to turn
' Essentially, Yeltsin wants to be allowed to shrink the areas covered by the CFE. 
This would result in a larger military presence as Russia would be allowed to maintain 
the same troops limits in a much smaller area. Yeltsin also wants extend the timetable 
for reductions in other areas; Sarah Walkling, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved," 
Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer (August 1996): 3.
^Leontiy P. Shevtsov, "Russian-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for 
the Future?" NATO Review 45, no. 2 (March 1997): 18.
79See NATO, “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,” NATO Fact Sheet, no. 19 
(July 1997).
^ A T O , Public Information Advisor, “Further Progress on Military Cooperation 
Between NATO and Russia,” Press Release 10.98 (22 June 1998).
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the CSCE into a regional collective security organization that would be able to intervene 
in substate conflicts and through collective actions such as peace-keeping or peace 
enforcement, manage and contain such conflicts from spreading. One of the driving 
forces behind the CSCE was the notion that the organization, because of its broad 
membership, would be able to overcome the East-West divide in security by replacing 
both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.81 Thus, Russia would have been guaranteed inclusion 
into the security architecture o f Europe and the loss of influence in Eastern Europe could 
be supplemented on a far grander scale.
It soon became apparent in fact that the wide membership (some fifty-three 
states) of the CSCE made it too bulky and cumbersome to effectively deal with many of 
the new' conflicts which broke out across Eastern Europe. Specifically, the CSCE, with 
its emphasis on diplomatic measures and negotiations, found itself unable to deter or 
counter "committed aggressors." A 1994 Russian initiative to streamline the institution 
by establishing a ten-member security council was rejected.82 Despite its promising 
beginnings, it became quickly apparent that the West European states and the United 
States did not have the political will to implement the views and or enforce the decisions 
of the organization. The failure o f the CSCE to maintain peace in either Bosnia or 
Chechnya confirmed its inability to coerce warring parties to the peace table since, in the 
end, the organization can only seek voluntary compliance.83 The OSCE has established
8lPhilip Zelikow' "The Masque of Institutions," Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 11.
“ Ibid., 11.
^Marten H.A. Van Heuvan, Russia. the United States. and NATO: The Outlook for  
European Security Atlantic Council Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic 
Council 1994), 22-23.
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a niche for itself in the diplomatic realm and has proven productive in negotiating 
between warring parties on more than one occasion.34 The OSCE has emerged as an 
important component in building multilateral coalitions to transfer concepts such as 
liberal democracy from the West.35 Nonetheless, it clearly has failed to develop into the 
broad pan-European collective security organization that could ensure stability on the 
continent and adequately address the larger framework of European security, albeit the 
element best able to meet the security concerns of Russia without alienating the former 
superpower.
The need to enmesh Russia in the institutional framework o f the West has 
become all the more important in light of that nation's deteriorating economy.36 Even 
before the fall of the ruble, the Russian economy was in trouble and the growing 
financial crisis only worsened an already bad situation.37 The collapse of the ruble and
^'OSCE monitoring missions have been particularly useful in several ongoing 
conflicts in Central Asia. Besides the mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina. there are ten 
permanent OSCE missions in the states of the former Soviet bloc: U.S.. Department of 
State, Implementation o f the Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35 th OSCE Report to 
the Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 2-3.
S5Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE as a Pluralistic Security- 
making Institution,’' Paper presented at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
.Affairs, Merrill House Program in New York City (Decemberl-2, 1995).
86The Russian ruble has lost 80 percent of its value, and many Russian companies 
have found their net worth reduced by some 70 percent. In addition, according to one 
Russian economist, the Russian middle class has shrunk from 25 percent of the 
population to 2 percent; Marcus Warren, “Rouble Crisis is Wiping Out the ‘New 
Russians’," Daily Telegraph (23 September 1998).
37Even before the collapse of the ruble, some 500 Russian banks went out of business 
in the last year and inflation peaked at around 50 percent, while now it approaches 300 
percent. For an overview of Russia’s economic problems see Michael Camdessus, 
“Russia and the IMF: Meeting the Challenges of an Emerging Market and Transition 
Economy,” address at the U.S.-Russian Business Council in Washington, D.C. (1 April
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the resultant deterioration in the Russian middle-class has led to an environment that 
may lay the seeds for the re-emergence of Russian nationalism and expansionism. For 
instance, recent polls show that a third of Russians favor a government by dictatorship.88 
In addition, the current Russian government has begun to roll back economic reforms 
and print rubles in order to provide short term relief for the Russian population with 
seemingly little concern for the future economic stability of the nation.89 Tire 
government of Yevgeny Primakov has also attempted to use the potential inflationary 
risks of printing more rubles and the threat of the renationalization of key industries as a 
means to pressure the West into providing more relief.90 These examples demonstrate 
the potential for Russian renationalization, although they by no means foreshadow an 
expansionist state. They do dramatize the need for continued cooperation between the 
West and Russia and the imperative to deepen Russia inclusion in the institutional 
framework of the West.
1998): or Grigory Yavlinsky, ‘‘Russia's Phony Capitalism," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 
(May/June 1998): 67-79.
^Some 34 percent of Russians surveyed said that a dictator with '‘supreme power" 
would be the only figure able to get Russia out of its current economic crisis. In 
addition, of those polled, most (19 percent o f the total) cited former general Alexander 
Lebed, an avowed nationalist, as the figure best suited to lead Russia; “Russia Poll: Bring 
on Dictatorship," Associated Press (23 September 1998). Meanwhile Lebed has 
publically called for Yeltsin’s resignation; “Lebed Calls for Yeltsin to Resign,” 
Associated Press (24 September 1998).
^Daniel Williams, “Plan to Print More Rubles Draws Fire,” Washington Post (29 
September 1998), A14.
90Mitchell Landsberg, “Russia Threatens Unpopular Measures,” Associated Press (1 
October 1998).
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The intensification of ethnic strife and conflict in and around Europe in die wake 
of the Cold War has led to a recognition that future security threats to the states of 
Western Europe will not likely come from direct, large-scale military invasions, but 
more likely come from internal conflicts that have the potential to either spread beyond 
national borders or disrupt trade and stability. On the continent itself, the most serious 
of these new risks is the growth of ethnic and religious strife in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The dispersion of ethnic minorities throughout the region, whose presence is 
usually unconnected with established national boundaries, creates the potential for 
transnational efforts to unify these groups, especially as nationalist forces use this issue 
to gamer public support in nascent democracies. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is 
the prime example of this, but calls for a “Greater Albania," or a “Greater Romania" 
demonstrate that the drive for territorial expansion has not entirely left the political 
landscape in the region.
Concurrent with the proliferation of these conflicts, has been a recognition that 
the place and status o f Russia in the European architecture has yet to be formalized. The 
militaiy potential of Russia, especially in strategic terms, still gives that state hegemonic 
potential over some areas of its near and abroad. Herein lies the prospect for future 
confrontations between Russia and the West as Russia works to retain and maintain 
some influence over states formerly within its sphere of influence, and the West works to 
reorient those states away from Russia through increased economic and security ties. At 
the same time, the West must also be concerned over ethnic and separatist clashes within 
Russia, such as Chechnya, and the potential spillover effect of conflicts in the states of 
the former Soviet Union, such as that in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. These disputes
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could undermine Russia's democratic processes and lay the foundation for an increase in 
an already strong nationalist movement. This is especially significant in light o f the 
fragility o f Yeltsin and the lack of a clear successor to ensure Moscow’s continued 
commitment to reform and incremental integration with the West. Russia’s economic 
crisis further exacerbates these trends and tends to erode support for Westem-style 
economic and democratic reform efforts and those Russian politicians who espouse such 
liberalization attempts.
During the Cold War. the nationstates o f Europe found that collective security 
and the Transatlantic Alliance provided the means with which to counter the Soviet 
threat, and the emergence of new threats must also be met through the institutional 
framework of European security. For the states o f Western Europe, security in the post- 
Cold War world has come to be defined collectively, and states have looked to 
institutions and regimes to develop policies that protect and defend national interests 
which themselves are increasingly expressed through the development o f international 
norms and rules.




Nationalism outside o f the continent o f Europe has increasingly become a 
significant factor in security equations for the nations of the West. Ethnic strife in 
various regions around the globe can impact the specific national interests o f EU states 
or. more broadly, have wide ramifications for Europe as a whole. This is especially true 
o f Europe’s southern flank. Political and economic instability in the Maghreb region 
have led to increased levels o f immigration and refugee outflows to Europe.
Concurrently, the states of southern Europe, including France and Italy, have faced 
increased risks from terrorism associated with conflicts in tire region. Algeria has been 
the main source of instability in the area, but the potential for unrest also exists in a 
number of other states along the Mediterranean coast and in the broader context o f the 
Middle East region, including the Persian Gulf. The proliferation of advanced weapons 
systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have added to tensions and prompted 
calls by states such as France, Spain and Italy for increased or new security structures to 
counter threats from the south. Concurrent with the proliferation of WMDs, the Middle 
East continues to be the largest arms market in the world. In 1997, the region accounted 
for some 40 percent of the world’s total arms imports at a value of some SI 5 billion.1 
This chapter will examine Europe’s interests in the region, and the potential threats to 
European interests posed by national and subnational forces in the Mediterranean basin,
^ee, ESS, The Military Balance. 1997/98. (London: Oxford, 1998).
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the Persian Gulf, and the broader region of the Middle East. Particular attention will be 
focused on the pivotal states o f Algeria, Iran, and Iraq during the period from 1991 to 
1997. These states may pose the most significant immediate sources for future 
instability, however, consideration will also be given to the potential for the spread of 
radical Islam throughout the region and its ability to be a destabilizing source.
Outside of the continent, the states of Western Europe face their most significant 
threat from nationalism from the Middle East region, including the Maghreb and the 
Mediterranean rim.2 This is especially true in the case of the religious nationalism 
associated with radical Islam. Three states with significant ties to Europe and significant 
European interests in them, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, face some level of threat 
to the current regimes from radical Islam. O f these, the regime in Algeria has stabilized 
its control over the nation, but continues to face the potential for a resurgence of the 
rebellion. Meanwhile the Mubarak regime in Egypt faces an ongoing low-intensity 
conflict, even as the regime in Saudi Arabia faces the potential for instability mainly 
over ties with the United States. The rapid growth in population and the growing 
inequity in wealth in these states has produced a populace that may respond to the 
message of radical Islam.3 For instance, the population of the Persian Gulf region rose 
from 45 million in 1980 to 100 million in 1995 and is expected to surpass!62 million by
2The Maghreb region includes the states o f northwest Africa--Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia.
3For example, in Saudi Arabia in 1980, the per capita income was S19,000. It had 
fallen to S6.900 by 1996; Gary S. Sick, "The Coming Crisis,” in The Persian Gulf at the 
Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, ed. Gary S. Sick and 
Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 20.
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20 lO.*1 The potential collapse of the regime in Algeria was of most immediate concern to 
moderate Islamist states since this could signal a spillover effect, but the regime seems 
to have stabilized the civil war in Algeria. The potential for a widespread “wave” of 
radical Islamist takeovers appears unlikely as the various national groups have been 
unable to form transborder movements or united opposition groups. In addition, many of 
the secular regimes in the region have successfully exploited the divisions among Islamic 
groups within their borders as a means to remain in power. Nonetheless, the increasingly 
transnational language and ideology of radical Islamic movements threaten to increase 
confrontations between these groups and their nation’s regimes.5 The perception of an 
Islamist threat to existing regimes was the focus of the antiterrorism code of conduct 
adopted at the 1994 Casablanca Islamic Conference and of subsequent meetings of the 
Arab ministers of the interior at conferences such as the 1995 Tunis conference.6 
Furthermore, even with its moderate government, Iran continues to promote its 
revolutionary version of Islam.7
When the Islamic fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the first 
round of parliamentary elections in December of 1991, the Algerian military canceled 
the second round of elections, forced the president to resign and installed a military
•'Ibid., 19-20.
5On the lack of cohesion among radical Islamic groups and the likelihood for various 
regimes to retain power, see Ibrahim A. Karawan, “The Islamist Impasse,” Adelphi 
Paper, no. 314 (November 1997).
6HSS, Strategic Survey 1994/95 (London: EISS, 1995), 139.
Anthony S. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas o f  Dual Containment 
(Boulder: Westview, 1997), 4.
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controlled government. Since that time, the Algerian military has been engaged in a 
counterinsurgency struggle against the FIS and the even more radical Groupe Islamique 
Arme (GIA).8 These groups have staged stunning terrorist acts, including the 
assassination of prominent government figures and numerous car bombings. The 
military has been able to keep the insurgency under control through a series o f notably 
brutal offensives against the Islamists. Since 1994, the situation in Algeria has been a 
military stalemate with the Islamists unable to topple the government and the 
government unable to completely stamp out the insurrection.9 In spite of the 
government’s fierce campaign of repression against the GIA.10 the military-backed 
government has maintained support, albeit somewhat tepid, from the international 
community.11 Most significantly for the Europeans is the possibility that the GIA might
8In addition to the GIA. one o f the largest armed Islamist groups is the Armee 
islamique chi saint (Islamic Salvation Army) or AIS which is the armed wing of the FIS. 
However, the AIS claims to only attack military and government targets, not civilian 
groups. Other groups include the Ligne islamique cle la daawa et le djihad (T-IDD), the 
Islamic League for Preaching and Holy War and the Front islamique pour le Djihad 
arme (FID A), the Islamic Front for Holy War.
9 While the conflict is essentially in a military stalemate, it continues to take its toll on 
the population, both pro- and anti-Islamist. Casualties are estimated to be between 
30,000 and 40,000 over the period from 1992 to 1995; USS, The Military Balance. 
1995/96 (London: Oxford, 1995), 124. By 1998, Amnesty International estimates that 
the conflict had produced some 80,000 casualties; Amnesty International, Algeria: 
Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral o f  Violence (New York: Amnesty International, 
1998).
I0On this point, see the above cited Amnesty International report or for instance UN, 
Concluding Observations o f  the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Algeria.
CRC/C/15/Add. 76, (18 June 1997).
“ Tire most visible sign o f this support came in 1998, when a UN commission offered 
its support to the government of President Liamine Zeroual stating that "Algeria deserves 
the support of the international community in its efforts” to end the civil war; Charles 
Truheart, “U.N. Panel Backs Algerian Drive to Crush Terror Campaign,” Washington
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resume its campaign against foreigners that it initiated in September of 1993. This 
campaign resulted in the killings of several European diplomats, business figures and 
tourists.12 Between 1992 and 1997. 133 foreigners have been killed by extremist groups 
in Algeria.13 Attacks against foreigners, however, paled in comparison with the 
widespread terror campaign against the nation’s civilian population. Among the more 
spectacular o f these incidents was the August 28. 1997 attack on the village of Sidi Rais, 
just south of Algiers. In this attack some 300 people were massacred, many o f them 
women and children. In another attack, on the night of September 23, o f the same year, 
more than 200 civilians were massacred at Baraki.1'1 These attacks were followed by 
raids on four villages on the first day o f Ramadan (the first week of January) in which 
some 400 civilians were killed.15 The atrocities committed by the Islamic groups have 
ended any support they may have had from the outside world and have led to 
condemnation by both the UN and the EU.16 The attacks also prompted the Arab League
Post (17 September 1998), A28.
12U.S., Department of State, Patterns o f  Global Terrorism: 1997, no. 10535 
(Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1998).
13 Ibid.
u Amnesty International, 7-8.
15“Hundreds Murdered in Widespread Algeria Attacks,” ICTMews (6 January 1998).
16For instance, UN Secretary General Kofi .Annan called for the GLA. to ”a£firm the 
sanctity o f human life and cease their terrorist attacks;” UN, "Secretary-General 
Deplores Continuing Loss of Life in Algeria,” Press Release SG/SM/6434 (12 January 
1998). Meanwhile the Presidency of the EU declared that “terrorists must stop this 
mindless violence against innocent people. No motive can justify these atrocities. The 
European Union supports and encourages all efforts of the Algerian authorities, within 
the rule o f law and consistent with human rights, to protect their citizens from 
terrorism;” EU, “Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union:
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to sign an antiterrorist accord on April 22, 1998.17 While the Ramadan violence abated 
somewhat in 1999, attacks continued albeit on a lesser scale. Pre-Ramadan attacks in 
December of 1999, claimed the lives of at least 100 villagers and followed the patterns 
of attacks in previous years.18 These attacks preceded the massacre of 81 'villagers and 
the kidnaping of 20 women in three mountain villages near Tadjena. By the start of 
Ramadan on December 20, 1999, some 200 Algerians had been killed by extremists.19 
Furthermore, the GIA increased attacks on military targets in Algeria in January of 
1999.20
Algeria is important to European policy makers for a variety of reasons. The 
historical ties to France make the nation of particular concern to Paris. France is home 
to some 800.000 Algerians, who form part o f a larger Muslim community o f some 4 
million. With unemployment hovering around 11%, the French government is 
concerned over the possibility' of a flood of new immigrants at a time when a significant 
portion of the French population blames France's economic problems on foreign
Massacres in Algeria," Press Release (5 January 1998).
1 While negotiations behind the accord had been ongoing for two years the .Algerian 
massacres seemed to galvanize the Arab states: “.Arab League States Sign an Accord to 
Fight Terrorism and Extremism,” ICT News (23 April 1998). Among other things the 
accord calls for states to extradite suspected terrorists. Already Syria has handed over 
sixteen suspected terrorists whom it had been harboring since 1992 to Algeria and Saudi 
.Arabia has extradited a prominent follower of Osama bin Ladin to Egypt: “First Fruits of 
Arab League Accord to Fight Terrorism,” ICT News (9 July 1998).
18tlDeath Toll Hits 100 in Algeria's Pre-Ramadan Violence,” CNN Interactive (9 
December, 1998).
19“Militants Massacre 81 and Kidnap 20,” Sydney Morning Herald (12 December. 
1998), 1.
20“Upsurge in Algeria Killings,” BBC News (2 January, 1999).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
149
workers.21 France, which is home to an estimated 350,000-500,000 illegal immigrants, 
continues the process of tightening immigration controls.22 A measure approved in 
1997, makes it easier to locate and remove illegal immigrants.23 Polls showed that 59 
percent of the French people supported the government’s tougher immigration policies.2'1 
During the parliamentary elections, the Socialists pledged to repeal these tough laws, 
however once in power they settled for a softening of the restrictions which now allows 
easier asylum and the government granted amnesty to some 76,000 immigrants, although 
it rejected the amnesty bids of dome 64,000 asylum-seekers.23
Other southern European states have similar concerns over the impact of 
immigration from the Mediterranean.26 In December and January of 1998, suburbs in 
both France and Belgium were wracked by violence after two youths of North African 
descent were killed by French police in Strasbourg and a suspected drug dealer of 
Moroccan descent was killed by Belgium authorities. Tensions in Belgium between 
French speaking North .Africans and the native Flemish and Dutch speaking in Brussels
21 Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy\ 
99 (Summer 1995): 138-40.
“ .Andrew Jack, "French Planning Tougher Curbs on Immigration." The Financial 
Times (April 21, 1996), 2; “French Parliament Debates Immigration Laws,” BBC News. 
(5 December 1998).
^ ’’France: Immigration Reform Approved,” Migration News 4, no. 3 (March 1997).
24Ibid.
25“France: Amnesty Controversy,” Migration News 5, no. 10 (October 1998), 9.
•“In fact, areas of southern Italy and Spain have the EU’s highest unemployment rates
at close to 30 percent at a time when the EU average unemployment rate is 10.7 percent;
EU, “Unemployment in EU Regions,” Eurostat, no. 7598 (24 September 1998).
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are exacerbated by the refusal of the Belgium government to give the North Africans 
voting rights for fear of upsetting the nation's political balance between French and non- 
French speakers.27 The violence in Belgium was the worst since 1992.
With the history of Arab extremist-sponsored terrorist attacks in France, there 
remains a concern that a deterioration in Algeria would lead to an escalation o f terrorist 
attacks in response for French support o f the government in .Algeria.28 The year 1995. 
proved to be the most significant one for such attacks, but 1996 also witnessed a number 
of spectacular attacks including the December 3 bombing of a Paris subway which killed 
4 and injured 86.29 Other European states have also been impacted by terror attacks 
committed by Islamist groups including the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).30 In 
addition, in May of 1998, Scotland Yard arrested eight men in Great Britain while 
Belgian authorities arrested seven additional suspects in part of a three-way operation 
between Belgian, British and French officials in an effort to foil a bomb plot against the 
World Cup matches held in France. The suspects were all linked to the GLA.31
i7t'France, Belgium: Suburbs, Algeria," Migration News 5, no. 2 (February" 1998).
■^During a three month period in the late summer and fall of 1995, the GLA carried 
out eight bombings in France which killed seven and wounded over 160, and then 
demanded that Chirac convert to Islam. All of which led the French to deploy an 
additional 12,000 police and troops in major metropolitan areas: Fred Coleman, 
"Toujours la guerre: Algerian Fanatics Unleash a Terrorist Wave in France that could 
Escalate," U.S. News and World Reports (30 October, 1995), 44-47.
“’No group claimed responsibility for the subway bombing, but French authorities 
blame Algerian fundamentalist groups.
30For an overview of Islamist terrorism, see Reuven Paz, "Is There an ‘Islamic 
Terrorism’,” ICT Policy> Briefs (7 September 1998).
3U‘Islamic Fundamentalists Arrested in England,” ICT News (13 May 1998).
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In general the West European states have been able to maintain sound economic 
and political relations with most of the Arab world.32 Nonetheless, specific cases such as 
Algeria or Libya point to the potential for instability to affect European interests.33 In 
addition, the militarization of both the Gulf region and North Africa could pose serious 
risks to European economic interests, especially energy imports, and even to the 
continent itself.3-1 For instance, France still has significant economic interests in .Algeria. 
France has been able to diversify its trading patterns in the region, but Algeria still 
supplies France with some 30 per cent of its natural gas and significant amount of oil. In 
addition, French exports account for some 31 per cent o f Algeria’s imports and 13 
percent of Algeria's exports go to France.35 Spain and Italy have concluded agreements 
with Algeria to more than double their imports of Algerian natural gas.36 In 1997,
Algeria provided Italy with 18.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas or roughly the 
nation’s total imports of the energy source. That same year, .Algeria provided Spain with
32See, for instance, Enzo Grilli, The European Community and the Developing 
Countries (New York: Cambridge 1993), 180-211.
33As a region, the Mediterranean constitutes the ELFs third largest partner with an 
annual volume o f trade approaching $65 billion a year, Andres Ortega, "Relations With 
the Maghreb," in Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges o f  
the Mediterranean, ed. John W. Holmes (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation. 1995),
35.
3-1 See Ian O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges 
(Santa Monica: RAND 1993).
35Pierre, 131-32.
36Ortega, "Relations," 35.
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4.2 billion cubic meters o f natural gas or three-quarters o f Spain’s imports.37 The 
Maghreb will continue to be important as an energy source as European consumption of 
petroleum and natural gas continues to grow.38 In 1997, Algeria exported some .68 
million barrels of oil to the EU per day, while Libya exported 1.27 million barrels per 
day. Only Saudi Arabia exported more than Libya and only Saudi Arabia and Iran 
exported more to the EU than Algeria.39 Of the EU’s four major oil importers, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, three are in the Mediterranean region.40 While falling oil 
prices have hurt the Middle East economies, they have increased European consumption 
of petroleum. Crude oil prices have fallen by S2 dollars a barrel over the last year, with 
no end in sight to the decline.41 The increased consumption in major European states has 
had the effect o f providing an impetus for oil-producing states to maintain their excess 
production which continues to depress prices.42 Low petroleum prices have also led 
some governments, notably Germany, to implement plans to cut nuclear energy 
production.
These ties mirror the overall economic bonds that exist between Europe and its 
neighbors to the south. Geographic proximity alone would lead to close economic ties
3 British Petroleum, BP Statiscal Review o f World Energy: 1998 (London: BP, 1998).
38European consumption of petroleum was grown steadily since 1981, from 390 
million tons per year to 480 million tons per year in 1997; Ibid.
39U.S., Energy Information Agency, International Petroleum Statistics Report: 1998 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO 1998).
40Ibid.
41"Oil Prices Wilt as Refiners Cut Runs,” Reuters (26 January 1999).
42“Saudi Oil Minister Says No Excess Oil Supply” Reuters (26 January 1999).
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and the potential markets o f the south are highly prized by the European states. These 
ties reflect close cultural ties between the states of southern Europe and the region. The 
contemporary primacy of the U.S. in the region is something o f an exception created by 
the Cold War. The EU states are now the third largest consumers of natural gas. after 
the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS) and the United States, and unlike the 
CIS and the United States which are not only self-sufficient in natural gas but are net 
exporters, Western Europe is almost wholly dependent on natural gas imports. The EU 
accounted for some 87 percent of Arab natural gas exports in 1992.'° In 1997, that figure 
remained relatively constant.44 In addition, Arab oil exports from the Maghreb to the 
EU accounted for 14 percent of the EU's total oil imports.45 As demand for energy 
supplies rises in Asia, it becomes increasingly important for the EU to secure its base 
source for these resources. By the year 2000. Asia is expected to surpass Europe in total 
energy consumption by some 300,000 barrels per day.46 Forecast models predict that the 
Maghreb will continue to expand production capabilities and could thus provide a 
greater share of energy exports to the EU if Asian nations secure a greater share of 
Persian Gulf oil exports.4 Since the end of the Persian Gulf War. India has also
430APEC, Secretary General's Twentieth Annual Report: 1993 (Safat, Kuwait: 
OAPEC, 1994), 30.
44British Petroleum. 374.
45EU, Commission of the European Communities (CEC), European Economy: The 
European Community as a World Trade Partner, 1993 (Brussels: CEC, 1993), 88.
4<sU.S., Energy Information Agency (EIA), International Energy Outlook: 1996. With 
Projections to the Year 2000 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 3.
47Ibid.
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undertaken notable steps to secure market share in the Persian Gulf.48 This is especially 
significant in light of the fact that the Persian Gulf region accounts for 64.9 percent of 
the world’s proven oil reserves.49
On the other hand, the Mediterranean and Middle East states provide tremendous 
trading opportunities for the EU. Trade between the EU and Middle East has doubled 
since 1975. The EU provides the largest share o f direct foreign investment to the Persian 
Gulf, some 32.6 percent.50 Also, the EU is by far the largest supplier o f products to the 
Middle East in general, providing some 36 percent of the region total imports—compared 
to the 13 percent of both the United States and Japan, respectively51
In the Persian Gulf, much of the focus o f EU trade relations continues to be on 
Iran and Iraq. The French continue to see Iran as strategically important which has been 
enhanced by the emergence of the Central Asian States.5'  Paris' commercial interest is no 
less important. The French import about 8 billion francs worth of oil and export roughly 
5 billion francs worth of its goods to Iran. The Chirac government has rescheduled 
Iranian debt and has extended additional official credits at preferential rates.'3 Indeed,
48Since 1995, India has embarked on a number o f ventures which include a potential 
oil pipeline from Iran and deals with Oman and Qatar, Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. 
Harkavy, Strategic Geograpfiv and the Changing Middle East (Washington, D.C.: 





531MF, Islamic Republic o f  Iran: Recent Economic Developments, Report SM/95/240 
(19 September 1995), appendix 5, table 55.
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the absence of American industries, because of the nation’s "Dual Containment” policy, 
has opened the door to French engineering and petroleum firms.
Engaging Iran has not been limited to France, however. Germany has also taken a 
dim view of isolating the Islamic Republic. Forty-two German banks jointly offered Iran 
unlimited long-term loans to assist in its second five-year development program. The 
German government has also agreed to finance S700 million worth of loans to Iran’s five 
leading banks. Meanwhile, even Turkey has embarked on a number of ventures with 
Iran, including a deal to import S23 billion in Iranian natural gas.1-1
In the Middle East, the Maghreb region has the greatest economic ties with 
Europe. It is the third largest trading partner of the EU with a volume of trade over S65 
billion a year and it is a region which promises continued market growth/5 Many of the 
nations in the region post significant growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).56 In 
1995, the Mediterranean region accounted for 8.2 percent of the EU’s exports and 5.7 
percent of its imports.57
In the overall Mediterranean region, Turkey is the EU's most significant trading 
partner and accounts for 24 percent (approximately ECU 9.2 billion) of the total imports 
from the region. Turkey is followed by .Algeria and Libya, each of whom provide 15
54Cordesman, Iran, 16.
55The EU’s balance of trade with the region provides the Union with a significant 
export surplus. By 1995, that surplus had risen to ECU 13.7 billion; EU, "EU Trade with 
the Mediterranean Countries, Results for 1995.” Eurostat, no. 13/96 (January' 1996).
56Ibid.
5/EU, "Step Forward in Euro-Mediterranean Statistical Cooperation,” Eurostat, no.
397 (15 April 1997), 1.
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percent of the EU’s imports (ECU 6 billion).53 While some 60 percent of both the 
imports from and exports to the region come from just three nations. Germany. France 
and Italy, all EU members with the exception of Portugal have trade surpluses with the 
region.59 The majority o f EU exports go to just three nations in the region, Turkey (26 
percent), Israel (16 percent), and Algeria (12 percent).60
The Maghreb region is also a major destination for EU tourists. For instance, in 
1995 the region played host to some 26 million tourists from the EU.61 For many nations 
in the region tourists from the EU members provide at least half, and in many more than 
half, of tire total number of tourists each year.62 The region provides a close and 
inexpensive destination for many Europeans and also forces the EU governments to pay 
close attention to political stability in the region in order to safeguard their citizens. The 
threat of terrorism has also led to calls for collective responses among the EU 
members.63 .An example of the potential for catastrophe occurred in Egypt in November
58EU, "EU Trade Surplus with Mediterranean Hits 13.7 Bn ECU." Eurostat, no. 797 
(28 January 1997).
:9France had the largest surplus with some ECU 3.7 billion, followed by Germany 
with ECU 2.7 billion. Even Portugal’s deficit was minor at ECU 2 million; ibid.
“ Ibid.
61EU, no. 397.
62Turkey is the most popular destination with some 7.7 million EU tourist each year, 
while Tunisia and Egypt come in second and third at 4.1 million and 3.1 million 
respectively; Ibid.
63For instance, in 1997 former German Chancellor Plelmut Kohl stated that "alone, we 
[Germany] will not be able to bring international criminality, the drugs Mafia and the 
threat of terrorism under control.” He went on to call for increased Europeanization to 
deal with such issues; Federal Republic of Germany, Office of Press and Information, 
Helmut Kohl, Speech Given on 3 November 1997 in Berlin, Press Release no. 19621 (3
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of 1997 when Islamist militants attacked a group of tourists in Luxor, killing 64 and 
wounding 25. This incident followed a number of attacks including the September 1997 
shooting on a Cairo bus and an April 1996 attack when gunmen opened fire on tourists 
outside the Hotel Europa near the Pyramids.6̂ In the summer of 1998. Egyptian 
authorities foiled a plot by the anti-government Islamist group, al-Jihad, to kidnap 
.American tourists in Egypt.65
There has also been an increasing amount of industrial relocation of European 
manufacturing concerns to the Maghreb region as European companies have tended to 
view the region as a "European Mexico."66 In response to the expanded economic 
opportunities, there has been a dramatic increase in EU economic aid to the Maghreb (an 
increase of some 370 per cent).6 This economic interaction forces the EU to take 
potential instability in region very seriously.
The EU must also factor in the impact of .Arab immigration in policy 
considerations. In overall terms, the EU is home to some 5 million people from the 
Mediterranean region. They account for some 1.3 percent o f the total population and 8
November 1997).
6-1 For an overview o f Egypt’s struggle against armed opposition terrorist groups, see 
Jon B. Alterman, ‘"The Luxor Shooting and Egypt’s Armed Islamist Opposition.” 
Policvwatch 279 (17 November 1997).
65 Al-Jihad is the same group that staged the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat. The group planned to use the Americans hostages in an effort to gain the 
release o f imprisoned comrades; “Islamic Militants Planned to Kidnap Americans in 
Egypt,” ICT News (28 June 1998).
“̂ Ortega, 35.
o7Ibid, p. 53; for a detailed examination of the economic policies o f the EU towards 
the Maghreb see Grilli.
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percent of the EU’s total immigrant population and 27.6 percent of the non-nationals 
living in the various EU countries.68 Germany and France were home to most o f these 
immigrants—45.5 percent were in Germany and 33.6 percent were in France.69 Of the 
immigrant population, the overwhelming majority in Germany were of Turkish descent, 
while in France most were from the Maghreb region. The potential for terrorism among 
the Mediterranean immigrant population has led to calls to enhance the police powers of 
the EU to stop transborder migration within the EU and prevent the movement of 
suspected terrorists."0
Algeria is not the only potential source of instability in the region. At present 
territorial disputes continue in Morocco, Libya and in several states in the eastern 
Mediterranean. In Morocco the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) continues its mission to monitor the cease-fire agreement between the 
Moroccan government and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Segida el-Hamra y  
de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) and progress toward a political settlement of the conflict 
continues to elude UN negotiators.71 Meanwhile. Libya faced a significant Islamic 
uprising in the eastern section of the nation in 1996, but government troops were able to
“ EU, ’’Populations and Social Conditions: Migration Between the Mediterranean 
basin and the EU in 1995," Eurostat, no. 3/98 (March 1998).
69EU, “EU Has Nearly 5 Million People From ‘Med 12'," Eurostat, no. 498 (16 April
1998), 1.
“Federal Republic of Germany, Press Release no. 30487.
"USS, The Military Balance, 1996/97 (London: Oxford, 1997), 120.
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suppress the movement.72 While both Morocco and Tunisia have been spared significant 
terrorist activity, both governments have been especially concerned over the potential for 
such actions and have taken the lead in sponsoring multilateral antiterrorist efforts, 
including the aforementioned Arab League accord.
In addition, several states have the capacity to cause significant instability in the 
region. Egypt, a critical state for maintaining stability in the region and an important 
actor in the Arab-Israeli peace process, has been engaged in a struggle against Islamic 
radicals for some time and domestic problems would only seem to exacerbate this 
struggle.73 While the regime of President Hosni Mubarak has thus far been able to 
contain the insurrection through repeated military offensives against rebel groups such as 
the Takfir and Higra groups, it has not been able to completely crush the insurgents. '4 If 
the Mubarak regime were to fall, the consequences could be extremely damaging to 
peace in the region.
In addition, Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, its aggressive armament program 
and its adventurism in Chad, also make it a source of deep concern for European, and 
especially French, policy makers. The possibility of another Libyan intervention in Chad 
was particularly worrisome for the French who have some 800 troops in Chad. France 
also has a bilateral defense treaty with the Central African Republic directly to the south
^Ibid.
"•’On the various potential sources for domestic unrest in Egypt, such as a growing 
urban poor and a population surge, see Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, 
"Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs 75, no.l (January 1996): 40-41.
74During a 1996 crackdown, the Egyptian Army captured some 245 suspected 
insurgents in 17 different provinces; "Crackdown on Islamic Militants," Financial Times 
(April 11, 1996), 4.
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of Chad, besides the numerous other military missions in the Francophone states of 
central Africa.75 Hence, containment of Libya is a major concern for the French. In 
response, Paris has attempted to utilize the collective powers and capabilities of the 
West's institutions to achieve these goals.
The EU states must also concern themselves with other conflicts in the region 
including the Kurdish problem and the question of Cyprus. WEU assets were used in the 
humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq, and a small contingent remains under the 
auspices of the UN. Furthermore, Turkey, a full member of NATO and an associate 
member of the WEU, brings its ongoing war with Kurdish separatists into the forum of 
both institutions. The Assembly of the WEU cited Turkey's actions in eastern Anatolia 
against the Kurds in 1995, as one of factors limiting Turkey's ability to be "integrated 
into Europe's intergovernmental and supranational structures."'6 This is in addition to 
Turkey's excursions into Iraq which create further complications for the EU. especially at 
a time when the French and Germans are pressing hard for a constructive engagement 
with Iraq.77
Syrian support for the rebel group the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) led to the 
1996 Military Training and Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Israel which 
allows for Israeli use of some Turkish airfields for training and reconnaissance missions.
7inSS, 1995, 238-39; France, Ministry of Defense, White Paper on Defense, 1994 
(Paris: SIRPA, 1994), 64-65.
6 WEU, Assembly of the WEU, Parliamentary Co-operation in the Mediterranean. 
WEU Document 1485 (6 November 1995).
MSee Anthony H. Cordesman and .Ahmed S. Has him. Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond 
(Boulder: Westview, 1997), 206-208.
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The Turkish military pressed hard for this arrangement as a means to pressure Syria into 
ending its support for the PKK.78 Syrian support for the PKK has led to heightened 
tensions between the two nations. Turkey has bolstered its troop presence on the border 
between the two nations and Turkish military aircraft have violated Syrian airspace. The 
crisis has reached a point that both the United States and the Arab League have 
attempted to mediate tensions and develop a diplomatic solution to the issue. 9
The Cyprus question carries the problem of ethnic strife between two Alliance 
partners, Turkey and Greece, into considerations over the future of the region. At 
present the European powers are pressuring Turkey to withdraw its troops in exchange 
for the deployment of a UN sponsored peace-keeping force.80 However. Greece and 
Turkey remain engaged in an arms race and both regard the other as their main security 
threat. The Greeks plan to spend some S24 billion over the next eight years while the 
Turks plan to spend S31 over the next decade in order to modernize their forces.81
All of the southern European nations have grave concerns over the militarization 
of the region. There have been significant increases in the defense budgets of most of 
the Maghreb states and Egypt.82 Most alarmingly, these increases have been spent on the
"TISS. Military Balance 1995/1996, 121.
,9“U.S. Urges Restraint in Turkey-Syria Standoff,” CNN Interactive (6 October 1998).
80HSS, Military' Balance 1995/1996, 121.
8ITasos Kokkinides, Lucy Amis and Nino Lorenzini, “Diplomacy and Arms: West 
Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries," BASIC PAPERS, no. 29 (August 1998), 
1-3.
82For instance, Algeria's defense budget increased by 48% to SI.3 billion, while 
Egypt's defense spending increased by $200 million a year since 1993 to an estimated S2 
billion a year in 1995; IISS. Military' Balance 1995/1996, 127.
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acquisition of advanced military hardware, including missiles capable of reaching 
Europe.83 Algeria now possesses ten SU-24 strike bombers, 2 Soviet Kilo-class 
submarines, and 18 launching pads for its FROG-7 and FROG-4 tactical missiles. 
Meanwhile both Egypt and Libya’s arsenal includes SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles.84
Furthermore, the European states are particularly concerned with the acquisition 
of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This concern is especially relevant now 
that several countries, including Algeria and Libya, have the aforementioned delivery 
systems. In 1989, .Algeria built a nuclear research reactor at Quera, and a second, larger 
reactor is under construction, with Chinese collaboration. Although a signatory of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard agreements are 
not in place yet. More alarming in the immediate sense is Libya. Colonel Muammar 
Kadhafi has publicly called for an "Islamic bomb," and has attempted to obtain a nuclear 
weapon for years. Libya presently has a Soviet-built nuclear reactor at Tajora, and 
construction has begun a larger reactor. In addition, Libya embarked on a massive 
campaign to develop chemical weapons (CWs) in 1985 with the construction o f CVV 
plant at Rabta. After discovery of this plant, most of Libya's C\V research seems to have 
been transferred to a partially constructed plant at Tarhuna. It is estimated that Libya
^Algeria, Libya and Iran are actively pursuing negotiations with China and Iran to 
purchase missile systems with ranges that exceed 1,000 kilometers—which would put 
them well within range of southern Europe; Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, A Sense 
o f Siege: The Geopolitics o f  Islam and the West (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 67.
84 WEU, 1485; US S. Military Balance 1995/96, 129.
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spends several hundred million dollars a year on its CW program, besides its S960 
million defense budget.85
Since his election in May 1995, Chirac has tried to revive what the French 
perceive as a “great Arab policy”, better known as Charles de Gaulle’s politique arabe.
One of the features of this strategy is its marked independence from American policy. In 
general terms, as Chirac himself points out, French policy emphasizes the need for the 
EU to develop into "an active and powerful center, the equal of the United States.” 86 
This strategy was illustrated in recent years by Chirac’s whirlwind tour of the Middle 
East in which he demonstrated French autonomy from U.S. policy. While in the region, 
he took steps to improve relations with the Arabs, even at the expense of Franco-Israeli 
relations. Exacerbating tensions further with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Chirac refused to recognize a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control and met 
with PLO officials at Orient House in East Jerusalem.
Many assert that the “exception” of American domination in the region will be 
relatively short lived. Europe will eventually grow impatient and frustrated with the 
present phase, in which Europe so clearly lacks the influence that it had for centuries. 
Compounding this lack of influence is the feeling that for the first time in contemporary 
history the Middle East could constitute a threat to European security.8'
85R. Jeffrey Smith, "Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon's List of Threats," Washington 
Post (April 12, 1996), A32; on the Libyan defense budget, see ESS, Military Balance 
1995/96, 140.
“ Jacques Chirac, “Pour un modele europeen,” Libereration (15 March 1996).
^Southern Europe in particular is vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. In 1986, two 
Libyan SCUD missiles fell short of the target in Italy. Today, the advances in ballistic 
missile technology would allow for a more precise strike against southern Europe from
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The Persian Gulf provides an illustration of the European bid for increased 
regional influence. The EU is interested in maintaining influence in the region for many 
the same reasons that propel engagement in the Mediterranean. In economic terms, the 
Persian Gulf is more significant than the Maghreb when it comes to energy imports. The 
region provides between 40 and 50 percent of the EU’s total imports of oil.88 This is 
especially significant in the case of France where energy imports have grown 
dramatically after declining for several years in the 1980s.89 France’s dual engagement 
policy reflects an effort to establish Paris as a present and future player in the region, 
while acknowledging the inability to supplant US dominance. Specifically, constructive 
engagement is a series of policies that ultimately seek dialogue without significant 
concession. In return for changes in behavior or policy, the target state is granted 
improvements in political and economic relations in what may be described as a "carrot" 
and "stick” policy which does not offer acquiescence. In the Mediterranean, Libya 
provides a qualified example of the success of engagement polices. The nation provides 
a significant amount of energy resources to Italy, which in turn, exports a variety of 
products to that nation. .As the Libyan government has worked to maintain access to
as far away as Iran and Iraq.
^In 1997, the Persian Gulf accounted for 45 percent of the EU’s oil imports 
compared with 43 percent in 1992 and 43 percent in 1987. The high level point in the 
last fifteen years occurred in 1993 when the region supplied the EU with 50 percent of 
its oil imports; U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, Persian Gulf 
Oil Export Fact Sheet (February 1998).
^From 1994 to 1997, French energy imports grew from 99.6 billion francs per year to 
129.7 billion francs per year; France, Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes 
Economiques (INSEE), L 'Economie frangaise-edition 1998-1999, abridged English ed., 
(Paris: INSEE, 1998).
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Western capital, there has been a corresponding decrease in that nation's support for 
international terrorism.
France's difficulties with the American dual containment range from the 
philosophical to the financial. Eric Rouleau made the point clearly in a Foreign Affairs 
article when he described Europe has having a "skeptical" view o f American Middle East 
policy. This is especially true in discussions of "rogue" or "pariah” regimes. Rouleau 
asserts that the majority of European states have no equivalent phrase in their political 
lexicon for "pariah" or "backlash" states.90 Hence, they are much more likely to consider 
tactics of engagement toward rogue regimes.
This penchant for engagement is reinforced when significant economic interests 
are at stake. Germany and France are Iran's largest trading partners. Their economic 
interests developed as the US tightened its controls on US investment in Iran. In Iraq,
Paris has already signed agreements which commits French industries to join oil industry 
products as soon as UN sanctions are lifted. In both cases there is a sense that Chirac is 
making good on his promise to transform French policy in the Middle East to be "more 
active and more ambitious." In this effort, Chirac has followed the traditional French 
tactic of utilizing institutional relationships in an effort to achieve national goals.
The British and French have signed defense accords with all o f the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In part as a result of these defense accords, British 
and French military personnel have been involved in a number o f joint exercises in the 
region such as maritime reconnaissance training, communications exercises, and
^Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq: The View from France,” 
Foreign Affairs 42, 3 (January-February 1995): 59.
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combined naval and air exercises with the GCC states.91 Examples of such operations 
include the joint Anglo-Omani Swift Shield exercise and the two Franco-Qatari bilateral 
operations titled Pearl Gathering.92
The Europeans have also stationed their own forces in the region. Great Britain 
and France, for instance, continue to station naval units in the Gulf, the most significant 
being the British Armilla Patrol.93 The British and French also have formal agreements 
with all o f the GCC states that allow them to use the naval and air stations of the various 
GCC countries. They also have various independent ground and air units in the GCC 
states, as well as forces involved in the United Nations contingent monitoring the 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi border (UNIKOM).94
The European military presence in the region has also increased simultaneously 
with the increasing European share of arms transfers to Gulf states. These sales have 
often paved the way for closer military cooperation and training, and access to GCC 
military facilities. For instance, the sale of 48 Tornado jets to Saudi .Arabia in 1988 
included an invitation to Britain to construct new airbases and train Saudi pilots.95
91 UK. Nlinistry o f Defense, Statement on the Defense Estimates. 1994, (London: 
HMSO, 1994), 4*9.
92J. de Lestapis, “Oman’s Armed Forces Keep up the Standard,” Jane's Defence 
Weekly 24, no. 13 (June 1995), 35; Ibid., “Qatar Shops .Around,” Jane's Defence Weekly 
24, no. 13 (June 1995), 38.
93UK. Ministry of Defense, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1995. (London: 
HMSO, 1995), 2*2-23, 48.
94For instance, the British military has some 1500 officers and NCOs serving with the 
Omani armed forces.
95HSS, The Military Balance. 1988/89 (London: HSS, 1989), 94.
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In addition to the bilateral links between the Gulf states and various European 
powers, there has also been an increasing amount of intra-European cooperation and 
force deployment in the region. The Iran-Iraq War marked the beginning of this trend as 
naval units from five nations (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands), 
acting under the auspices of the WEU, began routine minesweeping and tanker escort 
duties, separate from and independent of American naval forces in the region.96
WEU ships stopped some 16,000 out of the 21,000 ships searched during the 
period of the embargo.97 From this experience, the WEU has continued regular 
consultation with Gulf states on three levels: Political (through bilateral governmental 
contacts or EU contacts through groups such as the EU's Parliamentary Association for 
Euro-Arab Cooperation); Ministerial (Ministry of Defense contacts); and Local (at the 
level of the individual base or naval unit commander).98 Through these actions, the EU 
states have started to institutionalize their relations with the GCC.
The potential sources of instability emanating from the Mediterranean have 
prompted several attempts to develop a comprehensive, collective response. Individual 
European states have turned to the collective framework of the West's institutions to 
develop and implement policies that are beyond the scope of any one single nation.
NATO, the EU and the WEU have all been tasked by memberstates to attempt to
96Ibid., Strategic Survey, 1987-88 (London: HSS, 1988), 130.
97Willem Van Eekelen, "Defence and Security in a Changing World—WEU: The 
European Pillar?", Defense Yearbook, 1992 (London: Brassey's, 1992), 72.
^Willem Van Eekelen, "The Western European Union, European Security Interests 
and the Gulf," in Global Interests in the Arab Gulf ed. Charles E. Davies (New York:
St. Martin's, 1992), 176.
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implement dialogues with the Mediterranean states in order to build a framework to deal 
with future instability." As a report by the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) notes: 
“Mediterranean stability requires not only a military approach but, even more 
importantly, a comprehensive security approach that includes economic, social, and even 
historical considerations. In fact, most of the countries in the southern Mediterranean 
basin consider that security is equivalent to social stability which can only be achieved 
through development, in turn the base for democracy.”100 With the exception of the 
aborted “Euro-Arab” dialogue of the 1970s, the Mediterranean policy of the EU has been 
essentially an economic cooperation policy. The Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
(RMP), begun in 1990, has led to significant increases in EU aid to the region. From 
1992-1996, the EU provided some 4 billion ECU, three times as much as the period from 
1987-1991.101 However, in 1994 the EU has recognized the need for increased security' 
collaboration in the region. In June of that year, the European Council mandated that the 
Council of Ministers "evaluate, together with the Commission, the global policy of the 
European Union in the Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this 
policy in the short and medium term.”102
"On the various efforts to develop cooperation initiatives for the Mediterranean, see 
NATO, North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, 
Interim Report o f  the Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, AM 87 CC/'MB (95) 5 
(May 1995).
100NATO, NAA, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, AM 
295 PC/SR (95) 2 (October 1995).
10INATO, NAA, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, Frameworks For 
Cooperation in the Mediterranean, AM 259 CC/MB (95) 7 (October 1995).
I02EU, European Council, “Corfu Summit,” Age nee Europe, NX 6260, (June 1994),
10 .
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In 1992. the WEU began attempts to develop contacts with states in the region.
The WEU approach, however, has been limited to diplomatic contacts between the WEU 
presidency and secretariat and the foreign ministries of Mediterranean states.103 The 
failure of the WEU to develop a more comprehensive program has stemmed from the 
inability of WEU memberstates to agree on a common framework.
Momentum passed from the WEU to MATO where the six Mediterranean 
members of the Alliance. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal Spain, and Turkey, pushed for 
the establishment of a comprehensive and systematic approach toward the both Maghreb 
and the Mediterranean region in general. As early as 1991, NATO’s new Strategic 
Concept recognized the importance of the region and declared that "the stability and 
peace of the countries on the periphery' o f Europe are important for the security of the 
.Alliance . . . ."1CW NATO’s commitment to the peace of the region was reaffirmed at the 
1993 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) held in Athens, and again 
at the 1994 Brussels summit.105
103These states initially included Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. To these 
were added Egypt in 1994 and Israel in 1995; NAA, AM 259 CC/MB (95).
l<wNATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept. (8 November 1991). paragraph 12.
105The declaration issued at the end of the summit reiterated NATO’s stance that 
security in Europe was impacted by the southern flank. It also stated that the Alliance 
welcomed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and that the breakthrough was 
instrumental in “opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, 
understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region,” and called 
upon the permanent council to “review the overall situation” and “encourage all efforts 
conducive to strengthening regional stability;” NATO, Declaration o f  the Heads o f State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council Held at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels (11 January 1994), paragraph 22.
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In 1994, a combination o f three factors led NATO to begin to address the security 
concerns of the region. The deteriorating situation in Algeria and the unwillingness of 
several states in the region to renew the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when combined with 
the determination of the Alliance’s southern states to establish some balance in what was 
seen as a Eastern-centric focus on the part o f NATO, led to the establishment of a 
dialogue that initially embraced Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia.106 In 
late 1995, the dialogue was extended to include Jordan. The Alliance’s Mediterranean 
Initiative centers around a series of bilateral political discussions which are held on a 
biannual basis. These meetings are conducted between NATO and the individual 
Mediterranean state. Each of the nations are also invited to participate in programs that 
emphasize exchange of information on issues such as science and peacekeeping, and 
reciprocal visits.107 However, NATO’s attempted southern dialogue, like that of the 
WEU and the EU, has yet to develop into a broad framework, like that of the OSCE, that 
would encompass both the security' concerns of the states in the region and provide the 
means with which to engage in conflict prevention and resolution. Proposals have been 
made to extend the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program into the Mediterranean region, 
or to develop a new initiative based on the PfP concept specifically for the 
Mediterranean. Neither proposal has yet to be seriously considered by NAC, but 
cooperation between NATO and PfP states with Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan in
10<sThis dialogue involved meetings between representatives of individual states and 
NATO officials, including the International Secretariat, and members of the Ad Hoc 
Group on the Mediterranean: North Atlantic Council (NAC), Ministerial Meeting o f the 
North Atlantic Council: Final Communique (1 December 1994).
10'Raymond C. Ewing, "NATO and Mediterranean Security,” Atlantic Council o f the 
United States, Bulletin 8, no. 4 (March 1997), 3.
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Bosnia in first the implementation force (IFOR) and now the stabilization force (SFOR) 
point to the potential for future cooperation between the Alliance and the states of the 
region.108
Led by France, several southern European states have developed force structures, 
under the auspices of the WEU. to deal with humanitarian crises in the region. France. 
Italy and Spain agreed to create ground (EUROFOR) and naval reaction 
(EUROMARFOR) units in order to respond to security concerns in the Mediterranean. 
Soon afterwards. Portugal also agreed to participate in both forces.109 But the long 
sought after goal of developing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM) that would mirror the OSCE, remains elusive.
Meanwhile NATO has worked to develop its own strike force in the 
Mediterranean. Although the principal military force in the region remains the U.S.
Sixth Fleet, the Alliance has established its own multilateral amphibious unit for the 
Mediterranean. Developed in 1991 and approved in 1995, the Combined Amphibious 
Force Mediterranean (CAFMED) was designed to provide a structure under the auspices 
of NATO’s Striking and Supporting Forces Southern Europe (STRKFORSOUTH) 
headquarters in Naples that could deploy an amphibious brigade with supporting air and
108Ibid., 5.
l09The land component of these forces is the EUROFOR. EUROFOR is designed to 
be a division size rapid reaction force, made up of pre-assigned units from the 
participating nations. The sea component o f the new forces is the EUROMARFOR 
which is essentially an amphibious assault landing group centered around a French 
aircraft carrier WEU, Defense Committee, Draft Recommendation on European Armed 
Forces, WEU Document 1468 (12 June 1995).
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sea assets.110 CAFMED is not a standing force but one that would be raised to deal with 
particular crises. Forces from four NATO members, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Turkey 
could be bolstered by units from the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands to 
undertake operations. There have been a number of CAFMED exercises and the 
concept was tested during operation ‘'Silver Wake” in 1997 which involved the 
evacuation of U.S. citizens from .Albania during that nation's political crisis.111
NATO has also worked to develop systems to counter the proliferation of missile 
technology and WMD proliferation by conducting exercises and through multilateral 
efforts to develop effective theater missile defense (TMD) technologies. The United 
States has led a number of multilateral military exercises to test TMD defense 
systems.112 The led that the United States commands in TMD technology has lead 
European states such as Italy and Germany to collaborate with the U.S. in an effort to 
develop anti-missile systems through the Medium Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS).113 The inability o f the European states to match the U.S. in research and 
development has meant that the EU states continue and will continue to rely on the
1I0C.AFMED is part of NATO's southern command (AFSOUTH) which encompasses 
Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea from Gibralter to Syria, and the Black 
Sea and Sea of Marmara: NATO, NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation 
(Brussels: NATO, 1995), 171.
ulPaolo Valpolini, “Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces: 
CAFMED Brings Together Assets From Six NATO Countries,” Jane's International 
Defence Re^'iew (July 1998).
112These exercises include both bilateral and multilateral operations in both the 
United States and Europe; Joris Janssen Lok, “NATO Exercises Prop Up TMD Pillars,” 
Jane’sInternational Defense Review (July 1998), 58-59.
113On U.S. efforts to develop Th/ID systems, see Bryan Bender, “Cruise Control,”
Jane's Defence Weekly (22 July 1998), 22.
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Americans both for their nuclear deterrent and for the development o f weapons systems 
to defend against potential cruise missile attacks. This point also reinforces the 
continuing need for U.S. involvement in European security.
The sanctions in place against Iraq and the unilateral sanctions against Iran 
demonstrate the ability of the U.S. to tolerate, though not endorse, divergent policies by 
its allies in the region, while the Middle East peace process confirms the centrality of the 
United States to regional security. Barcelona and the Oslo accords set the stage for the 
rebirth of Palestinian authority in areas of tire former nation, but it remained for the 
United States to pressure the two sides into implementing the agreements. When an 
impasse was reached, it fell to Washington to endeavor to force the resumption of the 
process through the Wye River Memorandum.11'1 Furthermore, the Clinton 
Administration pledged to both act as the intermediary for the later permanent status 
discussions between the two sides and offered to make available the assets of the Central 
Intelligence Agency to act as a facilitator of security cooperation and a guarantor of 
reciprocity by the two sides.115
While much of the focus of preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution by the 
institutional framework of the West has been directed towards the east, there has been a 
growing realization, especially by those states in the southern tier, that the Mediterranean
1WAmong other things, the agreement called for Israel to transfer an additional 13 
percent of land to the Palestinian Authority, while the Palestinians pledged greater 
security cooperation and stricter enforcement of measures to deter anti-Israeli terrorism.
The concord also called for the resumption of permanent status talks in May of 1999;
“The ; Wye River Memorandum:’ Full Text,” Arabic News, (24 October 1998), 1-7.
U5“CIA to Have Active Role in Implementing Anti-Terror Measures,” ICT News (26 
October 1998), 1.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
174
region poses profound challenges for Europe in the years ahead. Radical Islam, while 
not necessarily a direct threat to the West itself, has the potential to undermine and even 
topple regimes with important politico-economic ties with Europe. This is especially 
true in the case of the Maghreb region and states such as Algeria and Egypt. Most 
ominously for the West is that this possible instability comes at a time of notable arms 
acquisitions and a general militarization of the region. To compound matters, the 
Mediterranean is the region that Europe has the least means with which to exercise 
influence. The West has yet to develop the institutional mechanisms that have garnered 
some success in conflict prevention and resolution elsewhere. For in the end, it will only 
be through collective action and institutionalism that these threats and challenges to 
European security can be adequately addressed.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
175
CHAPTER VH
THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The growing militarization of the Middle East and North Africa point to one of 
the most pressing security concerns for Western Europe-the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs).1 During the Cold War, the American nuclear umbrella 
seemed to preclude the possibility of an attack on Europe by the Soviet bloc using 
WMDs. Furthermore, both during the Cold War and to a greater degree afterwards, there 
has emerged a series o f international regimes designed to constrain the development of, 
and more importantly, prevent the use o f WMDs. The end of the Cold War and the 
resultant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two superpowers seemed to diminish 
the dangers of nuclear war. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union questions 
have arisen over the ability of Moscow to control both its nuclear hardware and its 
nuclear software, in the form of the knowledge and expertise capable of building nuclear 
weapons. These issues have become prominent as several states around the globe have 
embarked on programs designed to produce nuclear weapons and thus extend the 
world’s nuclear club, in many cases to states with less than stable or questionable 
political regimes. The attempts of these rogue or pariah states, such as North ICorea or 
Iraq, to develop nuclear weapons have occurred concurrently with several well- 
publicized efforts by international terrorist groups to attain nuclear weapons. Along with 
these nuclear issues, the potential for the development and use of certain chemical or
‘WMDs are traditionally defined as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.
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biological weapons has garnered the world’s attention after state use o f chemical 
weapons by Iraq against the Kurds, and the substate use of biological weapons by the 
Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo religious sect in an attack on a Tokyo subway in March of 
1995. While nuclear weapons are expensive and difficult to develop, especially without 
the knowledge of other states, biological and chemical weapons can be developed with 
relatively little expense and often without the knowledge of other states or international 
organizations. The acquisition of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (NBC) is 
especially troublesome in the case of terrorist groups. These groups might be more 
willing to use such weapons since retaliation against them would be more difficult, and 
such weapons would be convenient tools to use for political blackmail or to destabilize 
the current regime or government in power.
With escalations in ethnic and substate conflict in and around the European 
continent, the potential for the use of WMDs in a terrorist attack has increasingly 
become a concern for European governments. For the Europeans, proliferation threats 
revolve around three main areas: 1) The control and maintenance of the biological, 
chemical, and nuclear stockpiles, and the management of the infrastructure connected 
with the WMDs of the former Soviet Union; 2) the development of indigenous means of 
production of WMDs by so-called rogue or pariah states; 3) the sale o f WMD 
technology, especially the sale of delivery systems, i.e., ballistic missiles, capable of 
hitting Western Europe, as well as the trade in so-called dual-use technology which 
involves the transfer of seemingly innocuous materials and equipment that can actually 
be used to generate WMDs. While notable progress has been made in the development 
of control regimes to address these issues, in many cases these regimes have
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incorporated only those states whose governments pursue non-proliferation as a matter 
o f national policy. Nonetheless, the frameworks provided by international regimes such 
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) do establish international norms and rules for the governance of WMDs. To 
overcome the threats associated with WMDs and to better ensure protection for 
themselves, the states o f  Western Europe must continue to pursue policies that 
emphasize collective responses to the development or the potential use of WMDs in 
much the same fashion as these states have traditionally relied on NATO’s Article V 
guarantee to provide an American nuclear response to a WMD attack by the former 
Soviet Union during the Cold War and thus, with the exception of Great Britain and 
France, preclude the need for these states to develop significant NBC capabilities.
With the collapse o f the Soviet Union, concerns about the control and 
accountability of the former superpower's WMD arsenal have been paramount for 
European security. During the Cold War, the Soviets employed some 30,000 scientists 
and engineers just in their biological weapons program, named Biopreparat.2 Despite 
some progress in the dismantling o f its existing nuclear stockpile and the completion of 
the collection of warheads from the other former Soviet republics, the Russian 
Federation retains the world's second largest nuclear arsenal. The deteriorating moral 
and low pay of the state's strategic rocket forces raises serious questions about the 
Kremlin's ability to adequately control its inventory. The tight export controls promised
2Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., “Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked,” The Wall 
Street Journal (2 November 1995), 2.
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by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 have yet to be implemented.3 To further 
complicate matters, the loss o f  employment and prestige for the estimated three to seven 
thousand scientists and engineers who worked on the design and production o f Soviet 
nuclear weapons may tempt many to sell their services to those states in the process of 
developing their own nuclear weapons.4
At present, there are approximately 950 sites in the former Soviet Union in which 
enriched uranium and plutonium exist.5 These sites include research institutes, power 
plants, weapons laboratories, naval fuel depots and nuclear waste storage facilities. In 
total, it is estimated that Russia possesses some 1,000 tons o f enriched, weapons-grade 
uranium and 170 tons of plutonium.6 The states of the FSU are still the world’s largest 
producers of uranium. In total the FSU produces some 13,500 tons of the material 
annually with some 50 per cent coming from Kazakstan, 20 per cent from Russia, 20 per 
cent from Uzbekistan, and 7 per cent from the Ukraine.7 While security under the Soviet 
regime was tight, the collapse of the KGB triggered a collapse o f the nuclear control
3Duke, Security Disorder, 52.
4Ibid., 52-53.
’Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Smuggling Special Nuclear 
Materials, Commentary No. 57 (Ottawa: CSIS, 1995), 3.
6R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S.-Russian Anti-Smuggling Effort Largely in Disarray,” The 
Washington Post (28 August 1994), 3.
7Renee Pruneau, :‘WMD Proliferation From the Southern Tier o f the Former Soviet 
Union,” paper presented at the International Security Studies Section of the International 
Studies Association Conference on October 31, 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
179
system.8 Since 1991, there have been more than 1,000 reported cases involving attempts 
to smuggle nuclear materials.9 The overwhelming majority o f  these cases involved 
either minute amounts of nuclear material or actual nuclear fraud.10 Overall, only eleven 
cases have involved significant amounts of fissile material.11 Nonetheless, the sheer 
number of incidents is troubling since it only requires as little as three kilograms of 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear weapon.12 Since three kilograms of 
HEU is roughly the size o f a golf ball, the potential for smuggling such amounts is great. 
More troubling are computer simulations which have shown that primitive nuclear
8Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, “The Real Threat o f  Nuclear Smuggling,” 
Scientific American 21 A, no. 1 (January 1996): 40-44.
9U.S., Senate, “Appendix: U.S. Government Chronology o f Nuclear Smuggling 
Incidents,” Testimony o f John Deulch Before the Senate Permanent Investigations 
Subcommittee on Global Proliferation o f  Weapons o f  Mass Destruction and Illicit 
Trafficking o f Nuclear Materials (21 March 1996).
10Many cases o f nuclear smuggling have involved efforts by illicit traffickers to 
defraud buyers by selling them nuclear materials that are unusable in weapons 
manufacturing. The production of nuclear weapons requires either enriched uranium or 
plutonium, and may involve the use of Lithium 6, Polonium or the use Beryllium as the 
neutron reflector in the bomb. Traffickers have attempted to sell other radioactive 
materials such as Americium 241, Cesium 137, Cobalt 60 and Zirconium to unwary 
buyers; Williams and Woessner, 42-43.
"Four of these have involved seizures of fissile material outside of the FSU, and three 
involved the seizure of fissile before it had left the FSU. The remaining four cases 
centered around the diversion of fissile material, “but not as clearly meet the standard of 
unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent sources to corroborate the 
diversion, or the size or enrichment level of the material;” U.S., Congress, Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, William C. Potter, “Nuclear Leakage From the 
Post-Soviet States,” oral presentation before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (13 March 1996).
l2Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and 
Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” Paper for the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. (22 August 1994).
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weapons, with an explosive yield o f 100 tons o f TNT, could be produced with only one 
kilogram o f HEU.13 The present stocks of plutonium and HEU in Russia have the 
potential for yielding some 60,000 nuclear weapons.14
In 1994, there were two notable seizures o f nuclear materials which highlighted 
the deficiencies in the nuclear control regime of Russia. In May of that year, in Tengen 
Germany, officials seized 5.6 grams of weapons grade plutonium (99.75 per cent Pu- 
239) mixed with 50 grams of a metallic alloy. In December, Czech officials 
apprehended 2.72 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (87 per cent HEU) which were 
believed to be from stockpiles o f  fuel for the Russian Navy.15 The Czech case is 
especially troubling since the amount o f HEU recovered was roughly enough necessary 
to construct an atomic weapon.16
Within Russia, security at sites storing nuclear materials was until recently 
wholly inadequate. Most facilities had no inventory controls, external monitoring 
systems, or adequate fencing. Poor accounting practices meant that many officials were 
unable to keep accurate records o f the amount or the nature of those materials in their
13Steven Dolley and Paul Leventhal, “Highly Enriched Uranium Seized in Czech 
Republic Reveals a Growing Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” Nuclear Control Institute 
(NCI) Czech HEU Issue Brief, I (Washington, D.C.: NCI, 1994), 2.
14CSIS, 6.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey, 1994/95 
(London: IISS, 1995), 17.
16The amount o f HEU seized was enough for a nuclear weapon, and the level o f purity 
o f the HEU (87 per cent) was also sufficient for construction, since the level of purity 
required for nuclear weapons is approximately 80 per cent; Rick Atkinson, “Prague Says 
Uranium Found in Czech Auto Could Trigger Bomb,” The Washington Post (21 
December 1994), A27.
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possession.17 In March o f  1994, Russian authorities arrested three people in St. 
Petersburg for attempting to sell 3.5 kilograms o f HEU.18 In July of that same year, three 
Russian naval officers were arrested after authorities discovered that they had stolen 
some 4.5 kilograms o f HEU from their base.19 In one o f the most extraordinary cases, in 
November of 1993, a thief climbed through a hole in the fence surrounding the 
Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk and used a hacksaw to cut through a padlock on a 
storage compartment that contained fuel for nuclear submarines. He stole three fuel 
assemblies, each o f which contained 4.5 kilograms of HEU. The FSB official who 
conducted the investigation, Mikhail Kulik, criticized the lax security measures at the 
storage facility and specifically cited the facility’s lack of an alarm system and exterior 
lightening, as well as the minuscule number of guards. He concluded that “even 
potatoes are probably much better guarded today than radioactive materials.”20 As proof 
of the need to employ or retain in some many the scientists involved in the nuclear 
program of the FSU, a Russian scientist, using his own laboratory in the Siberian city of 
Krasnoyarsk, produced some 2.2 kilograms of a nuclear material used in weapons 
construction and attempted to smuggle the material out o f Russia.21 Russian officials
17CSIS, 3.
18Michael Gordon, “Russian Aide Says Gangsters Try to Steal Atom Material,” The 
New York Times (26 May 1994), A5.
19U.S., Senate, “Appendix: U.S. Government.”
20OIeg Bukharin and William Potter, “Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” Bulletin o f  the 
Atomic Scientists 5 1, no. 3 (May 1995): 46-50.
21The head o f the Krasnoyarsk Federal Security Branch (FSB), Anatoly Samkov stated
that the material “was not plutonium or uranium or anything o f the sort.. . ” but was “a
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were further embarrassed by the November 1994 discovery of a container of 32 
kilograms of Cesium-137 in a Moscow park. The container was placed there by 
Chechen separatists and turned out to be relatively harmless, but the incident did 
illustrate the potential for nuclear terrorism.22
In response to these and other incidents, Yeltsin has attempted to tighten security 
at nuclear facilities with some modest degree of success. Seizures o f nuclear material 
believed to have originated in the FSU peaked with some 267 apprehensions in 1994 and 
had declined since then.23 In August of 1994, Yeltsin established an inter-agency 
commission to deal with the issue. Headed by the director of Russia’s 
counterintelligence service, Sergei Stepashin, the commission titled the State Committee 
for Nuclear and Radiation Safety or Gosatomnadzor (GAN), the organization was 
supposed to be the supreme agency in charge of nuclear security issues. However, intra­
agency disputes between GAN and the variety of Russian agencies, from the Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the defense ministry and even the ministry of 
shipbuilding, with some degree of control over nuclear facilities, has prevented the 
implementation of many of GAN’s reforms.24 MINATOM has actually been the biggest 
obstacle to significant reforms within the Russian nuclear system. Comprising some 151 
different enterprises, MINATOM lacks the fiscal resources necessary to implement
substance that might be used as a component of nuclear devices -  coating, pie or 
something like that;” “Russian Arrested for Alleged Nuclear Smuggling,” Reuters (7 
May 1996).
^U.S., Senate, “Appendix.”
^Williams and Woessner, 42-44.
24CSIS, 5.
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GAN’s reforms, and, in an era of extreme budget constraints, the central government 
has not allocated the resources to support GAN’s efforts.25 For instance, MINATOM 
has agreed to shut down three plutonium-based reactors, in exchange for American aid in 
building two uranium-based reactors, but the new reactors will be not completed until 
the year 2000, and MINATOM needs the energy produced by the three older reactors. 
Consequently, the older reactors are kept on line and are not officially scheduled to be 
shut down until well after the year 2000. Other Russian agencies also continue to delay 
GAN’s reform efforts, fearing a loss of prestige and power.26 For example, MINATOM 
does not have the facilities to store all o f the fissile material that will be generated from 
the dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear weapons, so GAN has attempted to get 
MINATOM to store these materials at Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) sites. 
However, MINATOM, refuses to cooperate with the MOD, fearing encroachment on its 
functions by the MOD.27
The most promising developments in Russia’s endeavors to control its nuclear 
facilities have been the degree of multilateral cooperation afforded the nation. Both the 
United States and the EU have implemented a number of programs to assist the Russians 
their anti-proliferation efforts. In overall terms, the United States has taken the lead in 
publicizing the issue and attempting to develop programs to deal with Russia’s nuclear 
woes. The American Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a number o f programs
25IISS, Strategic Survey, 1994/1995 (London: IISS, 1995), 18-19.
26BilI Gertx, “Yeltsin Can’t Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too Powerful CIA 
Believes," The Washington Times (27 September 1994), A3.
27U.S., Department o f Defense, NSIAD-95-7, 6.
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designed to aid the Russians. Specifically, the DOE’s initiatives are designed to 
facilitate nuclear disarmament in Russia and aid in fissile material control.28 The DOE 
also sponsored a laboratory-to-laboratory effort which matched Russian facilities with 
American ones. The American laboratories have worked with the Russians in converting 
plants that develop HEU into plants that produce low-enriched Uranium (LEU) for 
commercial uses. This has been one of the more successful efforts in retaining nuclear 
trained specialists in Russia and preventing potentially jobless nuclear scientists from 
emigrating. The program has also involved exchanges between American and Russian 
laboratories. In addition, the FBI and the U.S. Customs service have launched 
cooperative programs with the Russians to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials.29
In 1992, the United States initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn- 
Lugar, program. The CTR provided the umbrella agreement for the distribution of 
American aid for Russian denuclearization and nuclear-industrial conversion. Overall, 
the United States has allocated some $1.2 billion for the CTR program, but the effort has 
been mired by criticisms over its slow start and waste of funds by Russian agencies.30 
Nonetheless, by 1995, CTR had provided some $38 million in aid for 23 different 
programs in the states of the FSU, and by 1996, the program had succeeded in removing
28U.S., House of Representatives, C. Bruce Tarter, 1.
29U.S., White House, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: The Clinton Administration 
Record, Press Release (20 May 1996).
30U.S., Department o f Defense, Weapons o f  Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat 
From the Former Soviet Union: An Update, NSLAD-95-165 (Washington, D.C.: GAO,
1995), 3.
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all nuclear weapons from the states of the FSU and placing them under Russian control, 
thereby concentrating the weapons and precluding the potential for smuggling in states 
with even less regulatory control than the Russisa.31 By May of 1998, the CTR had 
obligated some $1.7 billion to the FSU.32 The United States also undertook efforts to 
directly remove fissile material from the states of the FSU. For instance, in 1994, the 
United States purchased some 600 kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan and flew the 
material directly to the United States for dilution to reactor-grade fuel.33 By 1998, the 
CTR had removed 3,810 metric tons o f propellent fuel and assisted in the disposal of 
some 100,000 tons of the material, as well as delivering some 25,000 containers to store 
nuclear waste and materials to Russia.3'1
The CTR also provided funds for the destruction of chemical and biological 
weapons in the states of the FSU. In 1994, Russia declared its chemical weapons 
stockpile to be some 40,000 metric tons.35 In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense
3lIbid.,U.S., Department of Defense, Weapons o f  Mass Destruction: DOD Report 
Accounting for Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Needs Improvement, NSIAD- 
95-191 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995), 7; IISS, The Military Balance: 1996 97 
(London: IISS, 1997), p. 286.
32U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CTR Program: Accomplishments 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), 4.
33The Kazakh HEU was being stored in a facility were the only security measure was 
a large padlock on the building where the HEU was stored, NATO, NAA, Nuclear 
Proliferation, AM 310 STC (95) 10 (October 1995), paragraph 49.
WU.S„ CTR, 2-4.
35U.S., Department of Defense, Arms Control: Status o f US.-Russian Agreements and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, NSIAD-94-136 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994).
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gave Russia some $ 104 million in support for eliminating chemical weapons.36 The 
United States provided Russia with a technical support office and professional support 
for planning purposes. In addition, the United States funded the Russian government’s 
development of a comprehensive plan to destroy its chemical weapons.37 Foreign aid is 
critical for the destruction of Russia’s chemical stockpiles, since it is estimated that 
Russia can only pay about half the coasts associated with the disposal.38
In 1994, MINATOM agreed to cooperate with the United States and opened six 
facilities to American teams for planning and implementing improvements in physical 
security and inventory control.39 Also, in 1993, Russia agreed to sell the United States 
some 500 metric tons o f  HEU for $ 11.9 billion. The Russian HEU comes from 
dismantled warheads and American firms will convert the HEU to LEU and sell the 
material on the open market.'10
On a broad level, one of the most significant anti-proliferation efforts undertaken 
by both the United States and Russia has been the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks/Treaties (START). The START I Treaty was signed in 1991 and ratifies in 1994.
It called for both nations to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles to 6,000 strategic 
warheads and deploy no more than 1,600 delivery systems within seven years of the




40nSS, Strategic Survey, 1994/95, 22.
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Treaty’s ratification. The START II Treaty requires both nations to further reduce their 
strategic warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003.41
The Treaty also limits the number o f submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM) to 1,750 and bans multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) by 
only allowing one warhead per missile.42 START II was signed on January 3, 1993 and 
approved by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but remains unapproved by the Russian Duma, 
despite repeated promises by Yeltsin to push the measure through. The failure of the 
Russians to ratify START II further reveals the difficulties Yeltsin faces in efforts to 
both limit Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials and address proliferation 
issues.43
European efforts to aid Russian nuclear control and anti-proliferation efforts have 
come both on a bilateral level, and through programs of the EU. In August o f 1994, 
Russia and Germany signed a cooperation agreement to collaborate on anti-nuclear 
smuggling efforts. The agreement calls upon the two nations to share intelligence and to 
cooperate on law enforcement measures and operations. In addition, Russian and
41nSS, The Military Balance, 1996, 97 (London: IISS, 1997); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 1991, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1991); 
U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report to the President and 
Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996); “U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear 
Forces: Past Present and Projected,” Arms Control Today (October 1996), 29; U.S., Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report: 1998 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1997).
42U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Start II Treaty: Report,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995).
43See Vladimir Abarinov, “Russian Ratification of START II is Problematic,"Current 
Digest o f  the Post-Soviet Press (21 February 1996), 21; and Maria Katsva,
“Disarmament Will be Difficult,” Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press (31 January 
1996): 21.
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Germany will jointly analyze all potential nuclear material seized in Germany in order to 
aid officials in determining points of origin.44 Germany has also provided some S5.5 
million to Russia to aid in the disposal of chemical weapons and plans to provide an 
additional $4.5 million.45 Other states, particularly the Scandinavian states such as 
Norway and Sweden have offered considerable aid to Russia for improvements in 
nuclear safety. France is also providing Russia with $5 million in equipment to aid in 
nuclear disarmament.46 France and Great Britain have also developed a joint plan to 
supply the Russians with 350 supercontainers, valued at $35 million, to transport and 
temporarily store WMDs.47
As early as 1991, the ECJ initiated programs to aid the states of the FSU in 
nuclear conversion and safety. To address the problems of the Central and East 
European states, the EU launched the Concentration on European Regulatory Tasks 
(CONCERT) and to provide assistance to the states of the CIS, the EU established the 
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Both of 
these organizations work to develop links and exchange programs between EU 
memberstates and states of the former East bloc. In addition, CONCERT is working to 
develop pan-European nuclear safety and storage standards. These organizations
^Yekaterina Filippova, “Smuggling of Nuclear Materials: A New International 
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conduct safety inspections o f Soviet era reactors and work closely with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).48
Nonetheless, Russian control over its nuclear facilities continues to be 
problematic. Fiscal constraints and both inter- and intra-agency fighting have 
diminished the potential benefits of foreign assistance. While most of the world’s 
nuclear powers view plutonium as waste, Russia plans to continue using the material in 
fast reactors. This creates a problem since plutonium-based breeder reactors can actually 
produce more plutonium as a byproduct of their operation.49 In addition, the dismantling 
of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons also generates more plutonium and HEU from the 
discarded warheads.50 While the United States and most other nuclear powers have 
ceased the production o f fissile materials, Russia continues to produce some 900 tons of 
HEU and 190 tons o f plutonium per year.51 This additional plutonium further strains 
Russia’s already overloaded control system and increases the potential for nuclear 
smuggling. Meanwhile, the black market in nuclear technology and material continues 
to be a lucrative venture as "‘rogue” or “pariah” states attempt to develop their own 
nuclear programs.52 In response the United States has pressured Russia to sign a fissile
48HSS, Strategic Survey, 1994/95, 20.
49Ibid„ 23-24.
S&NAA, Nuclear Proliferation, paragraphs 52-53.
51Alexander Bolsunovsky, “How to Utilize Fissile Materials After Dismantling 
Russian Warheads,” The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 
2, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 1.
52See, for instance, U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report: 
1998.
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material production cutoff treaty (FMCT), but negotiations have yet to produce an 
agreement.53
The possible transfer of nuclear technology and secrets is especially troubling 
since several states in North Africa and the Gulf region have ongoing programs to 
develop WMDs. In 1995, Russia and Iran signed a deal for the Russians to supply the 
Iranians with 1,200 megawatt reactor and a second 880-megawatt reactor in Bushehr.54 
The Russians also agreed to assist Iranian research facilities and to provide technicians 
and engineers to aid Iran’s nuclear program. The United States has steadfastly 
maintained that this assistance will be used by the Iranians to build facilities that are 
capable of producing HEU for use in a nuclear weapons program.55 The American view 
of Iran was summarized by Peter Tamoff, the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs in 1995, when he asserted that Iran “is pursuing the development of weapons of 
mass destruction-that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missile 
systems to deliver them.”36 Libya operates a Soviet-supplied nuclear research facility 
near Tripoli, but seems to have abandoned its effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq 
and Libya's nuclear programs seem to have halted for the time, but both nations still
53U.S., White House, Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
Negotiations, Press Release (27 March 1997).
^ “Iran Nuclear Scheme Raises Temperatures in Washington,” The Middle East, no. 
248 (September 1995), 21.
55Evan S. Medeiros, “Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russian-Iran Nuclear 
Deal,” Arms Control Today 25, no. 5 (June 1995): 20-21.
56U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, House International Relations 
Committee, “Containing Iran: Statement by Peter Tamoff, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs” (9 November, 1995), 2.
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possess considerable capabilities in producing chemical weapons (CWs).57 For instance, 
Libya has the third world’s largest chemical weapons factory already operating at Rabta, 
and is in the process of completing what would be the world’s largest chemical weapons 
factory at Tarhunah.58 Iraq has an extensive arsenal of biological and chemical weapons 
(BCWs) that include anthrax, botulinum toxin and mustard gas.39
While there are a wide variety of chemical and biological weapons readily 
available, in general the major biological agents are anthrax, botulinal toxin, and ricin. 
Among the chemical agents, there are six general categories. Nerve agents which are the 
most lethal. These chemicals include sarin, tabin and VX.60 Blister agents or vesicants 
are less toxic than nerve agents and work by destroying tissue when they come into 
contact with skin or are inhaled. The most common form of blister agent is mustard gas. 
Blood agents block the flow o f oxygen to the blood which causes oxygen starvation. 
Cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide are the most used blood agents. Choking
57See, for instance, R. Jeffrey Smith "Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon's List of 
Threats" The Washington Post (12 April 1996), A32.
38U.S., Congress, House o f Representatives, House International Relations 
Committee, “Developments in the Middle East: Statement by Robert H. Pelletreau, 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs,” (25 September 1996), 9; U.S., Department 
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Motes: Libya (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1994), 8.
39Joachim Krause, “The Proliferation o f Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Risks for 
Europe,” in Europe and the Challenge o f  Proliferation, Chaillot Papers, no. 24, ed. Paul 
Cornish, Peter Van Ham, and Joachim Krause (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the 
WEU, 1996), 7.
“ Robert Purver, “The Threat o f Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” The Monitor: 
Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 2, no. 4 (Fall 1996), 7; Seth Caras 
and Karl Lowe, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Threat and Reponse,”
Policywatch, no. 247 (12 Mayl997).
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agents attack the respiratory system. Chlorine, which was first used in World War I, is a 
choking agent. Less lethal CWs, include harassing agents such as tear gas. Finally, 
psychological agents impair thinking. Common psychological agents include LSD and 
BZ.61
The true extent of Iraq’s BCW program was not discovered until after the 
defection of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, at which time the Iraqis 
turned over some 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents.62 Since then it has been 
learned that Iraq had an extensive biological weapons (BW) program and had obtained 
some 8,500 liters o f anthrax, 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 2,200 liters of 
aflatoxin. Iraq had also prepared BW-filled munitions, including 25 Scud missile 
warheads and artillery shells, as well as a MiG-21 drone. Iraq initially resisted 
dismantling the A1 Hakam BW factory after it was discovered that the plant had 
produced more than 500,000 liters of BWs from 1989 to 1990, however, the plant was 
eventually destroyed under pressure from the UNSCOM in 1996. Recently, it has been 
discovered that Iraq has also tested and produced the biological toxin Ricin.63 Iraq may 
still possess 16 Scud missiles, on mobile launchers, armed with biological warheads.54 
In addition, UNSCOM still cannot account for some 17 tons of the material used to
61Maria Bowers, The Disposal o f  Surplus Chemical Weapons (Bonn: Bonn 
International Center for Conversion, 1995), 2-3.
62U.S., Department o f Defense, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” U.S. 
Government White Paper, 3050, EUR 205 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), 2.
“ Ibid., 3.
W“U.N. Says Iraq May Have 16 Biological Missiles,” Associated Press (22 March
1996).
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create BWs that Iraq purchased in 199065 Recent revelations of Iraqi-Russian 
negotiations over the sale of a Russian-produced factory to produce single-cell proteins, 
a factory that was similar to one Iraq has admitted was used for the production of 
biological weapons in the early 1990s, further highlights the potential proliferation 
dangers of biological weapons facilities.66
While Iraq may still possess BWs, the nation’s CWs program has been essentially 
destroyed. Over the course of a two-year operation, UN inspectors destroyed more than 
480,000 liters of CW agents, including mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and tabun. 
The UN also destroyed more than 1,040,000 kilograms of 45 different materials used in 
the production of CWs. In addition, some 28,000 chemical munitions, which ranged 
from missiles to artillery shells to airdropped bombs, were eliminated. The main Iraqi 
CW facility at A1 Muthana was also closed.67
The United States estimates that at present ten countries are continuing efforts to 
develop biological warfare capabilities.68 Syria also has a significant CWs program.
“ “Editor’s Note,” The CBW Chronicle 2, no. 1 (January 1996), 2.
“ After initially denying reports about the negotiations, which surfaced after UN 
inspectors discovered documents detailing the meetings in 1994 and 1995, Russian 
officials have now acknowledged the meetings, but still maintain that no formal 
contracts were signed and no equipment was delivered to the Iraqis. The proposed plant 
would have had a capacity of some 50,000 liters of fermentation vessels, ten times larger 
than the plant that the Iraqis previously used to produce biological weapons, including 
anthrax and botulinum; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Russians Admit Firms Met Iraqis: Plant that 
Could Make Germ Weapons at Issue,” The Washington Post (18 February 1998), A16.
67UN, UNSCOM, “UN Says All Iraqi Chemical Weapons Destroyed,” 
Pol406/94062306 (23 June 1994).
“ U.S., Department o f Defense, Fact Sheet: Biological Warfare Threat Analysis, EUR 
508 (20 February 1998).
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The major impetus for Syrian development of WMDs has been Israel’s nuclear 
capability. Syria first acquired CWs from Egypt in 1973, and presently has at least one 
production facility, located north of Damascus. This plant produces mustard gas and 
Sarin and is in the process of developing VX. In order to counter Israel’s nuclear 
capability, Syria began an effort to develop a nuclear program. The Syrians established a 
nuclear research facility, sent engineers abroad to be trained and purchased nuclear 
equipment from the Europeans. Syria also signed a contract with China for a 30-kilowatt 
research reactor and made inquiries about the purchase of a I O-megawatt reactor. 
However, fiscal problems have prevented any significant progress in the nation’s nuclear 
program.69
In addition, in 1991, Algeria was discovered to have a secret nuclear research 
facility near Oussera and was accused by the Central Intelligence Agency of attempting 
to develop a nuclear bomb with the aid of China and Iraq.70 Although Algeria has since 
consented to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, doubts continue about the 
direction of the nation’s nuclear program, especially with the construction of a second 
reactor with Chinese collaboration.
Proliferation concerns are exacerbated by the transfer or sale o f delivery systems. 
Algeria and Iran now possess Kilo-class submarines. In addition, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
and Syria have FROG-7 missiles, and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have Scud-B/C
69Andrew Rathmall, “Syria’s Insecurity,” Jane's Intelligence Review (September
1994): 419.
70Mark Stenhouse "The Maghreb: The Rediscovered Region," Jane's International 
Defense Review (February 1995): 86.
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missiles.71 These missiles could be modernized to extend their present ranges but it is 
unlikely that any could have ranges in excess of 600 kilometers.72 At present, it is 
known that Iran and Syria have Scud C missiles with a range o f 500 kilometers and a 
payload of some 700 kilograms. Furthermore, it is suspected that Syria has acquired 
CSS-6/M-6 missiles that have a range of 600 kilometers and a 500-kilogram payload.73 
Many of these states, especially Iran, are interested in acquiring either Chinese or North 
Korean produced Nodong missiles (which are modernized versions of the Scud-C). The 
Nodong 1 has a range of 1,000 kilometers and the Nodong 2 has an estimated range of 
1,500 kilometers.74 China has already proven that is willing to sell advanced missile 
systems to Middle East states with its 1988 sale of 40 CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia.73 
Some 15 to 20 nations are presently working on developing missile systems with ranges 
in excess of 1,000 kilometers.76
Most of these states also have acquired Russian SU-24 strike bombers. By the 
year 2000, it is possible that several North African states, including Algeria and Libya 
will have missiles or air delivery systems capable of targeting all of the major Southern
71WEU, Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1485.
720 n  potential missile modifications, see Jane's Strategic Weapons, no. 18 (May
1995).
73IISS, The Military Balance, 1995 96 (London: IISS, 1995), 281.
74Krause, 11.
7SThe CSS-2 has a range of 2,700 kilometers and a payload of 2,500 kilograms; IISS, 
The Military Balance, 1995/96, 281.
76Peter Van Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics 
and Policies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 24.
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European cities.77 In addition, at present the naval forces o f the Western European 
powers already face the potential of being fired upon by missile systems with ranges of 
200-300 kilometers. This potential threat could severely limit the ability of Western 
naval forces to maneuver and to carry out tasks such as international blockades or the 
implementation of international sanctions.78 Western naval units in the area are also 
increasingly at risk from cruise missiles. In February of 1996, Iran placed Chinese C-802 
cruise missiles on board naval platforms, mainly on Kaman and Houdong patrol 
boats.79 In addition, the Iranians have three missile frigates which, with the twenty or so 
patrol boats, give them some or 23 launch platforms.80 Most ominously, the Iranians 
have successfully tested an air launched an anti-ship cruise missile, the Chinese 
manufactured C-801K. These cruise missiles have a range of about 20 miles which gives 
the Iranians, in the words o f a senior Department of Defense official, a “360 degree 
threat” since “an attack could know come from any direction.”81
The continued proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems, especially to 
states with known ties to terrorist organizations, has created an impetus for collaborative
77See Lesser, Security in North Africa., ESS, The Military Balance, 1997 1998 
(London: Oxford, 1998).
78Krause, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 8.
79U.S. Information Agency (USLA), “DOD Briefing on Iranian Cruise Missile 
Launch,” U.S. Policy in the Middle East (20 June 1997): 1-2.
80The Iranians have 10 Kaman patrol boats and 10 Hudong patrol boats, in addition 
to their three frigates; IISS, The Military Balance, 1996/97, 132.
81USIA, “DOD Briefing,”!.
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defense planning and intelligence exchanges to counter such risks.82 The March 1995, 
nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway has demonstrated the potential o f terrorists using 
CWs, and the ongoing struggle of groups such as the IRA or the Basque separatist 
movement raise the possibility of terrorist groups using WMDs or the threat of WMDs to 
accomplish politico-military goals.83 Within the United States, the recent arrest of two 
men for possession of anthrax in the United States further demonstrates the potential for 
terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons.84
Of notable concern in the area of proliferation are so-called dual-use 
technologies— materials and equipment that are sold for commercial purposes, but may 
have military applications. Dual-use technologies exist in all three areas of NBC 
weapons considerations. For instance, in the nuclear field, Russia continues to sell 
plutonium 238 as a power source for space programs, including satellites, despite 
evidence that the material can easily be converted for use in nuclear weapons.8i The 
Iraqi purchase of the Osirak experimental reactor from France in 1976 was supposedly
820 f  those states that the United States designates as sponsors of international 
terrorism, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, four are in the Middle 
East or North Africa, and Sudan’s proximity to and support of anti-government factions 
in Egypt necessitate its inclusion in discussions of terrorism in the region; U.S., 
Department of State, Patterns o f  Global Terrorism, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1996), 1.
83For an overview of proliferation issues affecting Europe, see Krause, 19. For the 
U.S. see Carus and Lowe.
^The two who had ties to white supremacist organizations were reported trying to 
arrange an attack on an American city in a copycat attack o f the Aum assault; William 
Claiborne, “Two Men Charged With Possessing Anthrax,” The Washington Post (20 
February 1998), A3.
85Tariq Rauf, “Cleaning Up With a Bang,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists (January 
1992): 9.
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for commercial purposes, but it has since been discovered that the Iraqis used the reactor 
to produce HEU. Commercial nuclear reactors are especially troubling since even IAEA 
guidelines allow for a detectable “loss” o f as much as 263 kilograms of plutonium per 
year (enough plutonium to make 33 large nuclear weapons a year).86 Also, Iraq acquired 
most o f the materials used to produce mustard gas which it used against Kurds from 
Germany and Switzerland, and Great Britain continued to sell Iraq “growth mediums,” 
ostensibly for use in growing hospital cultures, but also used to produce biological 
weapons, even after it was discovered that the amount of materials being sold to Iraq far 
exceeded the needs of Iraqi hospitals.87
The proliferation of dual-use technologies is likely to only increase in the coming 
years. As competition in the defense industry continues to increase as markets decline, 
military producers are increasing the amount of material that they produce which can 
have civilian applications. While he was still Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch 
estimated that by the turn of the century, 70 per cent o f the products manufactured by
86This “loss” results from the tendency for nuclear material to become “stuck” inside 
the reactor. While this stuck material can be measured, the technology used produces 
results that are inaccurate by as much as 30 per cent. In addition, the IAEA allows 
reactors up to a 5 per cent error margin in reporting quantities of fissile material; Paul 
Leventhal, “Safeguards Shortcomings--A Critique,” MCI B rief (Washington, D.C.: NCI, 
1994), 3-4.
87Paul Taylor, “Western Governments Draw Veil Over Aid to Saddam,” Reuters (19 
February, 1998). The United States also aided Iraq in its efforts to develop biological 
weapons by selling the Iraqis fourteen different consignments of biological agents 
between 1985 and 1989, including nineteen batches o f anthrax and fifteen batches of 
botulinum; “US Helped Iraq Develop Bio, Chemical Weapons,” Reuters (13 February
1998).
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defense companies will have commercial or dual-use capabilities.88 The only effective
means o f preventing the sale of potentially dangerous technologies and materials is
through increased export controls. The European states have incorporated the broad
concerns over WMD proliferation and export controls into a series of framework
regimes which seek to establish and enforce international norms forbidding the
development or transfer of WMDs. As a WEU report summarized:
The proliferation o f all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their 
delivery means continues to constitute a threat to international and 
European peace and security. A European priority in this field has been 
to pursue universal participation in and compliance with, multilateral 
disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (CWC) 
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the 
same time to continue to strengthen export control regimes such as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Zangger Committee, 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group.89
In general, the EU states have attempted to contain the proliferation of WMDs along two
tracks. The first is through support of WMD control regimes, such as the NPT. The
second has been close collaboration with the United States through existing security
structures.
For Western Europe, the cornerstone o f the nuclear non-proliferation regime is 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). EURATOM’s non­
proliferation functions are based on the principle that all fissile material within the EU is
88John Deutch, “Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation: The United States’ Point of 
View,” International Defense and Technology (November 1994): 15.
89 WEU, Council of Ministers, European Security: A Common Concept o f  the 27 WEU 
Countries (Brussels: WEU, 1995), paragraph 36.
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nominally owned by the EU.90 EURATOM also acts as the agent for the EU for external 
nuclear negotiations and treaties. Finally EURATOM established the first multilateral 
nuclear inspection and verification system. EURATOM has access to all commercial 
nuclear sites within the EU, and has the power to levy fines and other sanctions, 
including the removal of nuclear material from a site.91 Article HI, section 4 of the NPT 
calls for a partnership between the IAEA and EURATOM whereby EURATOM carries 
out most of the inspection and verification functions o f the IAEA in Europe. The 
relationship between EURATOM and the IAEA proved especially significant in the 
negotiations on Spain’s entry into the EU. While Spain was initially unwilling to accede 
to the NPT, because of the EURATOM-IAEA partnership, the EU was able to convince 
Spain to join the NPT regime.92
The NPT itself has proven to be a major factor in the denuclearization of Europe. 
The United States and the EU provided financial incentives for the states of the FSU to 
join the NPT and relinquish their nuclear arsenals to Russia. The NPT works both to 
discourage states from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and to control the supply of
90EURATOM was able to successfully challenge the French practice of not notifying 
it of transborder purchases and sales of fissile material. The result was a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” whereby EURATOM does not assert its property rights over French fissile 
material in exchange for notification of all movements o f fissile materials imported to or 
exported from EU members; Harald Muller, “European Nuclear Non-Proliferation After 
the NPT Extension: Achievements, Shortcomings and Needs,” in Europe and the 
Challenge o f  Proliferation, Chaillot Papers, no. 24, ed. Paul Cornish, Peter Van Ham, 
and Joachim Krause (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, 1996), 34-35.
91Ibid„ 35-36.
92See, Katlyn Saba, “Spain and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in A Survey o f  
European Nuclear Policy, 1985-1987, ed. Harald A. Muller (London: Macmillan, 1989), 
111-130.
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fissile material in order to prevent proliferation. The main instrument of the NPT regime 
is of course the IAEA, but another organization, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has 
worked to control and restrict the trade in fissile materials. While the NSG works to 
control the supply of nuclear materials and the IAEA works to ensure compliance with 
international norms and prevent proliferation, neither organization has the means to 
enforce compliance or to mete out punishment. Here the role and place of the United 
States becomes critical. As the world’s primary power, only the United States has the 
capabilities to force compliance with the NPT or to enforce sanctions.93 However, the 
inconsistency of American policy towards proliferation does act to weaken American 
credibility, as well as that of the NPT.94
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first multilateral disarmament 
treaty that bans a whole category of WMDs. In 1993, some 130 nations attended the 
signing ceremony of the convention which required 65 nations to ratify it in order to go 
into effect.95 Since that time, the number of nations that have signed the treaty has risen 
to 167. Despite some initial concerns over the means and place of disposal, as well as the 
confirmation details, 106 states have ratified the convention.96 The CWC bans all
930n this theme, see Michael Mandlebaum, “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War,” 
Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 31-3.
94For instance, compare American policies towards Israel and Pakistan and those 
towards Iran and Iraq.
95“Ratification Round-Up,” The CBWChronicle (January 1996), 2.
96After initial delays, China, India, Russia and the United States ratified the CWC in 
1997. Despite some domestic opposition to the CWC, especially in Congress, it is 
important to note that the United States has actually been in the forefront of the effort to 
restrict CWs. In 1989 the United States and the former USSR signed a memorandum of 
understanding which opened each nation’s CW stockpiles to inspections, and in 1990,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
202
chemical weapons and provides significant verification procedures including on-site 
inspections. Signatories to the CWC have ten years to destroy their CW arsenals and 
close their production facilities.
Progress on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which was originally 
signed in 1972, has been far more problematic than the CWC.97 For instance, at the 1994 
special conference of the BWC, which was supposed to establish the guidelines for BWs 
verification guidelines, the delegates could only agree to establish another ad hoc group 
to design verification measures and to incorporate them into a legally binding 
framework.98 Another area o f contention over the BWC is Article X which states that 
parties to the convention “. . .  undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange o f equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes.”99 Several developing nations, including China and India have used this article
the two nation’s signed the Bilateral Destruction Agreement which called for an end to 
production of CWs and a reduction in existing weapons to no more than 5,000 tons by 
the year 2002. Russia, however, unilaterally withdrew from the Agreement in 1996, 
because of fiscal constraints which prevented the Russians from completing their 
commitments. It is estimated that the destruction of Russia’s CWs program will cost 
between $3.3 and 5 billion; WEU, Assembly of the WEU, The State o f  Affairs in 
Disarmament (CFE, Nuclear Disarmament), WEU 1590 (Brussels: WEU, 1997).
97This is in spite of the fact that 157 nations have signed the convention and 140 
nations have ratified the convention.
98The Verification Expert Group, VEREX, which was itself an ad hoc group, 
presented its findings to the conference, but there were concerns over inspections of 
research facilities which are not prohibited by the CWC or the BWC; IISS, Military 
Balance, 1995/96, 280.
"Article X, section 1, Convention on the Prohibition o f  the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling o f Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction fThe Biological Weapons Convention) Geneva (10 April 1972).
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to press for greater information exchanges between themselves and nations with 
developed BWs capabilities-something which is intensely opposed by the United States 
and the EU on the grounds that such exchanges might lead to greater proliferation.
While the BWC has been essentially stalled at the international level, in 1992, 
Great Britain, Russia and the United States undertook a separate agreement to curtail the 
production of BWs and begin reductions in current stocks, and to provide aid to Russia 
in its effort to dismantle its BWs facilities and stockpiles. In exchange for this aid, 
Russia pledged to allow inspections of existing BW facilities and to cease all offensive 
research and begin dismantling experimental and weapons testing facilities.100
While the NPT, the CWC and the BWC, attempt to ban categories of weapons 
and prevent the future development o f such systems, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) attempts to prevent the transfer o f missile technology that could be 
used to deliver WMDs. Similar to the now defunct Cold War Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the MTCR is not based on any treaty or 
convention, but on nations’ willingness to unilaterally control their exports of sensitive 
technology. The MTCR was originally formed in 1987 by the G-7 nations and has now 
expanded to 28 nations, including the sixteen members o f the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as Russia and China.101 The 
missiles included in the MTCR are those capable o f carrying NBCs with a payload of at
100Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Joint Statement on Biological 
Weapons by the Governments o f the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian 
Federation, Moscow (11 September, 1992).
101Although a member of the MTCR, China has thus far not complied with the 
regime’s norms, because of its sales of missiles and missile technology. Joachim Krause 
contends that China represents the “greatest challenge for the MTCR;” Krause, 11.
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least 500 kilograms and a range of 300 kilometers. The MTCR also covers dual-use 
equipment that could be used for the direct development of missile systems or the 
development of guidance systems for these weapons. While Hungary is the only state in 
Central and Eastern Europe that belongs to the MTCR, all the associate partners of the 
WEU must abide by the guidelines of the regime. Hence, the potential for EU 
membership provides an incentive for states to at least comply with the MTCR.102
In addition to the MTCR, the demise of COCOM led to the development of 
several other ad hoc international agreements designed to prevent the proliferation of 
WMDs through export controls on advanced or sensitive military technology. After 
COCOM disbanded in 1994, twenty-eight states, the seventeen COCOM states, the six 
COCOM cooperating states, the Visegrad nations and Russia reached an agreement 
known as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual Use Goods and Technology.103 The Wassenaar Arrangement covers two broad 
categories of exports, conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. It calls upon 
signatories to report conventional arms transfers on a biannual basis, and while it gives 
national governments discretion over what to export, it also requires that they provide 
information on sensitive exports and report any attempts to purchase sensitive
102WEU, Council o f Ministers, European Security, paragraph 52.
I03The 17 COCOM states were Australia, Japan, and the NATO members, with the 
exception of Iceland. The six COCOM cooperating nations were Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. The Visegrad states include the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. After the Agreement was signed in 1994, 
Argentina, Romania and South Korea joined the regime, and in 1996, Bulgaria and 
Ukraine ascended.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 0 5
technologies by other states.104 Hence the Wassenaar Arrangement only increases the 
transparency of transfers, but lacks any real control mechanisms or enforcement 
capabilities.
[n order to supplement the CWC and aid in the formation of a BWC regime, the 
Australia Group of nations has harmonized the various national restrictions on exports of 
materials and technologies that can be used in chemical or biological weapons. The 
Group has produced a list of fifty-four chemical agents and more than fifty biological 
agents whose export is banned. The Group also provides a warning list o f  items that 
have commercial applications, but can be used in the production of BC weapons.105 
While many individual EU memberstates belong to the various control regimes, the EU 
itself has also moved to adopt controls on the export o f sensitive materials. In 1994, the 
EU adopted two measures designed to coordinate export controls among its member 
states. The first measure removes individual differences on intra-community trade 
within the EU, and the second measure establishes mechanisms to control the export of 
dual-use technologies. The EU also has developed a list of controlled dual-use 
technologies and materials which compliments that of the Australia Group and the 
MTCR.
NATO has also undertaken steps to address proliferation issues. For example, at 
the Brussels summit, Allied leaders agreed to increase efforts aimed at stopping the 
proliferation of WMDs. Subsequently, two groups were established to deal with the
lwnSS, The Military Balance, 1996/97, 288-89.
105Australia Group, Australia Group Export Controls on Materials Used in the 
Manufacture o f  Chemical and Biological Weapons, Control List o f Dual-Use Chemicals: 
Commercial and Military Application (7 November, 1996).
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issues of WMDs-one to deal with the political aspects of proliferation, the other to 
confront the military considerations o f WMDs.106 To address the proliferation of 
WMDs, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the Senior Politico-Military 
Group on Proliferation (SGP) to study the political dimensions of WMDs and the Senior 
Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) to deal with military issues involving defense 
against WMDs. These groups are overseen by the Joint Committee on Proliferation 
which reports directly to the NAC.107 While the SGP has worked on issues such as the 
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and consultations with Russia through 
NACC and the "16+1" meetings, the DGP embarked on a two-year study to redefine 
Alliance defense strategies against WMDs. The SGP meetings with Russia were soon 
broadened through the development o f the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, while 
the NACC was superceded by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) in 1997.108 One of the tasks o f the EAPC was to increase consultations on arms 
control and the proliferation of WMDs.109 Meanwhile, NATO's Council of Ministers 
agreed to establish "permanent mechanisms for political consultations" between NATO 
and Russia to address issues such as proliferation.110 The SGP has continued to focus on
I06These groups were established at the NATO Ministerial in Istanbul in June of 1994.
107Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role," NATO Review 
43, no. 4 (July 1995): 15.
l08On the creation of the EAPC see, NATO, “The Transformation of NATO’s 
Defence Posture,” NATO Fact Sheet, no. 22 (July 1997).
109NATO, “Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.”
II0The contemporary American Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, called for 
Russia to open permanent liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the 
Alliance's strategic commands. In exchange, NATO would establish reciprocal liaisons
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political issues and has “underscored the importance of creating a climate of confidence 
and security that contributes to alleviating regional tensions and reducing possible 
incentives for would-be proliferants to acquire WMDs. Important consultations are held 
with Partner countries, including Russia and Ukraine in a 16+1 format, with the aim of 
fostering a common understanding of and approach to the proliferation problem.”111 
While the SGP has concentrated on political initiatives, the DGP developed 
specific recommendations to improve the Alliance’s defensive capabilities against 
WMDs. These recommendations were subsequently adopted at the 1996 Brussels 
Summit. The DGP also presented three broad policy recommendations to the Alliance’s 
political leadership. First the DGP called for the maintenance of “robust” military 
capabilities to devalue WMDs by “raising the costs of acquiring or using them.”112 
Second, the DGP asserted the need to develop a mix of defensive capabilities, including 
intelligence and surveillance resources. Third, and finally, the DGP, called for the 
deployment of six core capabilities.113
Some states have attempted to develop their own WMD defensive capabilities.
For instance, the British MOD has proposed the establishment of a joint Army/Royal Air
with the Russian General Staff; William J. Perry, Speech, Moscow (17 October 1996); 
IISS, Military Balance, 1996/97, 35.
ulNATO, “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
NATO Basic Facl Sheet, no. 8 (April 1997): 2.
112Ibid., 3.
113These capabilities include: “strategic and operational intelligence; automated and 
deployable command, control and communications; wide area ground surveillance; 
stand-off/point biological and chemical agent detection, identification and warning; 
extended air defences, including tactical ballistic missile defence for deployed forces; 
individual protective equipment for deployed forces,”; ibid.
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Force defense unit to provide operational capability against WMD. The purpose of such 
a unit would be to provide rapid capabilities for deployed units. In addition, France has 
entered into an agreement with Italy to develop a ground-launched air defense missile 
system, known as the SAMP/T, Aster Missile.11'1 In the meanwhile, the gradual French 
re-integration into Alliance moved forward as France returned to some o f the NATO 
structures it left in 1966. After the Brussels Summit, France agreed to participate in the 
DGP and it was decided that France would serve as the first European co-chair of that 
Group.115 In 1995, France announced that it would return to the North Atlantic Military 
Committee and begin attending meetings of the Defense Planning Committee. The 
rewards of re-integration were apparent at the June 1996, Berlin Summit where France 
was able to gain concessions from the United States which allowed European states to 
have "political control and strategic direction" of CJTF missions that the European states 
control.116 By the Brussels Summit, there was a recognized convergence of interests 
around the future of European Security. NATO would remain the cornerstone of the 
continent's security architecture, but it would be a vastly different NATO than the Cold
114Jan Dirk Blauuw, ’’WEU’s Views on Theatre Missile Defence,” speech, Eilat (12 
June 1997).
115Robert Joseph, “Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO," Survival 38, no. 1 
(Spring 1996): 120.
U6Bruce Clark, "Europe Secures Greater Role in NATO Operations," Financial Times 
(4 June 1996), p. 1. In addition, at the Berlin Summit it was decided to reduce the 
number of standing NATO headquarter elements and establish mobile headquarters that 
would form the nuclei o f future CJTF missions; Bruce Clark, "NATO Seeks to Bridge 
Ambiguity Gap," Financial Times (6 June 1996), 2.
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War alliance. At the June 1996 summit, the Alliance endorsed the DGP's findings on 
WMDs.117
Concurrent with NATO’s activities, there has been a multilateral effort to 
develop a missile defense system for Europe. Such a system, although developed by 
individual nations or through joint procurement, could provide the foundation for 
NATO’s core ground to air anti-missile system. While outside o f the auspices of NATO, 
the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) was a transatlantic effort between 
the United States, France, Germany and Italy to replace the Patriot and Hawk missiles 
systems with a mobile anti-missile system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with 
nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. This effort followed calls by the WEU for 
transatlantic cooperation in missile defense systems.118 However, in 1996, France 
withdrew from participation in the MEADS project in order to develop its own 
aforementioned capability.119 Although there has been some progress made in the
117The DGP produced a risk assessment which stressed the proliferation of chemical 
and biological weapons on the periphery of Europe and the importance of monitoring 
states that were developing WMDs. The DGP also defined the Alliance's main policy 
guidelines in defense against WMDs, including conflict control and prevention, and the 
establishment of a "mix" of capabilities to deter would-be aggressors. Finally, the DGP 
identified the military needs of the Alliance with a focus on intelligence and extended air 
defenses. To carry-out these findings, the DGP developed thirty-nine Action Plans to 
implement its recommendations; Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, "Countering the 
Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," NATO 
Review 44, no. 5 (September 1996): 10-15; Joseph, 121-29.
118See, for example, the report by the WEU, Transatlantic Cooperation on European 
Anti-Missile Defence, Part I, WEU 1435 (9 November 1994).
119The primary reason behind the French withdrawal was budgetary restrictions; 
Blaauw.
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development of the Franco-Italian SAMP/T initiative, it is clear that any substantial 
progress in theater wide missile defense systems necessitates U.S. involvement.
American participation in the WMD defense systems is necessary because o f the 
tremendous advantages enjoyed in terms of both spending on R & D and in technological 
advances.120 The U.S. leads the world in both kinetic and energy weapons and in both 
exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric programs.121 In addition, the US is able to bring 
an immense amount of fiscal resources to such projects. For instance, in the MEADS 
program, the US pays for some 60 percent of the cost of the initiative, while Germany 
contributes 25 percent and Italy 15 percent.122
The technological advantages held by the U.S., when combined with the nation’s 
immense fiscal resources, have allowed it to take a leadership role in the development of 
anti-WMD defenses. With the exception of France and in spite of the rhetoric calling for 
the development of autonomous capabilities, the European states seem willing to allow 
the US to continue that role. Even the foremost proponent of ESDI, France, has been 
forced to severely curtail expenditures on R & D which ensures US dominance in fields 
such as anti-ballistic missile defense. Meanwhile, because of US participation in NATO, 
the Europeans can assure themselves of access to American technology through the 
Alliance’s integrated military commands. For instance, Europe’s main airborne early
l20Eliot Cohen argues that, in fact, the United States is leading the "revolution" in 
modem warfare; see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs, vol.
75, no. 2 (March 1996): 37-54; see also, "Defense Technology," The Economist (10 
June, 1995). This technological lead is bolstered by American leads in resources.
121WEU, Transatlantic Cooperation on European Anti-Missile Defence, Part II, WEU 
1435 (9 November 1994).
122 Ibid.
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warning system is the Alliance’s NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). 
NAEWF is commonly funded and made up of multilateral elements, including British 
and US forces and is based in the United Kingdom and Germany.123 For the foreseeable 
future, the Europeans will continue to rely on the US to provide the bulk of both the 
forces and the equipment to counter WMDs. Finally, in the end, the U.S. nuclear 
potential continues to be one of the West’s main deterrents, especially in light of reports 
that show U.S. military doctrine allows for the use of nuclear strikes against “non-state 
actors” that engage in terrorism using WMDs.124
The complexity and diversity of the issues raised by the proliferation of WMDs, 
necessitate joint and collaborative measures to counter the risks posed by these weapons. 
The plethora of regimes that has emerged over the past decades, provides the foundation 
for nations to collectively work to prevent the spread o f both WMDs and the materials 
and technology used to create them. By establishing regimes which commit all 
memberstates to either eliminate their WMDs or pledge not to acquire them, measures 
such as the CWC or the BWC provide the most effective means by which to ameliorate 
the security dilemma which would otherwise prompt states to seek to procure these 
weapons as the ultimate guarantees of national security. Instead, most nations are 
willing to comply with international norms precluding the development of WMDs in
i23NAEWF is made up of 18 E-3A aircraft and 7 E-3D aircraft. The forces “provide 
both air surveillance and early warning capability which greatly enhances effective 
command and control o f  NATO forces by enabling data to be transmitted directly from 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) aircraft to command and control 
centers on land, sea or in the air;” NATO, NATO Handbook, 173-74.
l24Bryan Bender, “Terrorists Using WMD Could Face US Nuclear Attack,” Jane's 
Defense Weekly (2 September 1998): 10.
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exchange for the regime assuming responsibility fro both monitoring and sanctioning 
those states outside of the regime or those states that defect from the regime.
Furthermore, export regimes can limit the ability of those states outside o f the regime to 
acquire the technologies and materials needed to develop WMDs. Export regimes also 
increase the transparency of the international system so that the international community 
can monitor those states that are suspected to be transgressing against international 
norms.
Nonetheless, the overall effectiveness of the various WMDs regimes continues to 
rest on the willingness o f primary powers to take the lead in non-proliferation efforts and 
to use their resources to aid these endeavors. As aforementioned, the United States was 
the most significant force in convincing the states of the FSU to return their nuclear 
weapons to Russia. The United States has also been the largest contributor to Russia in 
its efforts to destroy its chemical and biological facilities and weapon stockpiles. The 
United States has also assumed an enforcement role. American actions to force Iraqi 
compliance with UN mandates to destroy that nation’s WMDs capabilities are but one 
example of this. Hence the United States has played a pivotal role by both rewarding 
states, through financial assistance or other aid, for compliance with WMDs norms and 
by selectively punishing states that violate those norms.
Efforts to develop a nuclear free zone in the Mediterranean or to more fully 
develop the BWC require a primary or hegemonal power to set and enforce the rules and 
norms of such a regime. Only a powerful entity can set the rules and enforce the norms 
of a non-proliferation regime. In Europe, that hegemonal power is increasingly 
expressed in the institutional framework of the West. Individual nations are willing to
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relinquish aspects of national sovereignty to institutions and regimes in exchange for 
access to the increased levels o f public goods, such as security. In addition, through 
participation in these organizations, national governments are able to avoid action on 
contentious issues, such as immigration, by making them the domain o f the institution or 
regime. For these reasons, specific institutions have been granted hegemonal power by 
their memberstates. National governments turn to the EU or NATO to manage issues 
that otherwise would overwhelm the capabilities of the individual state, and in doing so, 
abdicate a portion of those powers that have been traditionally reserved only for the 
nationstate.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 1 4
CHAPTER Vin 
SECURITY INTEGRATION AND THE MEMBER STATE
One o f the more enduring features of international relations has been the 
development of balance of power systems. Throughout history various actors, whether 
city-states or nation-states, have banded together to prevent hegemony. In fact the most 
identifiable aspect of the European state system in the nineteenth century was the 
complex balance of power that maintained peace between the major powers for a 
century. During the Cold War, a rough balance o f power system developed between the 
West and the Soviet bloc. One of the most significant features of this system was the 
stability that it engendered, for this period of equilibrium allowed the development o f  the 
instititutional framework that has come to characterize the West. The American 
economic and military hegemony of the immediate post-War years compelled the 
European states to adopt policies that reflected American preferences for integration and 
collaborative engagement.1 While integration and the subsequent economic 
interdependence occasioned by institutions such as the EU have eroded aspects of 
individual state sovereignty, especially in areas o f national economic policy, they have 
also enhanced the nationstate’s to the greater public goods provided by the global 
economy and increased the security o f individual states.2 Hence, the balance of power 
system o f the bipolar era and o f American primacy in the Western bloc combined to 
establish a framework which encouraged and supported the general patterns of
‘On this theme see Ruggie, “Third Try,” 553-70.
2See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, especially pages 245-57.
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cooperation on security issues in Western Europe that led to the dramatic growth and 
proliferation of institutions and regimes.
One problem faced when dealing with the concept of balance o f power systems is 
to precisely define what the term balance of power. For instance, balance of power can 
mean the specific, historical European system that held sway during the late eighteenth 
century or it can denote the distribution o f power in the international system (is the 
world bi-polar, tri-polar, multi-polar, and so forth) in any given period. However, as 
Michael Doyle points out, most scholars agree that “the single most frequent definition 
o f the balance of power portrays it as the system o f interaction among states that assures 
the survival of independent states by preventing the empire or hegemony of any state or 
coalition of states.”3 Thus, the key functions o f a balance of power are: 1) the 
prevention of hegemony; 2) the establishment o f cooperation through the "interaction" 
that occurs as states strive to prevent hegemony; and 3) the "survival" o f the states within 
the system.'1 These functions mirror the goals of the United States in the post-War 
period, as the nation worked to prevent the emergence of hegemony on the European 
continent by either the Soviet Union or a resurgent Germany by ensuring the survival of 
individual states and enhancing the capabilities o f those states through cooperation and 
integration.
The central tenant o f balance o f power theory holds that arrangements o f  states, 
known as balances, will naturally occur as states strive for power and attempt to either
3Doyle, 134.
4Bull, The Anarchical Society, 106.
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maintain the status quo or overthrow i t 5 Those who apply balance o f power theory to 
the Cold War era, assert that the states o f Western Europe joined together with the 
United States in an attempt to “balance” against the Soviet Union in order to prevent 
Soviet hegemony on the European continent.6 While balance o f power theory goes far in 
explaining such factors as cooperation between nations in an otherwise anarchical world, 
and it does have predictive value, balance of power theory fails to adequately address 
several factors such as the difference between "equilibriunT'and balance of power.7
Balance of power theory is an subtheory of realism and incorporates all of the 
principal elements of realism. To begin with, realism stresses that states are the 
principal actors in international relations. Realism downplays the importance of non­
state actors. Realism also emphasizes that states seek power as end goal and as a means 
to accomplish that goal. The third major tenant of realism is that the state is a rational 
actor. It has ordered sets of preferences, and it engages in cost-beneflt analysis in order 
to meet those preferences. Lastly, realism sees world politics as a cyclical struggle for 
power, with national security as the top priority in the hierarchy of international issues.8 
Besides these basic realist components, neorealism also adds the importance of anarchy 
to balance of power theory. The presence of anarchy, which holds that there is no
’Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics o f  American Statecraft (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1990), 122.
6See Walt, The Origins o f Alliances^ 232.
Equilibrium refers to the preference states have for the status quo; Robert O.
Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study o f World Politics," in Neorealism, ed. 
Keohane, 13.
8Viotti and Kauppi, 5-7.
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effective government beyond the state level, means that balances become the principal 
means through which states maintain the status quo, and, thus, their independence.9
In addition to the realist underpinnings, four basic assumptions underlie any 
balance of power system. First, that there exist a number of actors that possess roughly 
equivalent power. Of course, there must be at least two actors for the system to develop. 
Second, all actors must at the very least promote their own survival, and most probably 
seek to enhance their status. Third, actors need to possess the ability to form shifting 
alliances. In other words, they cannot be too tightly constrained by factors such as 
ideology. Finally, war is accepted as a legitimate means to ensure the maintenance of 
the system. That is not to say that war is seen as a "good" thing, but that it be seen as a 
sometimes "necessary" part o f statecraft.10
As a subset of realism, balance o f  power theory concentrates on states as the 
primary actors. In addition, power is the driving force behind both concepts, while the 
neorealist notion of anarchy provides the stage for balance of power theory. Within a 
hierarchical world government, there would be little reason for balance o f power systems 
to emerge.
In order for a balance of power system to have this fluidity within alliances, it is 
critically important that factors such as ideology or nationalism do not form major 
impediments to shifts in alliances. In the nineteenth-century, this presented no problem.
9Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and the Balance of Power," in Neorealism, ed. 
Keohane, 117.
I0Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Oye, 60.
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There was a "relative homogeneity" among the main actors." This was expressed in a 
common core of norms among the diplomatic corps o f the principal powers that 
maintained the system. There was also a similarity in governments themselves. The 
autocratic nature o f the regimes allowed the leaders to exercise relatively unrestrained 
control in ally selection.
Critics argue that such homogeneity is lacking today. That states often have far 
differing ideologies which lessen the ability of states to shift alliances. However, realists 
assert that as long as a state rationally "sees" it in its best interest to shift alliances, it 
will. A modem example of this behavior would be America's willingness to cross 
ideological lines and attempt to form an anti-Soviet alliance with China.12
There is a debate among proponents of balance o f power theory over the cause o f 
alliance shifts. Some, such as Kenneth Waltz, see the system as providing an "invisible 
hand" that regulates the system—"the system restrains the actors rather than the actors 
being self-restrained."13 On the other hand, scholars such as Morton Kaplan or Henry 
Kissinger, see states taking actions to preserve the system itself. In other words, Kaplan 
and others like him contend that there are times when states put the balance o f power 
above their own self-interest.14 They propose that balances are usually the creations of 
statesmen, who create and operate these systems for their own advantages (a theme
"Gulick, 19-23.
12Stephen Walt asserts that Henry Kissinger championed the opening of relations with 
China as an act of balancing, since in a “triangular relationship, it was better to align 
with the weaker side;” Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, 211.
"Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," 185.
I4Ibid.
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known as volunteerism).15 This approach certainly applies to the classical European 
balance o f power, but it runs counter to realism 16. Under realism, states may make 
sacrifices on matters of self-interest if  they perceive the potential for a greater pay-off in 
the long run, however they certainly would not sacrifice or neglect national interests over 
a long period o f time. Volunteerism seems to be an attempt to take the tenants o f the 
classical balance of power and apply them too broadly. After all, other aspects of the 
classical system such as reciprocal compensation are hardly seen as playing an important 
role in the broad spectrum of international balances.
In addition to forming and shifting alliances and coalitions, the second major 
instrument in preventing hegemony under the balance of power system is war. War is 
seen as a necessary means to accomplish certain objectives. This leads to a whole host 
of criticisms over the role that balances play in starting conflicts. Balance systems do 
often feature minor conflicts that help preserve the balance of the system, but the 
purpose of the system is to preserve the independence of the states and prevent 
hegemony—not to prevent conflict. At least in the foreseeable future, war appears to be 
an inevitable aspect of international relations (Hedley Bull asserts that it is even an 
"institutionalized. . .  built-in feature of our arrangements),17 and balance systems 
actually seem to, at the very least, delay major wars. In sum, it is probably more realistic
I5Viotti and Kauppi, 51.
16Gulick, 67-9.
17Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," 64.
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to blame warfare on humanity in general rather than on institutions or regimes that are 
created by mankind.18
The second major function of the balance o f power system is to generate 
cooperation as a result of the efforts o f states to prevent hegemony. By establishing 
order and a structured system for international politics, balance of power systems foster 
the growth of international institutions. International law itself cannot function in 
complete anarchy, but the balance system provides some degree of stability in which 
international law can manifest itself.19 Especially since a balance system preserves the 
key states within the international arena, it, by its very nature, promotes cooperation 
between states.20 Furthermore, the formation o f alliances tends to increase cooperation 
between states. Robert Jervis asserts that "common goals give each state a stake in the 
well-being of others."21 Jervis contends that present cooperation leads to future 
cooperation. In addition, the very alliances that form within the system tend to decrease 
the vulnerability o f individual states which, in turn, lessens the potentially negative 
effects of the security dilemma.
While this emphasis on cooperation seems contradictory since war is a key 
feature of the system, historical evidence demonstrates that the balances that form after
l8On this theme, see Robert Holt, Brian Job and Lawrence Markus, '‘Catastrophe 
Theory and the Study of War,” The Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 22, no. 2 (June 1978): 
172.
19Ian Harris, “Order and Justice in the ‘Anarchical Society’,” International Affairs 69, 
no. 4 (October 1993): 730; and Terry Hardin, “International Ethics and International 
Law,” Review o f  International Studies 18, no. 1 (January 1992): 28.
20BulI, “Society,” 106-8.
2‘Jervis, "Balance," 67.
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major hegemonic wars are capable of providing long periods o f relative peace. This was 
certainly true after the Napoleonic Wars and after World War II. An even more obscure 
case would be the peace that resulted from the balance that developed in South America 
after the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).22 The point is not that balances always 
promote peace, but that they have the capability to do so.
The third major function o f a balance of power system is to preserve the 
independence of the states within the system.23 Simply put, the system should operate in 
such a manner that even minor states are guaranteed their continued existence.24 This 
promotes confidence in the system, and more importantly, may provide a greater degree 
of stability since the greater number of actors there are in the system, the greater the 
ability to shift alliances and form counter balances against potential hegemons. A 
multipolar balance of power system does not find itself locked into two rigid, opposing 
blocs that might go to war over minor incidents (such as was the case in the First World 
War).25 In addition, the greater number of actors involved in a multipolar system 
increases the uncertainty of the system, thereby increasing each individual actors’ 
caution.26
“ Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing o f  Power in South 
America, 1830-1905 {Berkeley: University o f California, 1974), 262-3.
“ Thomas J. Christiansen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: 
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 45, no. 3 
(Spring 1990): 145.
24Doyle, 136.
“ Gaddis, “International Relations Theory,” 23.
“ Howard, 412-13.
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That multipolar balances are more stable than bipolar systems is a matter of 
significant contention among scholars. Many, such as Kenneth Waltz assert that 
multipolar systems are themselves more unstable and while bipolarity offers a greater 
degree of equilibrium and stability. Waltz contends that more actors increase 
uncertainty, since under the security dilem ma, states assume the worst case scenario.27 
In addition, Waltz argues that the simplicity of a bipolar system, in terms o f the number 
of principle actors involved, eases negotiations and increases the likelihood o f 
cooperation, since conflicts become easier to avoid.28
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita rejects the contention that multipolar systems increase 
uncertainty. He ties a systems uncertainty to its relative change over time. If there is 
continuity in the system and states are able to form lasting relationships with other states, 
then the degree of uncertainty is lessened whether the system is bipolar or multipolar.29 
Hence the bipolar system that evolved after World War II was stable, not necessarily 
because it was bipolar, but because there was little change among the states within the 
system.30 This was especially true in Europe where American primacy was reflected by 
the policies adopted by those states which joined with the United States to balance 
against the Soviet Union. By adopting principles which encouraged collaboration, the 
European states initiated a period of unparalleled interstate cooperation that in turn
27Waltz, “Stability of a Bipolar World,” 890.
28Ibid., Waltz, “The Emerging Structure,” 45-7.
29Bueno de Mesquita, “Systemic Polarization,” 247.
30The presence o f nuclear weapons was also a major factor in preventing system wide 
wars; Waltz, “Structure of International Politics,” 44.
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altered the very nature o f the nationstate as national governments became increasingly 
willing to merge aspects of sovereignty within the framework of international institutions 
and regimes-institutions and regimes which reflected American preferences.
During the late 1940s and through the 1950s, the United States dominated both 
the economic and military arenas of the globe. The United States held a clear 
preponderance o f military force through its nuclear arsenal and the nation accounted for 
over half of the world's economic output.31 The traditional world powers of Europe were 
exhausted economically and militarily by the Second World War and by their ongoing 
colonial disengagements. This predominance o f power and the initial lack of a clear 
hegemonal rival, gave the administration of President Harry S. Truman the opportunity 
to attempt to construct a new world order that would reflect and embody American 
preferences. Hence, the Bretton Woods regime, with its twin institutions, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to promote free and open 
trade and overall world economic progress. Politically, the United States attempted to 
develop institutions, such as the UN, that would promote world peace through collective 
action. The Truman administration also attempted to develop collective structures to 
address security' concerns.
The onset of the Berlin blockade gave impetus to the preliminary negotiations 
that began in July of 1948 over the Washington Treaty which established the North
31 With only 6 per cent of the world’s population, the Gross National Product (GNP) of 
the United States in 1945 was $355.2 billion, or half the world’s total economic output. 
The United States led the world in agricultural production, industrial production; and 
controlled some 59 per cent o f the world’s proven oil reserves; U.S., Department o f 
Commerce, Historical Statistics o f  the United Slates: Colonial Times to 1970 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 228,464.
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Atlantic Treaty Organization. Concurrent with these negotiations, American military 
observers and planners began close cooperation with the Western European states in the 
development of long-range military plans.32 The signing of the Washington Treaty on 
April 4, 1949 confirmed American participation in European security, although the 
degree of commitment was unclear.33 At the first meeting o f the North Atlantic Council 
in Washington on September 17, 1949, the representatives established the basic structure 
of NATO, with a Defense Committee, Military Committee and Military Standing Group, 
in addition to five regional planning groups. As evidence of the centrality o f American 
involvement, the United States was placed in each o f the five regional groups.34
By the end o f 1949, the United States and Western Europe had accomplished 
several significant feats. Because of American security guarantees and economic aid, 
Western Europe had begun the process of political, economic and social recovery 
necessary after World War II. In addition, a firm military relationship had been 
established between the Americans and the West Europeans. The first tentative steps 
had been taken towards West European integration. Even so, however, there were still
32Bemard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs o f  Field-Marshall Montgomery (New 
York: World Publishing, 1958), 455.
33Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the memberstates agreed the “. . .  an armed attack 
against one or more o f them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if  such an attack occurs, each of them, 
in exercise of the right o f individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area;” NATO, “Article 5,” The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 
4 April, 1949. Hence, while the Treaty does pledge the United States to the defense of 
its NATO partners, it does not specify an American military presence in Europe.
^NATO, NAC, “Final Communique,” (17 September, 1949), 6.
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vital questions to be addressed in regards to West European security and the two most 
prominent issues to be resolved revolved around the exact nature and timetable o f the 
American military presence in Europe and the contentious matter o f Germany's place 
and role in continental security.
In response to its European allies’ economic difficulties, the United States 
initiated a series of programs, ranging from the Marshall Plan to Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act, designed to stabilize these nations and bolster their capabilities. 1950 
alone, the United States through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 1949, gave the West 
European Allies some $1 billion in military aid. By June o f  that year, some 134,000 tons 
o f military equipment, including small arms, artillery and combat vehicles had been 
supplied to Alliance partners.35 The advent of the Korean War in 1950 caused the 
Truman administration to even further emphasize the need for an increased conventional 
force in Europe as a counter to the Soviet bloc.36 For despite the ongoing Korean 
conflict, the administration continued to accentuate a “Europe-first” policy.37
For the Europeans, there were anxieties over the true extent of America's military 
commitment to the continent. This was especially significant at a time when there 
existed a perception that NATO conventional forces could not stand against Soviet 
forces. French forces, which would have to serve as the backbone of NATO's troop
jSU.S., Department o f Defense, Semiannual Report o f  the Secretary o f  Defense, 1950 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 2.
36Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years o f  Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 
380.
37IbicL, 397-98.
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strength in Germany, were seen as being wholly unprepared for that task.38 Meanwhile 
Great Britain seemed bent on maintaining its traditional aloofness from continental 
affairs. After having donated military equipment that ranged from fighter jets to small 
arms to its Alliance partners, Great Britain increasingly pushed for limits on new defense 
outlays and was successful in ensuring that the principle o f economic recovery was to 
have priority in the negotiations that surrounded the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
whereby the United States agreed to provide military supplies to the Alliance.39
In addition, the other major West European powers were also under a number of 
economic constraints that seemed to bode ill for their future military preparedness. 
Europe continued to see a significant deterioration in its terms o f trade caused by 
inflationary pressures at the same time that it was presented with sharp reductions in 
American financial assistance. Furthermore, the costs of empire, especially for the 
British and French continued to drain national resources.40 In 1951, both Great Britain 
and France were forced to reduce long range military procurement programs41
38Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making o f  Postwar France, 1945-1954 
(New York: Cambridge, 1991), 195.
39U.S., Department o f State, "Mutual Defense Assistance Act," Department o f  State 
Bulletin, no. 22 (6 February, 1950), 198-211.
40For example, by 1951, the war in Indochina was estimated to cost Paris some $1 
billion a year; U.S., Department o f State, Department o f State Bulletin, no. 25 (8 October 
1951), 570.
41In Great Britain, economic woes led to the fall of the Labour government and the 
election of Winston Churchill and the Tories in October o f 1951. By December, 
Churchill was forced to concede that the government's three year armament program 
could not be completed on time; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: House o f  Commons 
(6 December 1951), 2611-2613.
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The Eisenhower Administration continued to be concerned over the Soviet build­
up in Europe. By 1953, the Soviets had strengthened their conventional forces in Europe 
from 1,000,000 troops in 65 divisions in 1952 to 1,300,000 troops in 70 divisions. 
Overall, the Soviets had some 20,000 frontline aircraft and a total of 175 divisions.42 
Most ominously, the Soviets had begun to build the nucleus of an East German Army by 
converting police and paramilitary units into a formal military structure which numbered 
some 100,000. The Soviets also initiated the formation of an East German air force and 
navy.43 These actions added weight to the calls for West German rearmament as a 
countermeasure against Soviet actions in their zone.
For the United States a recurring theme in its relations with Europe since the end 
o f World War II has been the periodic American reassessments o f its contributions to 
European security. Usually prompted by domestic concerns that range from a general 
and longstanding isolationist bend among the American public to broader concerns over 
the fiscal costs of the American security presence in Europe, the debate over 
burdensharing among the Atlantic Alliance has, in fact, waxed and waned since the 
immediate post-World War II era. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act o f  1949, in 
exchange for American military equipment, there was supposed to be a loose division of 
labor within the Alliance. The United States would be in charge of strategic and most 
tactical bombing, as well as the majority of naval operations, and would provide limited
42U.S., State Department, “The New Framework for the Mutual Security Program: 
Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, August 17, 1953,” Report to 
Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1953 
(Washington, D.C.: Foreign Operations Administration, 1953).
43NATO, SACEUR, Annual Report o f  the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1953 
(30 May, 1953), 36.
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ground forces. But the Europeans were to supply the bulk o f the conventional, ground 
forces and Great Britain and France were specifically charged with supplying the 
majority of the "short-range attack bombardment, and air defense."44
With the beginning o f the Korean War, the United States was particularly 
interested in drawing the defense line of Europe as far to the east as possible and 
reinforcing the American troop presence in the region in order to reemphasize American 
priorities in the face of the Asian conflict, while at the same time seeing a greater 
European stake in defense o f the Continent to forestall Soviet aggression should the 
USSR perceive an opportunity for action.4S As early as 1950, at the North Atlantic 
Council Meeting in New York, the NATO foreign ministers had endorsed the concept of 
an “integrated military force adequate for the defense o f freedom in Europe.”46 At the 
same time, the conflict in Korea cast doubts upon the ability of the United States to deter 
Soviet aggression merely by its atomic strike ability. Truman noted that “the attack upon 
Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of 
subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”47 
American military planners began to consider the possibility that the Soviets might 
launch a conventional attack in Europe, if the Soviets perceived they could overrun
44U.S., House Foreign Relations Committee, "Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 
1949," Hearings on H.R. 5748 and H.R. 5895, 81st Congress (Washington: GPO, 1949), 
71,82.
45Furdson, 114-15.
46NATO, NAC, “Final Communique” (September 18, 1950).
47Harry S. Truman, “Statement on June 27, 1950,” U.S. Department o f  State Bulletin, 
no. 22 (July 3, 1950), 5.
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NATO’s minuscule conventional forces. As a result, the Truman administration began 
prodding its European Allies to increase their defensive capabilities. The North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) had already established a Defense Financial and Economic Committee 
and a Military Production and Supply Board to coordinate military production and 
cooperation.48 At the May, 1950 London meeting, with American prompting, the NAC 
ministers “. .  .urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced 
collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defense o f the North Atlantic area, 
taking at the same time fully into consideration the requirements for national forces 
which arise out o f commitments external tot he North Atlantic area.”49 This statement 
embodied both the American emphasis on the need for more substantial European 
resources in defense o f the continent and the desire of the colonial powers to maintain a 
balance between European defense and preservation of their empires.
The Truman administration set 1952 as the year of “maximum danger’-the date 
at which Soviet nuclear capabilities would converge with their already substantial 
conventional forces to such a degree as to overwhelm Western Europe’s defenses.50 In
48Among other tasks the Military Production and Supply Board was to “. . .  work in 
close coordination with military bodies on the promotion o f standardization of parts and 
end products of military equipment, and provide them with technical advice on the 
production and development o f new or improved weapons.” The Board thus became the 
body primarily responsible for standardization between the NATO allies; NAC, “Final 
Communique,” Washington Conference, (18 November, 1949), 3.
49NATO, NAC, “Final Communique,” London Conference, (18 May, 1950), 2.
50The year 1952 was initially set as the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCOS) target date, 
while NSC 68 set the date as 1954, but for planning purposes, the JCOS. continued to 
use 1952 as the date at which the Soviet threat would be the greatest, U.S., Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department ofDefense Appropriations for  
1953 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953), 332-35, 385.
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response, the United Sates embarked on an ambitious military build-up and shifted the 
focus of American aid to Western Europe from economic assistance to military aid.51 
The administration was willing to increase the number o f American troops stationed in 
Europe, but only if there was a corresponding increase in the Allies contributions to 
Continental defense. By 1952, American military planners had shifted strategy in a 
number of areas to reflect a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. For 
instance, in that summer, American planners reversed themselves and adopted the notion 
that an attack on Berlin would lead to a general war. The United States took the 
pragmatic approach that emphasized the need for the Federal Republic to be included in 
the development of a European security system in order to forestall any German 
movements to unilaterally rearm. Even though West Germany remained outside o f 
NATO, the United States and the West Europeans had incorporated West Germany into 
the so-called defensive framework of the Alliance in 1950 by pledging to "treat any 
attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon 
themselves."52 The United States proposed at meetings o f  the North Atlantic Council in 
September of 1950 that Germany be allowed to raise ten divisions which would be under 
the direct auspices o f NATO. In his first annual report as the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, Eisenhower concluded that . .  even with the maximum potential
5lFor instance, in 1951 France was awarded some $600 million in economic 
assistance, but half o f that came from funds designated under the Mutual Security Act. 
Meanwhile Great Britain was given $300 million in American aid to maintain defense- 
industrial production; U.S., Congress, “For a Strong and Free World,” Quarterly Reports 
to Congress on the Mutual Security Act, no. 1, (Washington, D.C.: 1951).
52U.S., Department of State, "Communique o f the U.S., U.K. and French Foreign 
Ministers," (19 September 1950), Department o f  State Bulletin, no. 23 (2 October 1950), 
530-31.
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realized through collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the 
economical long-term attainment o f security and stability in Europe unless Germany can 
be counted on the side of the free nations.”53
Meanwhile, France continued to resist German rearmament throughout the 
summer and early fall of 1950. During the meetings o f the North Atlantic Council in 
New York, France found itself isolated by the British and the Americans, yet the French 
delegation, headed by the venerable Robert Schuman, continued to oppose the 
reestablishment of a German Army and instead began to insist that the military problem 
be solved in the same "spirit" as the European Coal and Steel Community.54 French 
policy makers were obviously interested in ensuring against a repeat o f the previous two 
wars, and unlike their British or American counterparts held Germany to be as 
significant a potential future threat as the Soviet Union. Hence, the three major powers, 
the United States, Great Britain and France were working almost at cross purposes. The 
Americans wanted the Federal Republic rearmed as a means to alleviate the need for 
massive American ground deployments in Europe at a time when the nation was 
involved in an Asian war. The British were working to ensure continued American 
participation in continental defense in the face of a perceived increase in a Soviet threat 
to European security, all the while limiting their own contributions to continental 
security. Meanwhile French policymakers wanted to confirm both American and British 
participation in continental defense and prevent a resurgence in German power.
53NATO, SACEUR, First Annual Report (Brussels: NATO, 1951), 2.
^Furdson, 87.
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Concurrent with French opposition to rearmament, the West Germans themselves 
obstructed the issue by trying to extract as many concessions as possible in exchange for 
rearmament, although German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer enthusiastically supported 
the EDC.55 While Adenauer clearly saw the Federal Republic's future lay with the West, 
he carried an ambitious agenda designed to ensure that Germany became a full member 
of the West into rearmament negotiations.56 Specifically, Adenauer wanted the Allies to 
revoke the "Occupation Statute" and regard the Federal Republic as an equal in future 
talks, as well as protect Germany from any future deals between the West and the Soviet 
Union.57 Adenauer also wanted assurances that Germany would continue to receive 
financial assistance in order to "sustain the burden" o f rearmament and that German 
troops would be treated on an equal basis as other Allied forces.58 The European 
Defense Community proposal was designed to be the means with which to reconcile the 
divergent interests of the West’s major powers.
The burdensharing debate became especially contentious in the early years of the 
Eisenhower administration as the President and his Secretary of State demonstrated their 
resolve to cut defense expenditures for conventional forces and increasingly rely on
55Adenauer described the EDC as both central to integration and an “indispensable 
prerequisite for peace in Europe;” Federal Republic o f Germany, Government 
Declaration by the German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Before the 
German Bundestag on 20 October 1953 (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1953).
56See Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-1966 (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966).
57U.S., Office o f the High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive 
Secretary, History o f  the Allied High Commission fo r  Germany (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1951).
58RichardP. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1952), 63.
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America's nuclear deterrent With his election in 1952, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
brought with him the fiscal conservatism of the "Taft wing" of the Republican Party and 
his administration would ultimately push for European military cooperation and 
integration as a means to alleviate the need for a substantial American conventional 
military presence on the continent.59 Hence as Paris worked to solidify American 
commitments to Europe, and to tap into the fiscal and military resources of the Atlantic 
superpower, Washington increasingly looked to alleviate its substantial outlays for 
European defense by constructing a strong, autonomous European security structure 
within the broader framework o f the nascent transatlantic Alliance. One result was that 
American support for the European Recovery Program (ERP) increasingly was 
subordinated to security concerns and military aid.60 Another development was the so- 
called “New Look” which emphasized nuclear weapons over large conventional 
deployments.61 For Washington, the EDC, would integrate European national military 
forces into a broad European army was the preferred vehicle for the development of such 
a security structure.62 Eisenhower summed up the American policy towards European
59Eisenhower also initially hoped that improved relations with the Soviets could 
alleviate American military commitments; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change: 
The White House Years 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 149.
60Osgood, 70-71.
6IEisenhower, 149-51.
62This policy was part o f the "New Look" strategy of the Administration called for by 
NSC 162/2. The "New Look" did not envision a large American conventional presence 
in Europe as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, but rather an reliance on America's nuclear 
capabilities as a deterrent against the Soviets. In keeping with this strategy American 
troops in Europe deployed tactical nuclear weapons, including artillery, bombs and short 
range missiles; U.S., Department of Defense, The ‘New Look' in Defense Planning: 
Address by the Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs o f  StaffBefore the National Press Club,
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integration in general as such: “Our policy will be designed to foster the advent of 
practical unity in Western Europe. The nations of that region have contributed notably 
to the effort of sustaining the security o f the free world.. .  But the problem o f  security 
demands closer cooperation among the nations o f Europe than has been known to date. 
Only a more closely integrated economic and political system can provide the greatly 
increased economic strength needed to maintain both necessary military readiness and 
respectable living standards.”63 The origins o f the EDC had their genesis in the first 
concrete stirrings o f European security integration soon after the Second World War. 
Through the Dunkirk Treaty, Great Britain and France already joined together in a 
military alliance, albeit one primarily designed against future German aggression, but the 
failure of the wartime Allies to reach an agreement over the future of Germany and with 
increasing Soviet aggressiveness in Czechoslovakia, the two nations proposed a 
multilateral defensive alliance of the Western powers. The Brussels Treaty o f March, 
1948, joined Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands together 
in a collective defense arrangement which came to be known as the Western European 
Union (WEU). While the Treaty itself only established a framework for joint security 
and called for cooperation in other fields, it was significant for several major reasons.
To begin with, it tied Great Britain into the broader framework of continental security. 
The British were willing to commit to continental defense for London perceived the
Washington, D.C., December 14, 1953, Press Release 1163 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1953).
63D wight Eisenhower, The Principles o f  American Foreign Policy: Message o f  the 
President to the Congress on the State o f  the Union, February 2, 1953, House Document 
no. 75, 83d, Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 3 5
Treaty as the first step towards a wider Atlantic alliance that would include the United 
States.64
For the United States the Brussels Treaty marked a major step forward for the 
Europeans in that it was the first significant step taken by the various Western European 
steps in cooperative security, and thus, partially alleviated American concerns that the 
United States would have to remain the bulwark of European security. More 
importantly, the Treaty also set the stage for the subsequent North Atlantic Treaty, and 
the resultant military alliance, by strengthening Truman's domestic hand through 
substantiating his plans to aid Western Europe in security matters. For instance, in 
response to the Brussels Treaty, the American Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution 
in June of 1948 on a vote of 64 to 4. This resolution confirmed American support for the 
collective security measures that the European states were taking and signaled to the 
Truman Administration that it had Senate support for the subsequent steps taken to aid 
those efforts.
What emerged from the French was the Pleven Plan which called for the creation 
of an integrated European Army. In this way, the problem of German rearmament would 
be solved by having German troops subordinate to and fully integrated with troops from 
other European states. The plan won passage in the French National Assembly by 
including clauses which, for instance, forbade the establishment of a German general 
staff. This European Army would be under the direction of a Minister o f Defense chosen 
by the members of a European Assembly and would be integrated "on the level o f  the
“ Montgomery, 447.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 3 6
smallest possible unit" (for the French, this meant at the battalion level).65 In addition, 
German troops would not be allowed to undertake independent action.66 The costs of 
such a force would be bom by the member states, who would still be able to utilize their 
own national defense forces for their international needs and interests. The Pleven Plan 
also formally invited Great Britain to participate in the proposed security system and 
thus, attempted to draw Great Britain into the process of European integration.
The development and ultimate failure of the EDC revolved around a series of 
bilateral relations. For the United States, the EDC was seen as a means to accomplish a 
number o f goals based on its relations with West Europe's democracies. The EDC would 
provide a benign environment in which to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany and 
reintegrate and rehabilitate that nation into the fold o f the West. Simultaneously, the 
EDC would allay French concerns over German rearmament, bolster what were seen as 
deficiencies in France's armed forces, all the while providing a vehicle for French 
leadership in European security without compromising American dominance of NATO. 
For Anglo-American relations, Washington initially viewed the EDC as a method 
through which to tie Great Britain into the fabric of continental security. The integrated 
military structure o f the organization was also presented Washington with an instrument 
through which it could blunt criticisms from the smaller European states over dominance 
by their larger neighbors.
For the three major West European states, France, the Federal Republic and Great 
Britain, the formation of the EDC and its ultimate unraveling also revealed a series of
65Furdson, 89.
“ Osgood, 78-79.
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dynamic relationships that were evolving from their postwar origins into their Cold War 
patterns. For Paris, the failure of Atlanticism, albeit on French terms, would necessitate 
a turn to Europeanism and attempts to construct a Europe that would allow Paris to draw 
upon the capabilities needed to maintain France's status and perceived special role in the 
world. For the Federal Republic, the EDC confirmed the importance o f bilateral 
relations with both the United States and France. Meanwhile, for the British, the 
willingness o f Washington to acquiesce to London's demands on the EDC, both 
solidified and substantiated the "special relationship" between the two nations. The 
British diplomatic efforts which transformed the EDC into the WEU demonstrated both 
the necessity o f British inclusion in the broad pattern o f European security and the strong 
Atlanticism that would prove representative of British security policy, especially after 
the Suez Crisis in 1956. The reluctance of the British to join the EDC proved 
characteristic of policy that would continue to isolate Great Britain from the rest o f  the 
continent.
For the French, the EDC marked the last notable effort at reviving the World War 
II Atlantic Alliance as a triumvirate of the three major Western powers, the United 
States, Great Britain and France itself. From the end o f the Second World War into the 
early 1950s, Paris embarked on a course designed to reaffirm its position as a great 
power through association with the United States which offered the promise of immense 
resources at a time when the European powers lacked the capabilities to preserve their 
empires and their status. The Pleven plan which laid the foundation for the EDC 
proposals o f the 1950s came during a  time o f American preponderance in the world and 
reflected American preferences.
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On May 27, 1952, the United States, France and Great Britain concluded an 
agreement which formally ended the Allied occupation of the Federal Republic and 
launched the EDC. The EDC would initially be six nations, France, the Federal 
Republic, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Treaty called for 
Germany to contribute twelve divisions to an international army of some forty-three 
national divisions which would be under the initial command of the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe. In order to assuage French concerns over rearmament, both the 
United States and Great Britain pledged continued troop deployment in Europe, and 
specifically pledged continued deployment in the Federal Republic.67 EDC forces would 
also continue to be under the authority of the SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council, 
thereby ensuring some degree o f American involvement and interaction with the 
organization.
Through the Richards Amendment, the American Congress made approximately 
half of all American military aid to individual European countries contingent on their 
ratifying the EDC.68 In the end, though, no amount of cajoling from the United States or 
the other European powers could save the EDC which went down in defeat in the 
Assembled Nationale in August of 1954 because the plan failed to adequately address 
French concerns over German rearmament. However, the issues which had destroyed 
the EDC (German rearmament and British participation in Continental defense) were 
resolved at the diplomatic instigation o f the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden 
who invited the major players of the EDC drama to London for the Nine Power
67Osgood, 92.
68John Foster Dulles, “Statement to the NAC” (14 December, 1953), 20-21.
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Conference o f September, 1954. This began a process that culminated in the signing of 
the Paris Accords in October of 1955.
Under the terms of the Paris Accords, France, Great Britain and the United States 
ended their occupation of West Germany which, along with Italy, was invited to join the 
Brussels Treaty (which then became the WEU) and was invited to join NATO. In 
exchange, Germany agreed not to manufacture certain types of weapons, i.e, biological, 
chemical, nuclear, etc. In addition, it was agreed that NATO would oversee the 
"operational aspects" of the German military, while the WEU supervised the political 
and legal steps necessary for German rearmament.69 In order to ensure French approval 
of the Accords, Great Britain formally pledged to maintain a military presence on the 
Continent o f  a specified number o f troops, and not to withdraw those troops without the 
consent of the other members of the WEU. This step was unheralded for the British and 
it demonstrated a new British commitment to European security.70 In a further 
concession to the French, the Federal Republic pledged to pursue a peaceful foreign 
policy and, in particular, never "have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of 
Germany."71
The Paris Accords were able to satisfy the major concerns of all the parties 
involved. The French government had its concerns over German rearmament soothed
69Arie Bloed, and Ramses A. Wessel, eds. The Changing Functions o f  the Western 
European Union (WEU): Introduction and Basic Documents (London: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1994), xv-xviii.
70 Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European 
Defense Identity Within the Context o f  Atlantic Solidarity (London: Brassey's, 1989), 3.
71U.S., Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, no. 9446 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1986), 420-24.
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while at the same time it received concrete guarantees o f a prolonged British military 
presence on the Continent. Germany was allowed to rearm and join the community of 
Western nations with the end o f occupation and its ascendence into NATO. German 
rearmament helped satisfy Anglo-American concerns for the defense o f the Eastern flank 
o f Europe. In addition, the Paris Accords also confirmed NATO as the primary security 
organization for European defense, thus, preserving the primacy o f American influence 
in European security. Hence, the very failure of the EDC helped set the stage for the 
longterm success o f NATO by replacing a potential rival security organization, the EDC, 
with an essentially subordinate organization, the WEU. The success o f the Transatlantic 
Alliance became based on the organization’s ability to both reconcile the national 
security interests of its memberstates, while developing and enforcing the norms and 
rules that have characterized the regime.
For the Western European states, the bipolar system o f the Cold War compelled 
them to bandwagon with the United States in the system’s balance against the Soviet 
bloc by joining the Transatlantic alliance.72 That the Western bloc was dominated by the 
United States meant that the states of the West developed a regional system that echoed 
American preferences for institutionalism and integration. This system was based on 
cooperation and collaboration among nationstates.73 More significantly, this cooperation
72Although the states of Western Europe balanced against the Soviet Union, they did 
so by bandwagoning with the stronger power, the United States; Waltz, “Emerging 
Structure,” 74-79.
73Here cooperation can be defined as “. . .  actions of separate individuals or 
organizations-which are not in preexisting harmony-which are brought into conformity 
with one another through a process of policy coordination;” Keohane, After Hegemony, 
51. In addition, cooperation requires that “. . .  each party changes his or her behavior 
contingent on changes in the other’s behavior;” Robert O. Keohane, “International
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would eventually lead to changes in national policy in exchange for perceived benefits 
from membership in such institutions and regimes. The failure of the EDC demonstrated 
the unwillingness o f states to suborn national interest to supranational organizations, if 
the perceived pay-offs from membership did not out-way the costs. Ideally, regimes and 
institutions facilitate cooperation by “. . .  affecting patterns o f costs. Specifically, 
institutions reduce certain forms of uncertainty and alter transaction costs.”74 Writing 
specifically about security institutions, John Duffield asserts that these organizations 
constrain state behavior by providing incentives for compliance, even if  non-compliance 
might benefit the state in the short run.75
The original EDC proposal which bound Great Britain into the framework of 
continental security satisfied the necessary requirements to reduce uncertainty about 
German rearmament by both providing a preponderance of force capable of constraining 
Germany and preventing independent action by German troops through integration of 
German forces.76 Without British participation, the uncertainties surrounding German 
rearmament led the French to balk at their own proposal. In spite of the growing, and the 
potential growth, o f the Soviet threat, the French were unwilling to allow German 
rearmament without the involvement of the British or ready support from the United 
States within the institutional framework of any supranational security structure in
Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December 
1988): 380.
74Ibid., 386.
75John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution o f  NATO's Conventional Force 
Posture (Stanford: Stanford University, 1995), 22-25.
76Federal Republic o f Germany, Government Declaration, 70-71.
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Europe. Only when German rearmament was fixed within a collective security structure 
whereby the military capabilities o f both Great Britain and, more importantly the United 
States, could be brought to bear against the potential for a German resurgence, did Paris 
agree to place itself in a security institution along with its former enemy. The WEU was 
able to provide a bridge for German entry into NATO and safeguard the stability o f the 
nascent security system. In this manner, the United States was able to fulfill a 
continuing role as the security structure’s hegemonic power and ensure both compliance 
with the regime, and equal access to the collective goods provided by the regime.




The failure o f the EDC marked a pause in the drive for European military 
integration. The strengthened Transatlantic Alliance that emerged from the ashes of the 
EDC became the vehicle through which the states o f Western Europe were able to 
develop a strong security regime which both developed and enforced the rules and norms 
that allowed for the denationalization of borders and the amelioration of the security 
dilemma between the nationstates of the region.
The decade o f the 1980s witnessed a drive for the Europeanization o f the 
Transatlantic Alliance. The Maastricht Treaty called for the establishment o f an 
autonomous European security capability and the 1987 relaunch of the Western 
European Union (WEU) was seen by many as the vehicle with which to reach this goal. 
The end o f the Cold War and the resulting American drawdown of forces in Europe only 
seemed to confirm the need for a European Defence Identity (EDI) distinct from NATO. 
However, differences over the scope and nature o f the European pillar quickly derailed 
significant progress towards EDI as Atlanticist states, such as Great Britain or the 
Netherlands, insisted on the retention of NATO as the prime element of any European 
security structure while Europeanist states, mainly France, insisted on a Euro-centric 
security system.
Even as concrete steps, such as the formation o f the Eurocorps, were taken to 
provide the European Union (EU) with independent military assets, the Atlanticist states, 
with the backing of the United States, were able to bring the WEU into the fold of
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NATO as forces that were "separable, but not separate" from the transatlantic Alliance. 
The advent of the Gulf War and events in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated to many 
Europeans the need for a strong Atlantic component in the framework of any European 
security structure, and, more importantly, the need for American leadership in security 
matters and access to American military capabilities, particularly in intelligence and 
strategic lift. In an effort to satisfy the legitimate needs for an EDI and yet ensure 
American involvement in European security, a series o f compromises emerged which 
brought together the divergent Atlanticist and Europeanist viewpoints and which led to a 
strengthening of the transatlantic Alliance, even as it opened the door for the 
establishment of the European pillar.
While there emerged considerable optimism over the future of broad, multilateral 
organizations such as the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), the end o f  the Cold War initiated a period o f considerable debate and 
even pessimism within the Western Alliance. The lack o f a direct military threat to the 
continent led to a dramatic drawdown of American forces as Washington attempted to 
take advantage of the so-called "peace-dividend."1 Concurrent to the declining American 
military presence was a drive for the Europeanization o f NATO. Beginning in the 1980s, 
this movement aimed at creating a more balanced relationship within the security 
framework which would allow the Europeans to play a more important role in shaping
‘Total American forces in Europe, including those attached to the Mediterranean 6th 
Fleet, declined from 321,300 in 1990 to 139,200 in 1995. Furthermore, in the early 
1990s, there were proposals put forth to reduce American strength even further; ESS, 
The Military Balance, 1990/91 (London: Brassey's 1991), 25; ESS, The Military 
Balance, 1995-1996, 30.
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and defining the goals and policies o f the Alliance.2 This seemed especially important as 
concerns of a renewed isolationist America surfaced even as European leaders began to 
grapple with the new security threats emerging across the region.
NATO initially suffered from two major impediments to its ability to continue as 
one of the main elements o f European security. The first was the lack of a clear 
mechanism to allow the Alliance to address so-called out-of-area issues. Since most of 
the new security threats that affected Europe were actually outside of the borders o f the 
Alliance members, NATO needed to develop a means to allow its member states to 
deploy NATO resources outside o f member territory. The second major question facing 
the Alliance was the issue of expansion. Since NATO was primarily perceived as an 
anti-Soviet alliance, any expansion might be viewed with hostility by Russia which was, 
itself pushing for the establishment of a broader, more inclusive security architecture for 
Europe, much as it had done in the face of the EDC in the 1950s. In addition, if  NATO 
was to become the primary institution for European security it would establish a means 
to incorporate the traditional neutral states such as Austria or Sweden. NATO expansion 
could conceivably create an organization that, like the CSCE, was too unwieldy to be 
effective in a military sense. Finally, there was the question of how to establish criteria 
for the new members.3 These factors led to considerable debate over whether or not 
NATO should even enlarge.
2For a detailed examination o f  the history and the impetus behind this effort, see 
Robbin Laird, The Europeanization o f  the Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
3This was especially important in order to address concerns about degree o f 
democratization, civil military relations, military interoperability, and the possibility of 
bringing ongoing ethnic or border disputes into the Alliance.
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Despite these questions, support for a strong Transatlantic alliance as the
cornerstone of European security remained very strong in certain nations on both sides o f
the Atlantic. Great Britain was very consistent in its staunch support for NATO
remaining the centerpiece of European security. Michael Clarice captures the essence of
Britain's policy towards NATO: ££NATO's role in European security should remain
central and that, therefore, nothing should be done to undermine NATO in either the
short or the long term. NATO is an alliance which has proved its worth and it must not
be compromised in the guise of reformism for the sake o f reform.’"4 This emphasis on
NATO is reflected on an official level by the Defence White Papers:
NATO is the only security organization with the military means to back 
up its security guarantees. It secures the vital link between Europe and 
North America: vital in political terms because of our shared 
fundamental values and common interests, and in military terms because 
no other European country or group of countries is likely to be able to 
field the intelligence capabilities, sophisticated firepower or strategic lift 
supplied by the United States. We believe that the Alliance remains the 
best vehicle through which to ensure that, were a strategic threat to the 
United Kingdom to re-emerge, our interests could be effectively 
defended.5
For Great Britain, the central issue in European security is the preservation of the 
American commitment as a means to counterbalance any potential hegemon on the 
European continent (including both Germany and Russia). Because of this emphasis on 
the transatlantic link, the paramountacy of NATO has in many ways become the defining 
characteristic o f British defense policy.6 Atlanticism was also a means of preventing any
4Michael Clarke "British Policy Options," in Bluth, 58.
5UK, Ministry o f Defense, Defense Estimates, 1994, 9.
6Even as Great Britain has acknowledged the importance of military integration and 
collaboration, London has steadfastly promoted NATO as the main institution through
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surrender o f autonomy in foreign policy to the European Community (EC). In this 
Atlanticist camp, Great Britain was joined by a number of other European states, 
including Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal, and, of course, the North 
American states.
For the United States, NATO provided the best means to continue American 
influence in European security matters. For fifty years one of the overriding and 
consistent goals of American foreign policy has been peace and stability in Europe.
While this goal began as an attempt to prevent the outbreak of a third world war 
emanating from the continent, the goal soon became the interest as the transatlantic 
links, on the economic, military and political level, intensified and broad American 
foreign policy goals, including democracy, free trade and collective defense became 
cooperative goals shared by both the Americans and the West Europeans. The end of the 
Cold War seemed to offer the opportunity to expand these shared goals into the East and 
for the United States, NATO was the security vehicle to do so.
Nonetheless, there were calls in the United States for a reappraisal o f the 
Alliance relationship as a result of the burdensharing debate. In 1990, the United States 
supplied 61 per cent of NATO's total military expenditures, while the Europeans
which to develop multilateral military structures. The 1996 British White Paper on 
defense stated: “On some issues, the pursuit of our interests can only sensibly be carried 
out through multilateral organizations and alliances. The most potent example of this is 
NATO, where we have seen how military integration has allowed us to reap benefits for 
both our defence and more recently in the promotion o f international order;” UK, 
Ministry of Defense, Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1996 (London: HMSO, 1996), 
paragraph 108.
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accounted for 38.9 per cent o f that total (the remainder was supplied by Canada).7 
Although military disengagement from Europe was never seriously considered at the 
policy level, the debate itself occurred at a time o f renewed calls by some European 
states for the establishment of an autonomous European military capability or the 
European Defence Identity (EDI).
The leading proponent of the Europeanization o f the Alliance was France. The 
traditional French emphasis on independence in foreign policy and its sense o f grandeur, 
have propelled French governments to stress the need for independent military 
capabilities for the EC.8 For the French the development of EDI would satisfy two 
concerns. EDI would enrich French capabilities and aid France in its pursuit of 
international objectives by pooling the resources and influence of the EC.9 In addition, 
the French political leadership believed that the United States had fundamentally 
different security goals than did the Europeans. For instance, it was widely assumed that 
the United States would not want to become militarily involved in the local and regional 
conflicts which were emerging as the main threat to the stability o f the continent. There 
were also broader French concerns about the firmness of the American commitment to
7James Sperling, "Burden Sharing Revisited," in Bluth, et al., 170.
8For an assessment o f  French foreign policy goals and an overview o f the concept of 
grandeur in world affairs, see Gregory Flynn "French Identity and Post-Cold War 
Europe," in Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe, ed. Gregory 
Flynn (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
bobbin  Laird points out that EDI would also allow France involvement in the 
transatlantic alliance without having to re-enter NATO's military structure; Laird, French 
Security, 21.
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Europe. As such, the French wanted firm institutional constraints to contain a potentially 
assertive Germany and to counterbalance Russia.
For some time, cooperation between France and Germany had formed the core o f
French security policy in regards to Europe. Beginning with the Franco-German
Friendship Treaty of 1963, the fate of the two nations had became ever more intertwined.
The Treaty itself was far more important for its symbolism than for its practical steps,
nonetheless it created a pattern o f regular meetings between the heads of state of the two
nations and the major governmental ministers, including foreign affairs and defense. In
addition, the Treaty stated that
The two governments shall consult before any decision on all important 
questions o f foreign policy and primarily on questions of common interest 
with a view to reaching as far as possible parallel positions. This 
consultation shall apply, among others, to the following subjects:
Problems relating to the European Communities and European political 
cooperation; East-West relations both in the political and economic 
fields; Matters dealt with in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
In the field o f  strategy and tactics, the competent authorities of the two 
countries shall endeavor to bring their doctrines closer together;
Exchanges o f personnel between the armed forces shall be increased.10
Franco-German military cooperation reached it apex in the mid-1980s. For some 
Germans, most notably former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the proposed Intermediate- 
range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the Americans and the Soviets would leave 
Germany more vulnerable to nuclear exchanges between the shorter range missiles o f 
both superpowers which were already deployed in both East and West Germany.
Schmidt advocated the creation of a "Franco-German conventional army under the 
command of a French general" since "the two classical military nations of Europe are a
10U.S., Department of State, Documents on Germany, 833-5.
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conventional force which no Soviet marshal would ever dare take on."" Under 
Schmidt's vision such a force would ultimately serve as the foundation for a defense arm 
of the EU and render NATO unnecessary by building European conventional forces to 
point that American nuclear deterrence was no longer needed to forestall Soviet 
aggression.
On the twenty-fifth anniversary o f  the Franco-German Friendship Treaty, German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand agreed to create 
bilateral, standing committees to coordinate military and economic policy and to better 
advise the two heads of state during their biannual summits. The Security Council was 
to be made up of both nation's defense ministers and the military chiefs of staff of both 
nations. Most significantly, the leaders also announced a proposal for a joint Franco- 
German military brigade. The 4,200-man Brigade was to stationed in Germany and to be 
initially commanded by a French general.12
For France, this initiative was designed as a means of further securing the Federal 
Republic into the framework of the West at a time when there were serious divergences 
between the two nations over Germany's relations with the Soviet Union. This was 
especially significant in light of the French perception, as expressed by Pierre Lellouche, 
then an official of the French Institute for International Relations, that "West Germany is 
playing for the long term . . .  It believes it can get East Germany back without falling
“Robert Keatly, "Schmidt Would Disband NATO, Establish a Franco-German Force," 
Wall Street Journal (16 June 1987).
I213SS, Strategic Survey, 1987-1988, 83.
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under Soviet domination itself."13 The prospect of a reunified Germany propelled the 
French to revive efforts at military integration in an attempt to maintain meaningful 
influence over German security policy. France would also launched efforts to increase 
defense cooperation with Great Britain and other European states.14
For the West Germans military integration was a method to preserve force 
structures in the face of defense cutbacks and limited personnel. The Kohl government 
instituted a long military program, "Army Structure 2000" which called for cuts in 
manpower of some thirty per cent by the 1990s. The Federal Republic's Territorial Army 
was slated to have all ten of its Home Defense Brigades disbanded. With the 
establishment of the Franco-German Brigade, however, the Bundeswehr saved one of 
these units by making it the German contribution to the bilateral force.15
Concurrent with its efforts to increase security cooperation and collaboration 
with the Federal Republic, Paris continued to lead the drive for greater autonomy in 
European security. The French choose the moribund WEU as the vehicle for the 
development of the European pillar. The organization was reactivated by a French 
initiative in 1984. In its efforts to initiate a separate security identity, France was 
supported by Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain.16 For the Atlanticists, the WEU came
13Philip Revzin, "French Fight to Anchor Germany in West," Wall Street Journal (21 
January 1988).
I4For instance, France granted the British permission to use French ports to transport 
British troops during a crisis and initiated a number o f discussions over nuclear policy 
and the development of new weapons systems.
15fiSS, The Military Balance, 1988/89 (London: Brassey’s, 1989), 55-6.
I6For Italy and Spain, support for the development of an autonomous European pillar 
was based on an attempt to gain recognition of their particular national concerns, mainly
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to be seen as the means with which to create a European pillar, but one that was firmly 
wedded to NATO. By 1987, the two sides seemed deadlocked over the exact nature of 
the WEU and it took personal consultations between the then-Prime Ministers Jacques 
Chirac and Margaret Thatcher to settle the issue.17 In the end, the WEU reflected more 
o f the Atlanticist model than the Europeanist.
While the French did gain the establishment o f a European security organization 
that encompassed the major West European powers, its powers clearly left NATO as the 
central component of European security. The WEU initially had no operational 
responsibilities and no forces attached to it, nor was the WEU formally affiliated with 
the EC. Hence, the WEU was duly relaunched as a consultive body with a council at the 
ministerial level, working staff and parliamentary assembly.
The WEU soon showed, however, that unlike NATO, it would address out-of- 
area issues. In 1987, the WEU launched Operation Cleansweep to clear shipping lanes 
in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. During the Gulf War, the WEU coordinated the naval 
blockade against Iraq. After the war, the WEU initiated Operation Safe Haven to 
provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds. The organization would eventually coordinate 
the military side o f the UN efforts aimed at restoring peace in the former Yugoslavia.
focused on North Africa. Meanwhile, Germany supported the WEU as a means to bring 
the French back into the fold o f the Alliance by using the French participation in WEU 
discussions as a substitute for French involvement in NATO forums.
I7Laird, French Security, 25-26.
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These actions added impetus for NATO to develop its own structures to deal with out-of­
area operations.18
By 1990, the Bush administration had signalled a willingness to consider reforms 
to the existing European security architecture, although it was determined to keep NATO 
as the main element o f European security. Within a relatively short period of time, 
NATO planners began to address the out-of-area debate, the security and stability of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the Europeanist desire for a separate European Security 
and Defence Identity (ESDI). In July of 1990, during NATO's London Conference a 
Senior Review Group was established to redefine the Alliance's operational doctrines 
and strategic concepts and to allow for a greater European identity within the Alliance.19 
In addition, the London Declaration outlined NATO's plans to begin to develop regular 
contacts with the states of the former Warsaw Pact. By June, the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) agreed to a restructuring of NATO forces so that the Alliance would be able to 
address out-of-area issues. This was especially important in light of the aforementioned 
WEU actions.
The NAC decision resulted in the creation of a rapid reaction force titled the 
Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and comprised of forces from 
the two most staunch Atlanticist states, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The creation 
of ARRC was important for two reasons. It demonstrated that NATO was able to adapt
l8It should be noted that in each o f these operations, WEU actions took place only 
after lengthy and often tortuous consultations since the WEU had no standing forces and 
had to make arrangements on an ad hoc basis; Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic 
Options in the 1990s, Adelphi Papers 260 (Summer 1991), 47.
I9See Michael Legge, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," NATO Review 39, no.6 
(December 1991): 9-13.
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to changing circumstances after the Cold War, and thus, the Alliance was not simply a 
relic of the bi-polar conflict. ARRC also gave NATO the means, at least on paper, to 
address out-of-area issues.
Not to be outdone, EC leaders accelerated the drive for the creation of a common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP), and in February of 1991, the French and German 
governments formally proposed the creation o f CFSP and called for the WEU to become 
the military arm of the EC. The two governments then increased the stakes with the 
"October surprise"—the October 1991, Francois Mitterrand-Helmut Kohl initiative to turn 
the Franco-German brigade into a multinational force, dubbed the Eurocorps. Such a 
force was seen as a nucleus that could eventually give the EC military operational 
capabilities and the ability to conduct military operations which NATO would be 
“neither willing nor able to intervene.”20 Eventually several nations, including Belgium, 
Spain, and later Luxembourg, pledged to contribute forces to the new structure.21
Nevertheless, NATO continued to reform ahead of the challenges presented by 
proponents of ESDI. The New Strategic Concept developed at the 1991 Rome 
Conference abandoned the strategic doctrine of flexible response, while it also called for
“ Federal Republic o f Germany, Federal Press Office, “Eurocorps Will Strengthen 
European Pillar of NATO,” press release, (22 July, 1992), 15.
2IThe Eurocorps consists of some 50,000 land troops, whose stated mandate is to 
perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations under the auspices of the 
WEU. For background on the formation o f the Eurocorps, see Organization on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Topic A: European Defense Identity (Vienna: 
OSCE, 1996); and Jonathan G. Clarke, “The Eurocorps: A Fresh Start in Europe,” 
Foreign Policy Briefing, no., 21 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1992).
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the development of a European pillar within the framework of the Alliance.22 The North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established as a forum for the former 
Warsaw Pact states and NATO members to discuss security concerns and for NATO 
members to pass on experience and expertise in matters such as civil-military relations 
and defense conversion.23 The establishment of NACC began the process of addressing 
the security concerns of the Central and East Europeans at the same time that it 
attempted to broaden NATO's role from a defensive alliance into a "loosely-constructed 
collective security organization" which would give the Alliance greater flexibility in 
responding to the national interests o f  the member states.24
During the 1990-1991 negotiations that resulted in the Maastricht Treaty, it was 
agreed that the EC, henceforth the European Union (EU), should develop a CFSP and 
that the WEU would be responsible in the interim as the EU’s security organization until 
CFSP was implemented.25 The sections of the Treaty dealing with the WEU owe more 
to the Atlanticist view o f the WEU as "bridge" between NATO and the EU, than to the 
concept of the WEU as the embodiment of ESDI. In the Treaty, NATO was recognized 
as a "key element" in European security. French proposals to firmly establish the WEU 
as the foundation for ESDI failed because many states, including Denmark, Great
■“NATO, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (8 November 1991).
230 n  the initial functions o f the NACC, see NATO, NACC, Work Plan fo r Dialogue 
and Cooperation 1993 Issued at the Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
M-NACC-2(92)110, (18 December, 1992).
24Michael J. Brenner "A United States Perspective," in Multilateralism and Western 
Strategy, ed. Michael J. Brenner (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), 155.
25See the Maastricht Treaty, Single European Act, "Provisions on a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy," Title V, Article J.4 (1991).
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Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands were uneasy about surrendering national sovereignty 
in the realm o f foreign and security policy. Most importantly, the French argument that 
an autonomous ESDI would create a "hedge" against American withdrawal from Europe, 
fueled concerns in Bonn that such actions might make, as Roy Rempel states, "a self- 
fulfilling prophecy"26 in which the development of ESDI would convince Washington 
that it could withdraw from Europe. Hence, while the Maastricht Treaty called for the 
development o f CFSP, the Treaty's view o f the WEU owed more to the British viewpoint 
than to the French.27 Nonetheless, the WEU did proceed to lay the foundation for an 
eventual CFSP and many advocates o f autonomy in European defense structures saw the 
WEU as the interlocutor between the EU and NATO.
In June 1992, the Petersburg Declaration tasked the WEU to designate military 
units answerable to the organization and to establish a policy planning cell. The 
Declaration established three types of membership for the WEU and an associate status 
for the states of Central and Eastern Europe (similar to concept behind NACC).28 It also
26 Roy Rempel, "German Security Policy in the New European Order," in 
Disconcerted Europe: The Search fo r  a New Security Architecture, eds. Alexander 
Moens and Christopher Anstis (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 180.
27For specific details, see WEU, Council of Ministers, The Role o f  the Western 
European Union and its Relationship With the European Union (10 December 1991).
28The three types o f membership are: Full membership, for states that are members of 
both the EU and NATO; associate membership for states that are members of NATO, 
but not of the EU; and finally observer status for states that are members o f the EU but 
not NATO (with the exception o f Denmark which is a member of NATO but chooses to 
retain observer status in the WEU). In addition, Central and Eastern European states 
were offered associate partner status; WEU, Council of Ministers, Petersburg 
Declaration (19 June 1992).
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allowed WEU forces to participate in CSCE or United Nations (UN) peace-keeping 
operations.
By 1992, it was clear that NATO and the WEU were engaged in overlapping, 
often repetitive functions. Both organizations had offered their military capabilities to 
the UN and the CSCE for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Both 
organizations had developed reaction forces— ARRC for NATO, and the Eurocorps for 
the WEU. Both organizations were also engaged in a dialogue with the Central and East 
European states—through the NACC and the associate partner status of the WEU. In 
addition, the WEU was attempting to develop independent capabilities that rivaled 
existing NATO capabilities.29 It was becoming increasingly difficult to argue for the 
continued development of the WEU when it was also clear that NATO's reform efforts 
over the previous two years had alleviated many earlier concerns about the Alliance's 
ability to adjust to the post-Cold War world. Furthermore, it was also clear that NATO 
assets and capabilities would far exceed the WEUs for the immediate future.
In 1992, the euro-phoria surrounding European integration came crashing to a 
halt against the Danish and French referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, 
the worsening Bosnian crisis brought into question the ability of the EU to act without 
American leadership. Meanwhile, beginning in 1992 and continuing to the present, the
29This was especially apparent in the intelligence sphere through WEU actions such 
as the establishment of a satellite center at Torrejon, Spain, and the attempts to develop 
satellite intelligence potential through the French-led Helios satellite program.
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German government has made a major effort to ensure that the development of ESDI 
and CFSP was compatible with the Atlanticist emphasis on NATO.30
This effort on the part of the Kohl government came partially as a result o f the 
EU experiences in Bosnia and partially as a result o f initiatives by the new pro-Atlantic, 
German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, replacing the more Euro-centric Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher. The Kohl government also decided that NATO offered the surest security 
guarantees for the Central and East European states, and began to push for NATO and 
EU expansion to the east, especially for Visegrad states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland.31 The result of the renewed German emphasis on the transatlantic dimension of 
European security has been a drive to ensure that developments towards ESDI were 
compatible with NATO military structures.
This effort at compatibility resulted in the "double-hatting" arrangement whereby 
multinational and even national forces could be assigned to both the WEU and NATO. 
This would allow forces to act as either NATO units or WEU units depending on the 
mission. If NATO was prevented from going out-of-area because o f the Washington 
Treaty, the same units could be deployed under the auspices of the WEU.32 This system 
also allowed WEU forces access to NATO command and control structures and 
capabilities. One o f the first tangible results of the double-hatting system was an
30RempeI, 181-82.
3IVolker Ruhe, "Europe and the Alliance: Key Factors for Peace and Stability,"
NATO Review, no. 41 (June 1993): 12-15.
32The 1992 Oslo Agreement allowed NATO members to collectively participate in 
out-of-area peace-keeping operations on a case-by-case basis, if requested by the CSCE 
or the UN and approved by the NAC.
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agreement signed in January 1993 that allowed the Eurocorps to be deployed under 
NATO authority.33
This agreement signaled a dramatic, though slowly evolving, policy shift by 
France to move closer to the transatlantic Alliance. While France has remained the most 
vocal proponent of ESDI, the governments of first Mitterrand and later Jacques Chirac 
have demonstrated an interest in being involved in the future direction and evolution of 
the Alliance.34
In an area of shrinking defense budgets and dwindling force structures, the 
double-hatting arrangement allowed European governments to commit forces to the 
WEU without detracting from their NATO obligations.35 Moreover, the arrangement 
marked a continuing effort on the part o f NATO to formulate an ability to address out- 
of-area concerns. Since national forces retained their principal commitments to the 
Alliance, double-hatting eased reservations about committing forces to the WEU so that 
even the most ardent Atlanticist states, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, were 
willing to pledge forces to the WEU. In May 1993, the double-hatting concept was 
formalized when the WEU adopted the concept of Forces Answerable to the WEU
33The link between the Euro-Corps and NATO came out of the June 1992 WEU 
ministerial meeting at La Rochelle. The La Rochelle communique outlined the basic 
tasks of the Eurocorps, including defense under either Brussels or NATO treaties, but 
left the question of the Eurocorps relationship with NATO's command structure 
unresolved; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future o f  European Security: An Interim 
Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995), 59-60.
^Tom Lansford, "The Question o f France: French Security Choices at Century's 
End," European Security 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 55.
35NATO, NAC, Final Communique o f  the Ministerial Meeting o f  the North Atlantic 
Council, M-NAC-2(92) 106, (17 December 1992).
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(FAWEU). FA WEU initially included the Eurocorps (made up o f  French and German 
troops and bolstered by contingents from Belgium and Spain and later Luxembourg), the 
Multinational Division (made up o f Belgian, British, Dutch and German troops), and the 
Anglo-Dutch amphibious force.
Concurrent with the evolution o f the WEU, NATO continued to attempt to clarify 
its structures and missions.36 NATO's three major commands were consolidated into the 
Allied Command Atlantic and the Allied Command Europe. The European command 
was then organized into three sub-commands: Southern, Central and Northwest. At the 
Brussels Summit, Allied leaders agreed to increase efforts aimed at stopping the 
proliferation of WMDs.37 Subsequently, two groups were established to deal with the 
issues of WMDs-one to deal with the political aspects of proliferation, the other the 
confront the military considerations of WMDs.38 Most importantly, at the Summit 
NATO launched two new initiatives, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the 
Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) mechanism to further address the questions of
36The foundations o f these reforms efforts were established at the 1992 Brussels 
Ministerial; NATO, NAC, Final Communique ofthe Ministerial Session o f  the Defence 
Planning Committee, (11 December 1992).
37NATO, NAC, Final Communique o f  the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear 
Planning Group, M-DPC/NPG-2(94)126 (15 December 1994).
38These groups were established at the NATO Ministerial in Istanbul in June of 1994; 
NATO, NAC, Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation o f  Weapons o f  Mass 
Destruction, M-NAC-1(94) 45 (9 June 1994).
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enlargement and out-of-area issues.39 These initiatives were proposed by the United 
States as an attempt to firmly secure NATO's place at the center o f European security.40
By 1993, there was widespread disillusionment with NACC. NACC provided a 
forum for discussion of security concerns, but it lacked the ability to take action in 
regards to security matters. Furthermore, NACC did not provide the former Warsaw 
states with any substantial security guarantees. The PfP proposal was designed to 
increase direct military contacts between the East and West and thus make the Central 
and East European states feel more secure, yet not alienate Russia by direct NATO 
expansion. PfP was in fact touted as a precursor to NATO membership.
The PfP concept was approved at the January 1994, Brussels Summit and offered 
the states of the East tangible security benefits. For instance, PfP states were allowed to 
participate in NATO peacekeeping exercises and UN or OSCE sponsored NATO 
humanitarian operations. In addition, PfP states were given offices at NATO 
headquarters and allowed to take part in the new planning and coordination cell of 
NATO's European Command.41 Finally, PfP states were allowed regular consultations 
with NATO over military planning and procurement, military restructuring and civil-
39See NATO, NAC, Partnership fo r Peace: Invitation Issued by the Heads o f  State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, M-l(94)2, 
(10 January 1994); and NATO, NAC, Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, 
annex to M-1(94)2 (10 January 1994).
40The PfP and CJTF proposals were launched by then Secretary of Defense, Les 
Aspin, at the NATO ministerial at Travemuende in October of 1993.
4‘NATO, NAC, Partnership fo r  Peace.
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military relations.42 The requirements to join PfP were left deliberately vague, but states 
were required to work towards interoperability with NATO forces, and to share the cost 
o f any peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Most significantly, PfP did not come 
with any firm security guarantees. Nonetheless, PfP accomplishes two major goals. It 
provides a means for all of the OSCE states, including the Central and East European 
states, as well as the traditional neutral states such as Austria or Finland, to be involved 
in NATO. PfP also provides functional programs to meet specific needs instead of 
simply providing a forum for consultation.43
The second major American initiative o f 1993 was the CJTF concept. The CJTF 
concept allows for the use of NATO resources in out-of-area operations without 
changing the Washington Treaty.44 CJTF permits the use of NATO military resources in 
operations outside of NATO territory; for operations under the auspices of the WEU; and 
for operations with non-NATO states, including PfP members. As such, CJTF 
establishes the relationship between forces of NATO and the WEU as "separable but not 
separate."45 Thus, CJTF allows the WEU access to NATO resources and partially 
alleviates the need for the development of rival capabilities. It also allows the PfP states 
to utilize NATO resources and participate in NATO-backed humanitarian and
42British American Security Information Council (BASIC), NATO, Peacekeeping and 
the United Nations, Report 94.1 (September 1994), 26.
43Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?" 
Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 102.
44NATO, “NATO’s New Force Structures,” NATO Basic Fact Sheet, no. 5 (Brussels: 
NATO, 1996).
45NATO, NAC, Declaration o f  the Heads o f  State and Government Participating in 
the Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, M-1 (94)3 (11 January 1994), 1.
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peacekeeping operations. By its very nature, CJTF provides a mechanism for "coalitions 
o f the willing” which would permit those NATO states which do not want to be involved 
in a specific out-of-area operation, the ability to opt out without challenging the cohesion 
of the Alliance. CJTF contributes to ESDI by endowing the WEU with assets and 
capabilities that it otherwise has not developed.46 However, the NAC must approve each 
CJTF and this raised concerns about the ability of the United States to "veto" operations. 
Further concerns were raised about the influence of the United States since American 
staff officers would theoretically have to be involved in CJTF exercises at various levels 
to oversee the use of American assets. France was particularly disturbed over the 
possibility that the Americans would thus be able to exert significant influence over the 
direction of operations, without principal involvement.
In the meanwhile, the gradual French re-integration into Alliance moved forward 
as France returned to some o f the NATO structures it left in 1966. After the Brussels 
Summit, France agreed to participate in the DGP and it was decided that France would 
serve as the first European co-chair o f that Group.47 In 1995, France announced that it 
would return to the North Atlantic Military Committee and begin attending meetings of 
the Defense Planning Committee. The rewards of re-integration were apparent at the 
June 1996, Berlin Summit where France was able to gain concessions from the United
46WEU, International Secretariat, Structure and Functions: European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) (October 1995), 15.
47Joseph, 120.
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States which allowed European states to have "political control and strategic direction" 
of CJTF missions that the European states control.48
Concerned that the impetus for CFSP was draining as NATO moved forward to 
address the problems of Central and East Europe, the French offered a proposal designed 
to rival PfP at the June 1993, Copenhagen meeting o f the Council o f Europe. The 
Balladur initiative was an attempt to prevent the spread of ethnic conflict. The initiative 
called for states to settle minority problems and grant the OSCE the right to oversee the 
implementation minority rights. The Balladur plan also called for existing borders to be 
considered inviolable. The plan also offered military assistance and associate status in 
the WEU. The Balladur initiative became the European Stability Pact, and states that 
desired entrance into the EU were required to sign it.49 However, far from taking away 
from PfP, the European Stability Pact became another means for Central and East 
European states to further integrate themselves into the institutional framework of the 
West, albeit through associate status.
By the Brussels Summit, there was a recognized convergence o f interests around 
the future of European Security. NATO would remain the cornerstone of the continent's 
security architecture, but it would be a vastly different NATO than the Cold War
48Bruce Clark, "Europe Secures Greater Role in NATO Operations," Financial Times 
(4 June 1996), 1. In addition, at the Berlin Summit it was decided to reduce the number 
of standing NATO headquarter elements and establish mobile headquarters that would 
form the nuclei o f future CJTF missions; Bruce Clark, "NATO Seeks to Bridge 
Ambiguity Gap," Financial Times (6 June 1996), 2.
49BASIC, 29-31.
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alliance. At the June 1996, the Alliance endorsed the DGP's findings on WMDs.50 
Through CJTF and PfP NATO has further adapted to meet the new security challenges 
facing Europe, and it has adjusted itself to more adequately address the national interests 
o f the major powers involved in West European security, including the development o f a 
European defense pillar. NATO will provide the framework for the development of 
ESDI and the WEU will provide the means. Towards the end-goal of ESDI, the 
Europeans have worked along two tracks: 1) the establishment of increased capabilities 
through the FAWEU; and 2) the development o f an integrated defence market through 
the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).51
With the development of CJTF, it was widely recognized that the WEU needed to 
develop force structures that went beyond the three existing bodies (the Eurocorps, the 
Multinational Division and the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Group) in order to allow the 
WEU to effectively control and staff future CJTF operations. At the Lisbon WEU 
Ministerial in May of 1995, the ministers approved the creation of a Situation Center and 
an Intelligence Section in the WEU's Planning Cell.52 More significantly, the WEU
50The DGP produced a risk assessment which stressed the proliferation of chemical 
and biological weapons on the periphery of Europe and the importance of monitoring 
states that were developing WMDs. The DGP also defined the Alliance's main policy 
guidelines in defense against WMDs, including conflict control and prevention, and the 
establishment of a "mix" of capabilities to deter would-be aggressors. Finally, the DGP 
identified the military needs of the Alliance with a focus on intelligence and extended air 
defenses. To carry-out these findings, the DGP developed thirty-nine Action Plans to 
implement its recommendations; Carter and Omand, 10-15; Joseph, 121-29.
5IWEAG was created from the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 
December of 1992. In 1993, the national armaments directors of WEAG began meeting 
on a regular basis with WEU officials.
52Jose Cutileiro, “WEU’s Operational Development and Its relationship With 
NATO,” NATO Review 43, no. 5 (September 1995): 8-11.
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approved the creation of additional force structures for the WEU.53 France, Italy and 
Spain agreed to create ground and naval reaction units in order to respond to security 
concerns in the Mediterranean. Soon afterwards, Portugal also agreed to participate in 
both forces.
The land component of these forces is the EUROFOR. EUROFOR is designed to 
be a division size rapid reaction force, made up of pre-assigned units from the 
participating nations. The sea component of the new forces is the EUROMARFOR 
which is an amphibious assault landing group centered around a French aircraft carrier.54
In addition to the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, WEU capabilities have been 
further expanded by the creation o f the Franco-British Euro Air Group (FBEAG).
FBEAG was created to the enhance the capabilities of the two air forces to undertake 
humanitarian and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The Group does not 
have permanent forces attached to it, but would draw on national assets as needed.55 
With the creation of these new units and with a number of agreements in place that 
commit various national units to the WEU, the organization has acquired significant 
operational capabilities. The FA WEU now include the Eurocorps, EUROFOR and 
EUROMARFOR, the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, the Multinational Division,
53 WEU, Council o f Ministers, Lisbon Declaration (15 May 1995).
54WEU, Defense Committee, Document 1468.
5sIISS, Military Balance, 1995/96, 35.
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FBEAG and separate national units including the 1st UK Armoured Division, the Danish 
Reaction Brigade and the Belgian-Netherlands Deployable Air Task Force.56
A number o f other joint European military units also exist at the bilateral level 
and are for the most part within the framework o f NATO’s SACEUR. For instance, in 
1993, Germany and the Netherlands decided to combine a Dutch Army corps (1 NL 
Corps) and a German corps (I GE Corps) into a bilateral unit, the First German 
Netherlands Corps, headquartered in the German city o f Munster, and under NATO’s 
Central Region command.57 The development o f joint military structures is exemplified 
to an even greater degree by Belgian-Dutch cooperation. The navies o f the two states 
were already linked together in NATO’s Combined Belgium-Netherlands, Northwest 
command (COMBENENORTHWEST), but on March 28, 1995, the two states signed a 
comprehensive cooperation agreement which essentially combines the two forces.58 
There is an integrated command center, Admiral Benelux (ABNL) at Den Fielder in the 
Netherlands, and the two nations share training facilities for all naval personnel, as well 
as operate a joint Mine Warfare School (EGUERMIN).59 These integrated units allow 
the Europeans to eliminate overlapping and repetitious functions, thereby reducing
56WEU, Defense Committee, Document 1468.
57For both the Germans and the Dutch, this new unit allowed the individual 
governments to reduce manpower and defense expenditures, all the while maintaining 
their commitments to NATO; Federal Republic o f Germany, Ministry of Defense, Fact 
Sheet: First German Netherlands Corps I (GE/NE) Corps, (Munster: I (GE/NE) Corps, 
1994).
58The Netherlands, Ministry o f Defense, Admiral Benelux (Dan Helder: Dutch 
Ministry of Defense, 1997).
59Belgium, Ministry o f Defense, Who Are We? Organization o f  Our Navy (Brussels: 
Ministry of Defense, 1997).
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defense expenditures, among their militaries since the essential denationalization of 
borders has all but eliminated the need for national defense against neighboring 
memberstates.
Hence, since 1992, the WEU has evolved from a consultive body into a security 
organization with significant military forces and some operational experience. 
Nonetheless, serious problems remain for the WEU. Unlike NATO, the WEU lacks an 
integrated military command. This necessitates ad hoc command arrangements. Despite 
some force structures, the WEU does not have collective assets (such as the NATO 
AW ACS fleet) which forces the organization to rely almost wholly on either national 
assets or to "borrow" assets from NATO. The member states have yet to work out a 
codified system to procure funding for operations. In the end, as Catherine McArdle 
Kelleher points out about the WEU, "the value o f  the organization lies in its potential, 
not in its present achievements or basically nonexistent capabilities."60
While the WEU has made several important steps towards the development o f 
ESDI, it is clear that the organization still has a number of obstacles to overcome. The 
WELTs continued reliance on NATO resources (necessitated by a lack o f assets in the 
intelligence, theater lift and command and control fields) presents a dichotomy.61 On the 
one hand, for the immediate future all major WEU operations will be subject to 
American approval through the NAC. Conversely, it also means that future WEU
60Kelleher, 62-63.
6ISpecifIc military assets in which the United States has a clear preponderance 
include: "satellite surveillance; command, control, communication and intelligence; 
logistics; long-range airlift and sealift; all-weather aviation; amphibious capabilities; 
large deck aircraft carriers; and missile defenses;" John Duffleld, "NATO's Functions 
After the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Winter 1994-95): 781.
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operations will be possible through either CJTF actions or the release o f national forces 
from NATO obligations. At the same time, the lack of an integrated military command 
structure forces the WEU to tie its potential headquarters to established NATO 
headquarters, again with the same results—the ability to conduct operations, but with 
substantial NATO influence. CJTF operations thus offer the opportunity to satisfy both 
the Atlanticist and the Europeanist stance on European security. American influence is 
preserved through CJTF, but there is now also a mechanism in place to allow for greater 
European autonomy in security matters.
In an era o f declining defense expenditures, CJTF is attractive to the Europeans 
because through its access to American assets it lessens the need for WEU states to 
develop autonomous capabilities that would replicate those same American resources. 
The WEU also gains access to NATO's established communications, and command and 
control infrastructure.62 At the same time, CJTF establishes a mechanism to allow the 
Americans to provide assets and support, but not necessarily troops for out-of-area 
operations in which Washington wishes to avoid involvement.
Through the double-hatting system, the CJTF concept allows forces to be 
answerable to both NATO and the WEU. This has bolstered the number of units 
committed to the WEU. As a result, states have a greater range of options to address 
national concerns. For example, the Southern European NATO states o f Portugal, Spain,
“ For instance, in October of 1995, NATO agreed to provide the WEU with 
communications connections which would provide plain and encrypted communications 
between NATO and the WEU and between the WEU headquarters in Brussels and WEU 
capitals; "Signature of a Memorandum o f Understanding between NATO and WEU," 
NATO Review 44, no. I (January 1996): 19.
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France and Italy were able to establish EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to address 
potential instability in the Mediterranean.
The CJTF concept also has the added benefit o f establishing a means for military 
operations involving NATO and both the WEU and PfP states. This provides another 
concrete step to increase cooperation between the nation-states of Europe. Hence, the 
PfP and neutral states, such as Austria or Sweden, have moved from being limited to a 
security dialogue with the West through the NACC, to participating in joint exercises 
with the NATO members and conducting humanitarian and peace enforcement 
operations such as the ongoing Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in Bosnia.63 
Membership in PfP and WEU observer status serve as complimentary means to allow 
NATO non-member states to integrate themselves into the broad framework of Western 
European security through joint exercises, training, and consultation.54
At the same time PfP also serves as a stepping stone for NATO membership. 
Through expansion of the Alliance, NATO provides a mechanism to extend the security 
sphere of Western Europe to the east. Furthermore, since enthusiasm for EU expansion 
was waned as the general "euro-phoria" has faded against the economic pains of EMU, 
NATO expansion will almost certainly proceed EU expansion. The first wave of Central 
and East European states, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have generally met 
the basic requirements involving minority and border issues, and civil-military relations,
63IFOR includes contingents from the following PfP members: Russia, the Ukraine, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Austria, 
Finland, and Hungary. In addition, Hungary also provided staging areas for NATO 
forces.
64Anthony Cragg, “The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process,” NATO 
Review 43, no. 6 (November 1995): 23-25.
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to qualify for NATO membership and should enter the Alliance by the turn o f the 
century.65 In addition, NATO has also moved forward to address the concerns of those 
states in PfP that are unlikely to join the Alliance within the near future. Several 
proposals have been put forth in an effort to include these states within the framework of 
the Alliance. One such recommendation is the development o f a "super-PfP" which 
would grant states practically all the rights of fiill-NATO membership except the Article 
V guarantee.66
Steps have also been taken to alleviate Russian concerns over NATO expansion, 
and additional steps are in the works. At a ”16 + 1" meeting following the Berlin 
Summit, Russia acknowledged the "inevitability" of NATO enlargement and proposed a 
more meaningful system o f "16 + 1" meetings to address issues such as proliferation and 
disarmament. In response, NATO's Council of Ministers agreed to establish "permanent 
mechanisms for political consultations" between NATO and Russia.67 This has been 
followed by American calls for a direct charter between NATO and Russia.68 The
65See Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement," NATO Review 
44, no. 1 (January 1996): 3-6.
^The Super-PfP proposal is aimed, in particular, at the Baltic states as a means to 
alleviate their security concerns without unduly provoking a backlash from Russia; 
"Baltics May Have to Take 'Second Best'," Financial Times (22 November, 1996), 2.
67The contemporary American Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, called for 
Russia to open permanent liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the 
Alliance's strategic commands. In exchange, NATO would establish reciprocal liaisons 
with the Russian General Staff; Perry, Speech; USS, Military Balance, 1996/97, 35.
68The contemporary American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, called for a 
formal charter between NATO and Russia which would "create standing arrangements 
for consultation and joint action" as well as establishing "a permanent mechanism for 
crisis management." Christopher went on to call for joint training between NATO and 
Russian troops in order to prepare for joint exercises; Warren Christopher, Speech,
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Alliance has also pledged that "NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no 
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory o f new members."69 NATO has also 
offered concessions to Russia over the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.70
In these ways, NATO has alleviated much of the demand for an autonomous 
ESDI, distinct from the transatlantic Alliance. PfP, while admittedly less than the hard 
security guarantees sought by most Central and East European states, provides a 
mechanism for security engagement between NATO and non-member states. PfP also 
prevents a vacuum from forming in the geographic space between the West and Russia 
and helps dampen the emergence of ethno-nationalistic strife in this region. Meanwhile, 
CJTF allows for the development of a European pillar within the framework o f the 
Alliance—a pillar that is "separable, but not separate". This is critically important since 
the reluctance of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the neutral states to give the 
EU direct political authority over the WEU seems to preclude the development of ESDI 
under the auspices o f the EU for the immediate future,71 and no other institution could 
credibly foster ESDI. Even France has gone "in four short years from NATO's denigrator
Stuttgart (6 September 1996).
69The strong wording of the statement reflects the Alliance's desire to defuse the 
nuclear issue with Russia; see NATO, NAC, Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f  
the NAC, M-NAC-2 (96) 165, 10 December 1996.
70These concessions are in response to Moscow's desire to update the CFE treaty to 
better reflect the post-Cold War world; Bruce Clark and Peter Wise, "NATO and Russia 
Plan Arms Talks," Financial Times (3 December 1996), 1.
7lFor elucidation o f this point, see John Goulden, "The WELTs Role in the New 
Strategic Environment," NATO Review 44, no. 3 (May 1996): 21-24.
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to its supporter."72 NATO has become an essential part o f the "community-building" 
process of Western Europe by complementing the economic links of the region with 
security measures. With its reform process, NATO has met the three main challenges 
facing the organization at the end o f the Cold War: NATO has adapted itself to new 
missions; it has inaugurated the process of enlargement and engagement of Central and 
East Europe; and the Alliance has begun to develop a  new, post-Cold War relationship 
with Russia. The Cold War Alliance was thought by many to be unable to adapt to the 
changing security requirements of the new Europe, and the drive for greater European 
autonomy in security matters propelled new initiatives designed to speed the 
development of ESDI. Within a few short years, it has become clear that far from being 
a "Cold War relic," NATO remains the cornerstone o f Europe's security architecture.
Concerns over the renationalization of Western Europe have dissipated as 
Germany has remained firmly committed to the institutional course it developed during 
the Cold War. In Central and Eastern Europe, with the glaring exception of Bosnia, 
states have in fact worked towards the resolution o f minority issues and the acceptance 
of established borders as preconditions for inclusion in the security and economic 
structures of the West. NATO expansion will also precede EU expansion into Central 
Europe, thus tying the Visegrad states into the fabric o f the West through the security 
architecture of the West before these states join the economic system. The recent 
decision by Switzerland to join PfP, and thereby erode that country's vaunted neutrality, 
is demonstrative of the growing recognition of the centrality o f NATO as the foundation
720 n  this issue, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and 
NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111, no. I (Spring 1996): 34.
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of Europe's security architecture. Meanwhile, until and unless the WEU develops 
significantly more capabilities, NATO remains West Europe's best security guarantee 
against the re-emergence of an assertive or expansionistic Russia, and the best vehicle to 
prevent such a possibility. NATO's nuclear deterrent also provides the most effective 
detriment to the use of WMDs against Western Europe. Through the work o f NATO's 
nuclear planning groups, the Alliance has begun to develop multi-layered and multi­
faceted methods to deter against WMD attack, including anti-missile systems. NATO 
has established regular consultations with Russia in the "16+1" negotiations to work 
towards the effective control of Russia's nuclear arsenal and, through the PGP, begun to 
address the political means to counter proliferation of WMDs.
The Alliance has been able to adopt a compromise position which, for the 
Atlanticist states, maintains the centrality o f  the American commitment to European 
security while, for the more Eurocentric states, fosters a greater degree of European 
influence and direction over potential operations, and in doing so, promotes the 
development of ESDI within the framework of the existing transatlantic relationship.
The success of NATO in evolving to meet most of the post-Cold War security concerns 
of Europe has prevented the WEU from growing into a more substantial organization 
and has preserved the main foundations that led to the success o f the Transatlantic 
Alliance.
Both the EDC and the revived WEU were initiatives that were proposed by 
France in an effort to prevent a resurgent Germany from becoming a hegemonal power in 
central Europe. For France, the EDC offered a means by which to encage the Federal 
Republic into a broad European security system. By pooling the military resources of
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the continent and Great Britain, French policy makers saw the EDC as the only means 
through which Germany could be safely rearmed in the face o f  the Soviet threat, without 
a return of German militarism or nationalism.
The failure o f the EDC demonstrated the importance o f the involvement o f the 
"big four" of West European security—the United States, France, Germany, and Great 
Britain. The EDC also demonstrated the inability of Washington to force its will on its 
European allies, and offered a foreshadowing of later divergences between the United 
States and France. The debate over German rearmament also offered a preview of many 
of the issues that would ultimately arise over German reunification. With the failure of 
the EDC, the WEU became the vehicle with which to rescue the Transatlantic Alliance. 
The Federal Republic's entrance into the WEU allowed for German rearmament, while 
British participation involved that nation in continental security, all the while assuaging 
French concerns over Germany.
Many of the main issues surrounding the EDC would later surface in the relaunch 
of the WEU in the 1980s. The EDC, the revived WEU was initially proposed primarily 
as a means to supplant NATO and lessen the influence of the United States in European 
security. Some saw NATO as a relic of the conflict and advocated the creation of new 
structures to respond to new security concerns. Nonetheless, the WEU became the 
means to develop a European pillar within the Transatlantic Alliance and thereby the 
means to allow the United States to underwrite European security concerns by granting 
access to American assets. The WEU allows for greater autonomy within the Alliance 
without detracting from NATO itself. In the end, the main direction o f European 
military integration continues to be within the framework o f the Transatlantic Alliance.




Parallel with the effort to develop operational capabilities for the WEU, there has 
been an effort, spurred mainly by France and Germany and joined as of late by Great 
Britain, to cultivate a unified defense market in Western Europe. While there have been 
sporadic efforts towards this end since 1953,1 defense cutbacks and declining arms 
transfers have led to a period of consolidation and excess capacity for the major 
European defense manufacturers.2 In an effort to save these industries and to establish 
autonomous capabilities for the next generation o f sophisticated weaponry, and thereby 
lessen reliance on American products, the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG) was formed in 1992 as part o f the WEU.3 In general, the European states have 
lagged behind the United States in their transition to defense production in the post-Cold 
War era. While the United States has already gone through a period of consolidation and 
mergers in its domestic defense industries, the Europeans have yet to make significant
‘In October 1953, France (F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (N), Belgium (BE) and 
Luxembourg (L) formed FINBEL which promoted consultation and coordination among 
the member states, including the standardization of equipment.
2In overall terms, defense outlays declined by an average of twelve percent between 
1989 and 1994. In addition, between 1984 and 1992, some 410,000 defense related jobs 
were lost (out a total of just over a million), and it is expected that the West European 
defense industry will continue to lose some 30,000 jobs a year for the foreseeable future; 
WEU, Assembly of the WEU, Document 1483.
3The purposes o f WEAG include "the reduction of national research, development 
and production costs which overIap";"creation o f conditions for an integrated, 
rationalized and competitive European defense industry:" and "identification of 
conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more competitive 
approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;" WEU, 1483, 13.
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similar market adjustments. In addition, the governments of many European nations 
continue to support and subsidize costly and inefficient defense manufacturers. 
Concurrently, European producers face a variety o f problems that range from repetition 
and redundancy of effort to disadvantages associated with the small economies of scale 
o f the militaries o f these nations.
In response to these problems, European defense firms have become the driving 
force behind integration efforts in the defense-industrial sector. While certain 
governments, particularly France and Germany, had previously pushed joint ventures 
and collaborative defense projects, they have now been superceded by Europe’s private 
sector in its efforts to remain competitive with the United States. This is especially true 
in an age when national marketplaces can no longer provide security to the state.
Instead, national security has to be provided by international or transnational markets.
As national borders become less important, efficiency has become the main focus of 
state governments as they attempt to retain both some element o f defense-industrial 
capability and to preserve market share. The role of the state in Europe has been 
transformed so that now the state defines national priorities, but the market is the driving 
force behind policy development. Hence the new spirit o f defense-industrial cooperation 
in Europe is driven by the private sector and is manifested in a renewed level of both 
bilateralism, in the form of joint projects and multilateralism in the form of 
multinational, collaborative ventures that are structured to benefit both national firms 
and national governments.
This chapter will review the current trends in the arms industry and the effect of 
military downsizing on the European defense manufacturers. The increased influence of
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the private sector will be detailed against the reaction of the Europeans states to 
constraints on arms production in the post-Cold War era and the resultant 
multilateralism. The response of France to the changed environment in the defense 
sector will be compared with that o f the United States in order to illustrate the opposite 
ends of the spectrum of actions taken to adopt to the new global arms market.4 Finally, 
strategies to preserve Europe’s defense-industrial base will be examined in light of the 
continuing constriction on the sector and the renewed bi- and multilateralism o f the 
market.
From 1990 through 1995, total global arms exports declined by 73 percent.5 In 
1997, the value of major arms transfers was approximately $25 billion or about 62 
percent of the volume of 1986.6 This drop occurred as nations have dramatically cut 
defense expenditures since the end o f the Cold War. Of the five regions which spent the 
most (93 percent) on defense outlays, East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North 
America, and Western Europe, only East Asia has posted continuous positive growth 
since the end of the Cold War.7 In Europe, all o f the major powers, with the exception of
4France and the United Kingdom are Europe’s leading arms producers, and in 1997, 
France ranked second only to the United States in total arms sales. In addition, France 
has become the leading supplier of arms to developing nations. More significantly,
France has pursued a very different strategy toward defense-industrial restructuring than 
has the United States.
5U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1995 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 15.
6See, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 1998 (London: Oxford, 1998).
7East Asia posted positive growth o f some 3.3 percent, while Eastern Europe declined 
by 24.1 percent, the Middle East dropped by 18.0 percent, North American fell by 3.0 
percent and Western Europe declined by 3.3 percent; U.S., ACDA, WMEAT, 1996
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Greece and Turkey have dramatically cut military spending.8 Since 1987, world military 
expenditures have declined at an average yearly rate o f 4.5 percent. Worldwide military 
spending has declined from its peak in 1987 of some $1 trillion to $668 billion in 1996 
(at 1993 constant dollars).9 This translates into an overall reduction of some one third.
Since 1990, the West European states saw their share o f the world’s arms export 
market decline from 67 percent to 43 percent.10 These trends have led to a significant 
period of downsizing and consolidation in the global defense industry, and among the 
Western arms firms. These changes have been exacerbated as major Western nations 
themselves have dramatically reduced their defense spending, hence putting added 
pressure on national arms manufacturers who were already reeling from declining export 
markets. From 1994 to 1997, defense spending by the EU memberstates declined from 
$168 billion to $157 billion.11 A study by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities showed that the eight nations of Europe that represent 80 percent of the
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 2.
8Greece has expanded defense outlays since 1990 by approximately 5.8 percent. 
Turkey has increased spending by 1.7 percent, but the nation has increased its 
procurement budget by 20 percent, while cutting personnel costs by 15 percent; 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, 1997 (London: Oxford, 1997), 165.
9Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Conversion Survey 1998: Global 
Disarmament, Defense Industry Consolidation and Conversion (Bonn: BICC, 1998), 
chapter 6, 2.
l0US, ACDA, WMEAT, 1996, 22.
"OSS, The Military Balance, 1996/97,34.
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EU’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reduced their defense budgets from an average of 
3.18 percent of GDP to 1.88 percent over a ten-year period.12
Significantly, much o f this decline in defense expenditures came in the form of 
reductions in procurement of new weapons systems. From 1987 to 1997, procurement 
by European states declined by an average o f 10 percent per year.13 The dynamics of this 
environment has created a highly competitive “buyer’s market” which has given arms 
consumers increased purchasing power and arms manufacturing states less inhibitions 
about their distribution. Representatives from Western defense firms have already spent 
considerable time and effort in attempts to gain toeholds around the world—even what 
would normally be viewed as small-scale purchases may be critically important as states 
continue to procure ever-increasing numbers of the same equipment. This is especially 
significant when the total number of states is considered and even small states such as 
Latvia look to procure Western arms.14
In response to the present budgetary constraints of these states, and yet with a 
determination to secure their places in the export markets of these same states, Western 
defense manufacturers have devised a number of strategies to capture market shares in 
new markets such as Eastern Europe or Latin America.IS New markets are especially
12European Union, Eurostat, no. 4298 (11 June 1998), 3.
,3S1PRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1997, 185-87.
14 “Latvian Army Changes,” Jane's Military Exercise & Training Monitor (January 
1996): 2.
ISEstimates put the potential market in East Europe to be worth some $35 billion over 
the next decade; “Military Build-up in Central and Eastern Europe: NATO Membership 
for Sale,” BASIC Papers, no. 22 (July 1997), 4. In addition, studies predict that the 
markets in Latin America may be worth as much as $80 billion over the next ten years
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important in light o f the declines in the existing markets. For instance, the total value of 
arms exports to the Middle East declined from $8.3 billion in 1988 to $5.04 billion in 
1997, while European purchases fell from $11.82 billion to $4.87 billion over the same 
period.16 Middle East purchases of new equipment have fallen to about half what they 
were immediately following their peak during the Gulf War.17 Nonetheless, the Middle 
East remains the world’s largest export market, followed closely by East Asia.18 
Meanwhile most of the decline in European sales occurred in Eastern Europe-a market 
which has contracted by dramatically since the end o f the Cold War.19
New strategies that states have adopted to promote arms sales include options 
that range from joint manufacturing offers to "rent to own" deals. Specifically, in 
addition to attempts to persuade states to purchase new arms and weapons systems, 
Western efforts have revolved around four main approaches: leasing equipment options; 
collaborative manufacturing; offset deals; and incentives centered around the transfer of 
"free" equipment.
with three states, Brazil, Chile and Columbia purchasing the majority of new equipment; 
“Study Reveals Latin America Defense Markets Worth Nearly $80 Billion,” Defence 
Systems Daily (5 June 1998).
I6Ian Anthony, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “The Volume of 
Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons, 1988-97,” SIPRI Arms Transfers Project 
Report {XT July 1997), 2.
17ACDA, WMEAT, 1996, 13.
I8The Middle East and East Asia accounted for 92.5 percent of total arms imports 
during the period from 1994 to 1997; Wade Boese, “U.S. Remains Largest Supplier to a 
Shrinking Arms Market,” Arms Control Today (June/July 1998).
19Arms exports to Eastern Europe dropped from a peak of 9.2 percent of the world’s 
total in 1985 to 2.6 percent o f the world’s total in 1995; Ibid., 12.
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Much o f the focus o f these new efforts has been in Central and Eastern Europe. 
NATO expansion to the nations of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have 
enticed Western arms manufacturers attempting to sell equipment as these states and 
other future Alliance candidates such as Romania. These states seek to acquire Western 
arms in order to both achieve interoperability and to gain favor with the West.20
American defense firms have centered their tactics around the lease option. With 
some 350 used F-16 aircraft on hand, the United States Air Force has signaled its 
willingness to allow numbers o f these planes to be leased in the hopes that lessees will in 
the future purchase new F-16s. If states are still unable or unwilling to acquire new 
fighters, then those states would have the option to buy the used planes. Besides F-16s, 
the Americans have also made similar proposals for C-130 transport aircraft and E-2 
AWACs early warning aircraft.21 American defense firms, following well-established 
practices used elsewhere, have also made significant offers in the context of joint 
manufacturing o f weapons systems. For instance, the American defense firm, Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, has offered to allow between 50 and 100 percent o f the 
manufacturing of new F-16s to be done domestically in new markets.22 The 1995 F-18
20This is especially true in regards to advanced fighter aircraft which all three new 
NATO members are planning to purchase, yet for which there is little comparable threat 
to provoke such purchases; BASIC, “Military Build-up,” 3.
2IDaniel T. Plesch and Sam Fournier, "East Embraced in NATO's Arms," The Nation 
(December 25, 1995): 827.
“ “US-Polish F-16 Deal May be Worth $1.5 BLN-Lockheed," CETOn-Line, no. 357 
(May 29,1996)
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sale to Finland included a provision for the domestic manufacture of 57 of the planes.23 
In addition, the United States government has granted Romania a license to domestically 
manufacture ninety-six Cobra Attack helicopters.24 This deal alone is worth $3 billion to 
U.S. manufacturers.25
While American firms have centered their efforts on the lease options and 
collaborative manufacturing, the European states have concentrated their efforts on 
offset deals and incentives. The primary focus of the European offset strategy centers 
around offers to invest in the export countries infrastructure, both in military and civilian 
terms.26 For example, Swedish companies have pledged to invest some $100 million in 
Hungary to "modernize" factories and improve the technological base of the nation if 
that state purchases the Saab/British Aerospace-built JAS 39 Gripen fighter.27 When 
Hungary agreed to these terms and signed an agreement to purchase some 30 Gripens for 
an eventual $ 1 billion, American companies such as Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas 
sent teams to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in an effort to find companies
^USS, Military Balance, 1996, 47.
24Plesch and Fournier, 827
25Jorgen Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarize Central Europe,” BASIC 
Papers, no. 28 (July 1998), I.
26The European use o f offsets reflects the region’s own preference for its arms 
transfer agreements. European states regularly demand offset deals in exchange for the 
purchase of American equipment. In 1995, the Europeans accounted for some 86 per 
cent of all U.S. offset arrangements; Barbara Starr, Jane’s Defence Weekly (September 
24, 1997): 19.
27Raymond Bonner, "Central Europe is Newest Arena for Arms Race," Mew York 
Times (July 15, 1996): A-1; "Hungary's Fighter Deal Ready to Take Off," CETOn-Line, 
no. 348 (May 14, 1996).
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that the American firms could invest in.28 In the realm of incentives, Sweden has 
offered Poland the free use of a squadron of AJS 37 Viggen fighters if the Poles purchase 
Gripens.
Both American and European governments have taken additional actions which 
should aid their respective defense industries. The United States has used its military 
training programs to familiarize and train Eastern European military officers on 
American weapons systems. In the Pentagon's International Military Education and 
Training Program (1MET), Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Romanians make up the 
largest contingents from Europe (surpassing even traditional American allies such as 
Turkey or Greece) and the largest dollar figures.29 The U.S. also shifted $7.8 million 
away from economic assistance programs to defense assistance programs in the new 
NATO members.30 In addition, the American government supplied Hungary with 
American radio equipment to use on Hungarian MiG-2 Is until the aircraft are replaced 
and funded a study of Poland’s command and control system.
The cessation of Cold War hostilities has mostly benefitted the conflict’s 
primary protagonists by abrogating their massive procurement efforts. Government 
attention and resources that were once funneled into the military sector, have now turned 
towards long-neglected economic and social issues. However, the sudden disruption of
28Bonner, A-6.
29This pattern began in 1994, and by 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
were given $1.3 million, $1.5 million and $1.5 million under IMET; U.S. Department of 
Defense, Defense Almanac, ‘95, no. 5 (Fall, 1995), 36-37; U.S., Department of Defense, 
Defense Almanac, ‘97, no. 5, (Fall 1997), 38.
30BASIC, “Military Build-up,” 4.
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large defense expenditure has created a dilemma for industries within arms producing 
states, and therefore a dilemma for the governments o f these states—how to reduce 
government expenditure, yet maintain their defense industrial base.
The dilemma created by defense downsizing is twofold, with domestic and 
strategic dimensions. On the domestic side, post-Cold War domestic restructuring in 
arms producing states has led to reduced profit for corporations in the domain of defense 
production.31 It has led many manufacturers to take on increased debt levels in order to 
finance new programs and research and development.32 This trend has resulted in 
growing dislocation and unemployment for defense sector workers. From 1987 to 1996, 
8.3 million of 17.5 million jobs in the global defense industry were lost. This 
corresponds to a decline of some 47 percent.33 Defense procurement declines have led 
to domestic restructuring in arms producing states as well. Within the context of these 
domestic determinants arms sales have become the focus of states who are seeking to 
preserve the vitality of their industrial base which is perceived at risk by all concerned. 
The strategic dimension involves the state motivation to protect the talents of arms 
producing corporations, because these corporations are uniquely endowed with 
technological abilities not easily recreated once lost.34 This makes parent states less 
willing to allow defense corporations to simply dissolve overnight.
3'Defense profits peaked in 1987; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
Yearbook, 1997, 244.
32“Soaring Debt May Tether Industry,” Defense News, (15 January 1996), 9.
33BICC, 1.
wOn this theme, see U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, Defense Conversion: 
Redirecting R & D (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993).
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Defense corporations across the globe have not fared equally during the current 
era of reduced global defense expenditure.35 Corporations located in Western states 
have similarly eliminated positions and also developed the tactic of government- 
sponsored consolidation.36 Industries of former Soviet bloc states have mostly ceased 
production, their home countries being burdened with the task of selling the inventory 
they already possess.
The exception to this trend among the states o f the former Soviet Union is 
Russia. Russia military doctrine formally encourages weapons exports as a means to 
accomplish a variety o f goals. Russia needs the hard currency of weapons exports to pay 
for the conversion o f defense industries and the dismantlement existing weapons 
systems. Even under the revised Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) limits that 
were approved in June, Russia still has to drastically reduce the number of weapons 
systems in its flank areas.37 In addition, exports would both pay for further military 
research and for the development of new weapons systems. Finally, Moscow believes 
weapons exports are necessary in order to maintain the capabilities and means of
35Reduced global defense expenditure can be demonstrated by the decline o f the arms 
trade in general. In 1987 the value of arms trade deliveries totaled $78.6 billion which 
decreased to $29.6 billion by 1994; ASS, The Military Balance 1996/97, 21A.
36For more concerning the consolidation trend see, Jeff Cole, “Defense Consolidation 
Rushes Toward an Era O f Only 3 or 4 Giants,” Wall Street Journal, (December 6, 1996), 
A-l; Thomas Kamm and Matt Marshall, “Global Forces Push Europe’s Firms, Too, Into 
a Merger Frenzy,” Wall Street Journal, (April 4, 1997), A-l
37For instance, Russia has to reduce the number o f tanks from 1,897 to 1,300; the 
number of armored vehicles from 4,397 to 1,380; and the number of artillery pieces from 
2,422 to 1,640; Sarah Walking, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved," Jane's 
Intelligence Review (August 1996): 3.
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production of existing systems and to maintain the "social guarantees" for Russians 
involved in weapons production.38
In an effort to increase weapons sales, Russia has reorganized its defense industry 
by combining the three agencies that had formerly managed arms exports into a single 
entity—Rosvooruzhenie. The relative price advantages of Russian weapons and more 
aggressive marketing have doubled sales since 1994.39 Russia's share of the world's arms 
market fell from 35.3 per cent in 1989 (worth some $18.9 billion) to 11.7 per cent in 
1994 ($1.5 billion) and then rebounded to 31.6 percent (some $3.1 billion) in 1995.40 In 
particular, Russian sales to Central and Eastern Europe have continued for three main 
reasons: Russian equipment is less expensive; It is interoperable with existing weapons; 
and Russia has used arms exports as a means to address its debts with states in the 
region.
Reduction o f defense expenditure has had a cascade effect o f forcing industry­
wide consolidation, with the result o f exacerbating unemployment. A contrast of the 
French and U.S. experiences illustrates different approaches taken to the current trends 
in the defense industry. Substantial unemployment and government involvement with 
the major defense firms in France have prevented meaningful reforms and consolidation 
in the nation’s defense sector. Meanwhile U.S. firms have dramatically downsized and
38Charles Dick, "Russian Military Doctrine," Jane's Intelligence Review—Special 
Report (January 1994): 12.
39Edwin Bacon, "Russian Arms Exports—A Triumph for Marketing?" Jane's 
Intelligence Review 6, no. 6 (June 1994): 268; Sarah Walkling, "U.S. Arms Sales 
Continue Decline, Russia Top Exporter in 1995," Arms Control Today 26, no. 6 (August 
1996): 33.
40Grimmett, 80-81.
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consolidated, eliminating repetition and increasing efficiency through economies of 
scale and reduced labor costs.41 In this way, U.S. firms have reacted much more 
successfully to the changed global arms market than have the Europeans.42 In fact, with 
the exception o f 1995, for the past eight years, the U.S. has been the world’s leading 
arms supplier.43
In general, defense contractors have adopted a variety o f responses to the 
changed marketplace. As new military technologies have emerged, two broad trends 
have influenced weapon development.44 First, the development of “revolutionary” 
technologies has led to vast increases in capital investments in national armed forces, all 
the while manpower numbers have declined. This trend has been accelerated by the 
move toward integrating electronics into weapons systems.45 Second, companies have 
increasingly turned to the creation and production of dual-use technologies that have 
applications in both the civilian and defense sectors. Dual-use technologies allow firms 
to spin-off military technology to the private sector and thereby recoup research and 
development expenditures and diversify into the commercial market. The development
4lFor a concise overview, see Berkeley Planning Associates, Evaluation o f  Defense 
Conversion Adjustment Demonstration (Oakland: Berkeley Planning Associates, 1995).
42See Norman R. Augustine, “Reengineering the Arsenal of Democracy,” Atlantic 
Council o f  the United States: Bulletin 9, no. 6 (August 1998); and for a more detailed 
picture of the changes in the U.S. defense industry, see U.S., Department o f Defense, 100 
Companies Receiving the Largest Volume o f  Prime Contract Awards (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1995).
43Boese, “U.S. Remains Largest Supplier,” 1.
44BICC, 3.
4SOn electronic warfare and digitization in the military, see U.S., Department of 
Defense, Defense Almanac, 97.
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of dual-use technologies is estimated to have created 500,000 new jobs in the defense 
sector which has otherwise seen the aforementioned dramatic losses.'16 The increased 
costs of new weapons systems is one reason for the spread of dual-use technologies. A 
result o f the combination of the reduced expenditures by states and the increased costs of 
newer electronic and digital systems has been the creation o f a dichotomy wherein states 
which to buy and deploy state of the art equipment, but are prevented from doing so by 
fiscal constraints.
One result is a widening technological gap, first between the United States and 
Europe, and second between the larger states of Europe and the small nations. As a 
Defense Science Board report pointed out, “US and allied military commanders and 
other officials have expressed concern that with the USA’s unmatched ability to invest in 
next-generation military technologies, it runs the risk o f  outpacing NATO and other 
allies to the point where they are incapable of operating effectively with US forces on 
future battlefields.”47 For instance in the field of digitization, the U.S. military has 
moved from a “formative phase” of development and experimentation to one of 
“consolidation” and application.48 While the U.S. is deploying new electronic warfare 
systems on the battlefield and testing them in exercises, most other nations have slowed 
or eliminated their digitization programs. France, the Netherlands and Sweden have all 
dramatically scaled back their programs due to budgetary concerns while Great Britain
46BICC, 10.
47As reported by Bryan Bender, “US Worried by Coalition ‘Technology-Gap’,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly (29 July 1998): 8.
48Rupert Pengelley, “Digitization Hits a Rocky Road,” Jane’s International Defence 
Review (July 1998): 53.
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has yet to develop a long-range concept o f how to integrate these new technologies into 
their conventional ground systems. Alone among the U.S.’s Atlantic allies, Germany is 
the only other nation besides the U.S. to test a battle management system at the battalion 
level during military exercises.49
Much of the reductions in European defense expenditures have come at the 
expense of research and development and in weapons procurement. Between 1995 and 
1997, NATO’s European members cut expenditures on research and development from a 
total of $13.5 billion to $11.2 billion. Non-NATO European states, including the 
“neutral states” of Austria and Sweden, cut their spending from $186 million to $172 
million50 European expenditures on procurement and research and development 
illustrate the gap between the large and small states of the continent. The vast majority 
of spending on new weapons and technology was by just three countries: France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom.51 While the U.S. has also cut research and 
procurement expenditures, it still spends three times as much on research and 
development of new weapons as all o f the NATO states combined.52
49Ibid., 53-54.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1997/98, 
(London: IISS, 1997), 34.
5IFor example, in 1997, France spent $4.6 billion on R & D, while Germany spent 
$1.7 billion and the United Kingdom spent $3.5 billion. Taken together, the three 
nations routinely account for more than half the European defense outlays for R& D; 
ibid.
52See SIPRI, Yearbook, 1998; and IISS, The Military Balance, 1997/98.
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The differences between U.S. and European military expenditures extend beyond
issues of scale and scope. The Defense Minister of Norway, Dag Fjaervoll, summed up
the differences in the following manner
The European efforts [in defense expenditures and procurement] appear 
to be directed generally towards improvements to existing systems and 
concepts, with rich duplication of efforts and lack of coordination. The 
technology gap is now evident in several critical areas such as high energy 
lasers, imaging and remote control technologies. Novel American 
applications o f these advanced technologies are found in intelligence 
systems, simulation systems, command systems, unmanned aircraft and 
other vehicles, and a variety o f lethal, and non-lethal weapons.53
Unemployment on the European continent has continued to remain stubbornly in 
the double-digit category, with military-industrial concerns continuing the downsizing 
process. Hence, French policy makers have been under pressure to limit cuts in the 
defense sector. For example, one of the largest French military suppliers, Thomson-CSF, 
released 2,300 employees in 1996, and cut an additional by cutting 2,700 jobs in 1997.54 
After acquiring Dassault Electronique, Thomson-CSF merged the company with two of 
its affiliates and announced an additional 4,000 job cuts in 1998.55 Of the 252,000 
defense jobs in France in 1990, only 193,00 remained in 1996.56 Further cuts can be 
expected as France continues to rework its 1997-2002 defense spending program. The
53Dag Fjaervoll, “Military Technology-The Transatlantic Gap,” in Europe and the 
US: Partners in Defense, ed. Jacqueline Grapin (Washington, D.C.: European Institute, 
1998), 31.
^“French Military Supplier Plans 2,700 Job Cuts,” New York Times, (November 26, 
1996), D-5.
55J.A.C. Lewis, "Thomson-CSF Plans to Cut 4,000 Jobs," Jane's Defence Weekly (6 
January 1999), 16.
56SIPRI, Yearbook, 1997, 171.
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original program, passed in 1996, called for reductions in defense spending by some 14 
percent. Included in the plan was a restructuring of the nation’s defense industries which 
was designed to produce a 30 percent reduction in the sector.57 However, the original 
plan has been reduced even further and instead o f the FF92 billion per year figure, the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) now plans to spend FF85 billion per year.58 Furthermore, a 
number of programs were canceled by the MOD including the HORUS radar satellite, 
the TRIGAT LR antitank missile, and the MACPED antitank mine. In addition, a 
number of other programs were cut back including the delay o f the third and fourth 
submarines of the Le Triomphant class and delays in the acquisition of new M51 
missiles.59
Nonetheless, pressure from the defense industry forced the government to soften 
the planned cuts. For instance, the Rafale fighter program was suspended in 1996, but 
under pressure from Dassault the government signed contracts for 48 new aircraft in a 
measure designed to keep the company alive. In addition, existing orders for new 
aircraft were moved forward so that the first deliveries would be in 2001 instead of 
2005.60 Yet, the government has also used the aircraft program in a bid to promote 
consolidation in the defense sector. One French journalist described the relationship 
between Dassault and the MOD as such: “It is nowadays completely clear that the
57Ibid„ 169.
58Jean-Marc Tanguy, “France’s Program Review: In the Middle of the Rubicon,” 
Defense Systems Daily (28 May 1998).
59Ibid.
60SIPRI, Yearbook, 1997, 170.
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RAFALE programme is completely hostage to the French government’s stated goal of 
enforcing a merger between Dassault and Aerospatiale.”61
Within the French government, however, there has emerged a clear 
understanding that France cannot be autonomous in its defense procurement. While in 
the past joint and collaborative projects were seen as means to share costs and ensure or 
expand market share, it has become clear that the nation must look to other suppliers to 
meet some equipment needs. In an editorial, the French Minister of Defense, Alain 
Richard, admitted that “France can no longer autonomously conceive and produce at a 
world class level 95% of its equipment needs.”62 He went on state that the current level 
of costs forced states to seek a true sharing of costs and a sharing of roles. However, 
Richard also stated that France only wanted to participate in broad initiatives that met 
three criteria: 1) that national governments be involved in the decision-making 
framework; 2) that industry restructuring be done through a “harmonized regulatory 
structure;” and 3) that all equipment programs be based on cooperative armament 
programs.63
Paris recognizes the necessity of developing a consolidated, transnational defense 
industry in order to compete with the United States which has 15 of the world’s 30 
largest defense contractors.6*1 Both French policy makers and industry ieaders would like
6lTanguy, 4.
“ Alain Richard, L 'Armement (March 1998); reprinted by FED- CREST (1 June 
1998).
“ Ibid.
“ Marvin Leibstone, “The U.S. Defense and Aerospace Industry',” Defense Systems 
Daily (5 October 1998): 4.
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to develop a multinational base with German and British firms. Unfortunately, the 
French are constrained by two major factors. First, the defense industry in France is 
fragmented and rivalry between domestic firms is intense. French firms have yet to 
develop the type of clear mission or niche that defense companies in other states have 
established. This makes domestic cooperation difficult, to say nothing o f transnational 
collaboration. Second, and more significant, the heavy involvement of the French 
government in individual companies prevents firms from other nations, including Great 
Britain’s Aerospace and Germany’s Daimler, from merging or creating joint subsidies 
with French firms. Also, Paris cannot expect to hold the same type of public ownership 
it currently does in future multinational firms.65 Hence, until Paris is able and willing to 
make necessary adjustments in its industrial policy, it will continue to be eclipsed by 
U.S. firms since the United States has already turned the comer in its efforts to 
restructure its domestic defense industry.
Much of the pressure to reform and consolidate within France has come from the 
defense manufacturers themselves. In December o f 1998, France's leading defense 
firms, Thomson-CSF, Aerospatiale, Alcatel, and Lagardere concluded an agreement 
designed to reduce redundancy and national competition. The accord set out each 
companies areas of expertise in avionics, missile systems and satellites. The agreement 
also pledged the companies to cooperate with other European firms through the Eurosam 
consortium.66 This comes on the heels o f an April 1998 concord between Alcatel,
65Gabriel Voisin and Charles Voisin, “Breaking Taboos in European Defense Industry 
Consolidation,” TTU (17 July 1997); reprinted by FED-CREST (28 October 1997), 1.
“ "Agreement in Avionics, Missile Systems and Satellites," Joint Press Release by 
Aerospatiale, Alcatel, Lagardere, and Thomson-CSF, December 9, 1998.
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Dassault Industries and Aerospatiale to cooperate on a range o f projects in order to shed 
redundant branches and capacities. However, these companies must go along way to 
convincing the French government to adopt the policies necessary to further consolidate 
the sector and to bring French firms to the level of competitiveness of their U.S. 
counterparts.
U.S. defense procurement has declined from an apex o f $134 billion in 1985, to 
$40 billion in 1997. Analysts predict that 700,000 jobs could be lost by 1998, with the 
industry having already eliminated 1.2. million jobs since 1987. Nonetheless, steps 
taken which have caused the U.S. defense industry to essentially turn the comer and 
become much more competitive. Since 1993 there have been twenty-one mergers in the 
U.S. defense industry alone, and this process has not reached its completion.67 In 1993, 
the Pentagon began serious efforts to promote consolidation in the U.S. defense 
industry.68 In order to facilitate such mergers, the Department o f Defense offered 
subsidies to companies which ranged from $133 million for four mergers from 1992 to 
1995, to the estimated $1.8 billion subsidy offered for the Lockheed Martin merger.69 
Between 1992 and 1997 there were more than $100 billion in mergers in the U.S. 
defense sector and the result was a consolidation from 14 major defense firms to four.
Beyond subsidies, the U.S. government has initiated a number of programs to 
both encourage consolidation and to generally aid defense firms. From 1990-1997, the
67Jeff Cole, “Defense Consolidation Rushes Toward an Era of Only 3 or 4 Giants,” 
Wall Street Journal (December 6, 1996): A-l.
68Augustine, 3.
69SIPRI, Yearbook, 1997, pp. 242-43.
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U.S. spent $17.1 billion to aid defense manufacturers. Of this sum, $7.3 billion went to 
encourage the development of new technology initiatives and $4.9 billion went to 
“stimulate” new technology industries.70 Hughes Electronics has been the most 
successful U.S. defense firm in developing dual-use technologies and has reduced its 
defense related business from 75 percent of the companies business in 1990 to 40 
percent in 1995. The company did layoff some 14,000 workers, but has produced real 
revenue growth since its restructuring.71
The Clinton Administration has also spent an additional $16.5 from 1993 to 1997 
in direct assistance to defense companies.72 The centerpiece o f the Administration’s 
efforts was the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) which received $1.3 billion to 
promote dual-use technologies. The Administration also attempted to preserve the 
sector through the Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program which matched 
federal dollars with that of private companies in order to develop new technologies. The 
ManTech program alone, allocates more for research and development ($145 million in 
1998) than many o f the smaller European states.73 This is especially significant since
64.5 percent of U.S. exports are high technology missile and missile launchers.7"* The
70BICC, “US Conversion After the Cold War, 1990-1997: Lessons for Forging a New 
Conversion Policy,” Brief 9, (Bonn: BICC, 1997), 6.
71 Greg Bischak, Defense Conversion, National Commission for Economic Conversion 
and Defense (NCECD) Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: NCECD, 1997), 2.
72BICC, Brief 9, 6.
73U.S., Department of Defense, ManTech: Program Funding Overview (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1998).
74“U.S. 1997 Data for the UN Conventional Arms Register,” Arms Control Today 
(June/July 1998).
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May 1998 U.S.-United Arab Emirates F-16 C/D deal, worth $7 billion, was cemented 
only by the U.S. pledge to also sell advanced missile technology along with the 
fighters.75 This support for private industry has allowed U.S. firms a degree o f shelter 
that stability, while still encouraging efficiency and consolidation.
Some of the main reasons for the concentration in the U.S. defense sector include 
the ability of companies to assume greater responsibility financial risks associated with 
the major weapons programs and the prospect of establishing integrated capacities to 
produce total weapons systems.76 The result has been dramatic cuts in both weapons 
systems costs and downsizing. For instance, Lockhead-Martin shut down three major 
headquarters and four major research labs and sold 13 subsidiary companies-with the 
result being the loss of 125,000 jobs. Nonetheless, the downsizing resulted in savings of
S2.5 billion per year and the company now boasts profits of some $18 billion per year.77 
Lockheed now ranks only behind Boeing as the world’s largest and most profitable 
defense manufacturer.78 Nonetheless, U.S. firms have also been the beneficiaries of 
privatization as the Defense Department has downsized and shed functions to private 
industry. These plans have produced as much as $30 billion in savings and initiatives for 
further privatization may dramatically increase savings by the year 2002. These 
programs will also further integrate private firms into areas of operation that were
75The Clinton Administration also touted the deal as a means to create new 
jobs-15,000 in Texas alone; Wade Boese, “UAE to Purchase 80 F-16 C/Ds, Arms in 
Deal Worth $7 billion,” Arms Control Today (May 1998).
76SIPRI, Yearbook 1997,242.
77Augustine, 4; Leibstone, 1.
78SIPRI, Yearbook 1998,245.
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previously the domain o f uniformed troops or employees of the Department o f  Defense.79 
By 1998, the Administration hopes to increase the civilian-oriented share of government- 
funded military research to 50 percent.80 The Administration has also signaled, through 
its opposition to the proposed Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman merger, that it 
perceives the era of consolidation in the U.S. defense sector to be over and that any 
further consolidation may result in reduced competition.81
U.S. firms have the additional advantage of having a ready source o f revenue for 
contracts because of the size and scale o f domestic military outlays. The Pentagon’s 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) calls for spending on procurement to rise from $45 
billion per year in 1997 to $50 billion by the year 2002.82 In addition, many analysts 
predict that this figure falls far short o f the Defense Department’s needs and will have to 
be revised by as much as $ 15 billion per year.83 For instance, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen has called for the procurement budget to be increased to $60 billion.84 
Already the Clinton Administration has increased defense spending for fiscal year 2000 
by $12 billion, and there would have to be continuous increases to meet the requirements
790 n  the specific savings, see U.S., Defense Science Board, Achieving an Innovative 
Support Structure fo r 21st Century Military Superiority (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996).
“ Bischak, I.
81Augustine, 2.
82U.S., Department of Defense, Defense 97: Special Issue: the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, no. 4 (June 1997): 4-5.
83Michael O’Hanlon, “The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review,” Brookings 
Policy Brief no., 15 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1997), 1.
^Douglas J. Gillert, “Secretary, Senator Call for More Defense Dollars,” DefenseLink 
(23 October 1998).
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for the QDR.85 As part of the pledged increase, Clinton has promised to increase 
procurement spending to the level called for by Cohen ($60 billion).86
The Pentagon is following the pattern of many European states and endeavoring 
to maintain and acquire new weapons and technology even as it reduces troop strength 
and civilian personnel. By 2003, the Department o f Defense expects to reduce civilian 
personnel by some 33 percent and to further reduce troop strength by 9 percent, all the 
while increasing the procurement budget by 5 percent.87
The failure of the WEAG to develop policy guidelines led France and Germany 
to create a new joint procurement agency, the Joint Armaments Cooperation 
Organization (JACO), which was launched in 1996. Great Britain and Italy have made 
renewed efforts at collaborative projects with France and Germany, and both have joined 
JACO88 while a 1998 British White Paper stated that “wherever possible, European 
governments should harmonize the requirements of their Armed Forces and pursue 
cooperative solutions.”89 In November o f 1996, ten WEU states also formed a new 
armaments procurement agency to promote collaborative projects, the Western European 
Armaments Organization (WEAO). WEAO provides a forum for those sates that are
8sSome estimates predict the shortfall on procurement spending to be as much as $160 
billion during the period from 1999-2003; “Clinton’s Defense Increases Look More Like 
Political ‘Triangulation’ Than a Cure for the Hollow Military,” Decision Brief, no. 99-D 
3 (4 January 1999), 2.
86Jim Garamone, “Clinton Pledges Defense Spending Increase,” DefenseLink (5 
January 1999).
87U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Almanac, ‘97, no. 5, 33-35.
88HSS, Military Balance, 1997/98, 35.
89UK, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defense Review (London: HMSO, 1998), 167.
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either unable or unwilling to join JACO. Such states include Turkey, Denmark and 
Norway. Unlike JACO, WEAO focuses more on research and development than on 
actual joint production and has the ability to contract out research projects.90
In the end, however, these efforts are unlikely to bear meaningful results since 
European defense spending in general, and expenditures on research and development, 
will continue to decline behind that of the United States as the nationstates of Europe are 
forced to maintain the criteria necessary for EMU.91 For instance, in 1997, the United 
States spent some 3 times as much on R & D as all o f the Western states of Europe 
combined.92 The contemporary fiscal constraints and the need for both U.S. leadership 
and access to U.S. military resources, necessitate American involvement in future 
European security systems to ensure both interoperability and technological parity. This 
is especially true when European expenditures on defense do not match returns that U.S. 
expenditures offer: As the former Italian Deputy Defense Minister, Massimo Brutti, 
stated, “we know that Europe has to face a serious challenge in the field of its military.
90HSS, The Military Balance, 1997/98, 35.
91In 1996, the United States and Canada devoted some fourteen percent of their 
military budgets on research and development (R & D) while the European NATO states 
budgeted only seven percent. The states under the most pressure to limit their R & D 
spending, France and Germany, also happen to be the leading champions for the single 
currency. The result has been drastic cuts in equipment purchases; ESS, The Military 
Balance, 1996/97,41.
^In 1997, the U.S. spent $38.5 billion on R & D compared with $11.4 billion for all 
of Western Europe; ESS, Military Balance, 1997/98, 34.
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Our military capabilities do not match with the financial resources we devote to the 
defense sector.”93
Progress towards a unified defense market has been impeded by a series of well- 
publicized problems, including cost-ovemms and delays in production, in joint, 
collaborative efforts such as the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) or the Tiger helicopter. 
Moreover, the Europeans have found themselves often unable to compete with American 
defense firms.94 In 1994, the WEU went so far as to denounce what were termed 
"discriminatory [business] practices" by the United States.95 On the other hand, the 
Atlanticist states, especially Denmark, Great Britain and the Netherlands, have 
demonstrated a clear preference for American equipment.96 These states assert that more 
centralization and protectionism are only likely to decrease efficiency in an increasingly 
competitive industry, and that anti-American measures would deny European contractors 
access to American markets, capital and technology transfers.97 While both Great 
Britain and Italy have made renewed efforts at collaborative projects with France and
93Massimo Brutti, “The Development o f the European Security and Defense Identity 
Within a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership,” in Europe and the US: Partners in 
Defense, ed. Jacqueline Grapin (Washington, D.C.: European Institute, 1998), 35.
wOn the aggressive marketing by U.S. defense firms, see Craig Covault, "U.S. Export 
Push Challenges Europeans," Aviation Week & Space Technology (27 May 1996), 
especially pages 20-23.
95Quoted in Pierre Sparaco, "Europeans Advocate Unified Defense Market," Aviation 
Week & Space Technology (25 July 1994): 54.
96See Craig Covault, "European Politics Burden Weapon Procurements," Aviation 
Week & Space Technology (13 March 1995): 57-61; and for a detailed examination of 
Anglo-American cooperation in defense procurement see "The Currency of 
Cooperation," Jane's Defense Weekly {3 September 1994): 54-6.
97nSS, The Military Balance 1995/96, (London: HSS, 1995), 40.
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Germany, these efforts are unlikely to bear meaningful results since European defense 
spending in general, and spending on research and development in particular, will only 
continue to decline and lag behind the United States as the states o f Europe their 
implement single-currency plans.98
The EU has undertaken a number o f projects to aid in defense conversion, but the 
most significant o f these, the KONVERI and KONVER H programs, focus more on aid 
for economic restructuring and easing the loss o f defense-industrial jobs than on 
industrial consolidation or conversion.99 While KONVER I was aimed at helping those 
communities hurt by military downsizing, KONVER n aims to help communities 
dependent on defense expenditures diversify their economies in order to preempt 
economic problems. The original KONVER program allocated some ECU 500 million 
and that some has been raised to a total o f ECU 744.3 million through 1999.100 The 
KONVER programs have funded a variety o f programs which range from the
98In 1996, the United States and Canada devoted some fourteen percent o f their 
military budgets on research and development (R & D) while the European NATO states 
budgeted only seven percent. The states under the most pressure to limit their R & D 
spending, France and Germany, also happen to be the leading champions for the single 
currency. The result has been drastic cuts in equipment purchases; IISS, The Military 
Balance, 1996/97, 41.
"The EU began these effort in 1991 with the Perifra I measure which allocated aid to 
areas hurt by defense downsizing. KONVER I was initiated in 1993 and provided aid to 
regions within the EU that had lost at least 1,000 jobs due to defense cutbacks. From 
1993-1997, some ECU 500 million was allocated to the program; EU, for an overview of 
KONVER see, EU, European Commission, “KONVER (1993-1997) Guide to 
Community Initiatives” (Brussels: EC, 1998).
,00J6m Brommelhorster, “KONVER II: Fostering of Conversion by the European 
Union,” BICC Report, no. 9 (Bonn: BICC, 1997), 2.
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establishment o f a naval museum in Cherbourg to the “rehabilitation” of former military 
bases in Bremen to the retraining o f workers in Denmark and Great Britain.
The efforts by individual European states to protect their national industries have 
further impeded collaborative efforts. Since many of these companies have no domestic 
competition, they have adopted monopolistic policies which further erode efficiency and 
at the same time often preclude effective transnational cooperation. This is exacerbated 
by ongoing policies which seek to preserve a range of autonomous capabilities within 
each nation. As a report by the Bonn International Center for Conversion points out, “A 
major obstacle to cooperative development, production and procurement is now, as in 
the past, the overarching goal of maintaining the highly developed scientific, 
technological and industrial capability for the full range of conventional weapons at the 
national level and often-short sighted-policies to protect jobs in the defense industry.”101 
The report goes on to criticize national governments for their failure to recognize the 
“contradiction” in seeking to maintain a broad array of these minimum capabilities while 
they endeavor to overcome fragmented markets and end redundancy of effort by 
preserving companies that are too small to thrive in the contemporary environment, but 
are too large to allow to allow them to fail or be swallowed up without a noticeable 
domestic economic impact.102
More than any other European state, Great Britain has attempted to diversify its 
defense industry and support a commercialization of the sector. Nonetheless, it was not 
until the election o f  the Labour government that the Parliament initiated govemment-
10IBICC, Conversion Survey, 17.
‘̂ Ibid-
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sponsored efforts to aid diversification. Tony Blair’s government is seeking policies that 
would extend the benefits of diversification to the maximum number of firms.103 In its 
election manifesto, the Labour Party stated that “we support a strong UK defence 
industry, which is a strategic part of our industrial base as well as our defence effort. We 
believe that part of its expertise can be extended to civilian use through a defense 
diversification agency.”104 Specifically, the government has proposed a Defence 
Diversification Agency within the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). 
DERA is tasked to maintain a database on capabilities and market trends. The agency 
would also expand the ability o f small and medium-sized companies to gain access to 
procurement and research projects.105
Blair has also worked to promote intra-European defense-industrial cooperation. 
The Prime Minister supported a proposed merger between British defense giant British 
Aerospace (BAe) and Germany’s DAS A (the aerospace subsidiary of Daimler-Chrysler). 
When BAe instead announced that it would acquire GEC-Marconi (another British firm), 
Blair criticized the merger as being “too British.”106 The deal would create a company 
that would be the third largest aerospace contractor behind Boeing and Lockheed-Martin 
of the U.S. Despite the national merger, Blair continues to support European-wide
l 0 3 « U K  Revea[s Defense Industry Diversification Proposals,” Defense Systems Daily 
(9 March 1998).
I04UK, Ministry of Defense, Defense Diversification: Getting the Most Out o f  Defence 
Technology CM3861 (London: GPO, 1998), paragraph 3.
10SIbid., paragraph 17.
106“‘British’ Defence Deal Under Fire,” Daily Telegraph (21 January, 1999).
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consolidation and has now announced support for a merger between the new company 
andDASA.107
Germany has also undertaken efforts to both diversify their defense sector and
concurrently to promote arms exports. For instance, in 1997, German Ministry of
Defense and industry leaders attended for the first time an international aerospace
exhibition in an effort to promote German firms such as Daimler Benz Aerospace and
BGT.108 In general, the efforts o f Great Britain and Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy
and the Netherlands, foreshadow the potential for consolidation within the continent’s
defense sector as European firms, and especially British companies, and forge links with
U.S. firms. Examples o f this trend include the increasingly close links between
Lockheed Martin and British Aerospace and the merger between Daimler and
Chrysler.109 In addition, states such as Denmark and Norway also continue to insist that
cooperative projects should be developed through the framework of NATO.110
Transatlantic cooperation in the defense sector is also promoted by the United States.
Under Secretary of Defense, Jacques Gansler, asserted that he thought it would be 
s
I07“BAe’s Defence Deal ‘Too British:’ Blair,” The Australian (21 January 1999).
l08“German Government Delegation at Dubai 97,” Defense Systems Daily (7 
November 1997).
109While the British continue to maintain close ties with U.S. firms, Germany 
continues to both support an official policy of encouraging an autonomous European 
defense sector and placating the French by maintaining involvement in projects that 
could be better served through Transatlantic cooperation; Heinz Schulte, “Germans 
Ponder Options After UK Satellite Pull-out,” Jane's Defence Weekly (26 August 1998), 
20.
1I0Norway has even called for the incorporation of guidelines for joint and 
collaborative projects within the Alliance’s Strategic Concept; Fjaervoll, 32.
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“unwise” for Europe to develop a single large conglomerate to supply weapons systems 
and instead suggests the development of Transatlantic “teams” of companies to develop 
and produce weapons systems to ensure interoperability and ensure technological 
parity.111
In order to foster transatlantic cooperation, the U.S. has embarked upon a 
significant diplomatic effort. In November of 1998, at a NATO conference in Norfolk, 
Virginia, the U.S. Secretary of Defense called for increased cooperation in the develop 
of logistics and core capabilities."2 Cohen also called for NATO allies to “share 
technological innovations.”"3 On a more concrete level, the U.S. has proposed a 
“defense capabilities initiative” in order to better delineate the needs and capabilities of 
the alliance partners for the future and thereby reduce redundancy and repetition of 
function and production."4
However, increased defense-industrial cooperation between the U.S. and its 
European allies faces a number o f hurdles. The same factors which have worked to 
thwart consolidation either within or among European states will cause friction with the 
larger U.S. firms. In addition, states will be reluctant to surrender national capabilities in 
the interest of efficiency and consolidation. Nonetheless, in the increasingly
‘"Atlantic Council, Third Party Arms Transfers: Requirements fo r  the 21st Century, 
Atlantic Council Policy Paper (September 1998), 3.
" 2U.S., Department of Defense, “NATO Nations Hold Talks to Plan for 21st Century 
Security,” Press Release, no. 593-98 (13 November 1998).
1 "Linda D. Kozaryn, “Cohen: NATO Needs More Mobility, Better Commo,” 
DefenseLink (19 November 1998).
"4U.S., Department of Defense, “Background Briefing,” DefenseLink (11 December 
1998).
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transnational market, it remains imperative that defense companies become more 
competitive. In the end, national governments must promote consolidation. For Europe, 
the choice then has become whether to endeavor to retain autonomous capacities and 
compete with the United States, and thereby hazard a continuing loss o f marketshare, or 
to risk both a short-term loss o f capabilities and jobs in order to gain a more secure 
future by merging and collaborating with U.S. firms. By adopting the latter course, the 
Europeans potentially gain access to the lucrative U.S. market, and to superior R & D 
capabilities o f U.S. firms.
As European defense manufacturers attempt to maintain both market share and 
preserve or enhance their competitiveness, they often find themselves working at cross­
purposes with their national governments. The U.S. defense sector has demonstrated 
that consolidation and the elimination of repetition produce companies whose economies 
of scale and whose ability to produce whole, integrated weapons systems leads to 
increased efficiency and lower costs. Small and medium companies that cannot 
replicate such capabilities find themselves swallowed or driven from the market. These 
trends also produce downsizing and the elimination of jobs. Through governmental 
support for mergers and programs designed to augment the research capabilities of 
domestic firms, the U.S. government has established patterns of conduct that have led 
European firms to attempt to emulate them. This is true as U.S. firms utilize new 
strategies to export products in which governmental support aids private firms and in 
efforts to develop offset arrangements which provide economic benefits through joint 
manufacturing and production for states purchasing new equipment.
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The major European defense firms are increasingly pressuring national 
governments to allow transnational mergers and to increase joint and collaborative 
projects. Only in this way can many of these companies hope to survive by working 
together to establish the economies of scale and the ability to develop integrated 
weapons systems for future customers. However, such consolidation results in a loss of 
control that many national governments oppose.
Various European defense firms have also demonstrated clear preferences for 
increased cooperation with U.S. firms. This preference is most marked in the 
“Atlanticist” states such as Great Britain or Denmark in which there is a  long-established 
history of collaboration. However, even firms in states such as France and Germany 
support closer Transatlantic cooperation for several reasons. To begin with, cooperation 
with U.S. firms offers the promise o f increased access to the U.S. defense market which 
remains the largest in the world. Furthermore, Transatlantic teamwork can provide 
European firms access to the greater resources of U.S. firms, both in terms o f economy 
of scale, but also in defense technology and research and development.
While individual firms may promote or desire increased transborder and 
Transatlantic cooperation, national many national governments retain a preference for 
maintaining a wide-range of autonomous defense capabilities. Hence, problems of 
repetition and inefficiency continue and are exacerbated as state governments also 
endeavor to preserve defense-related jobs. In addition, heavy public investment in 
inefficient firms precludes efforts to enact meaningful reforms or consolidations in 
domestic industries. More than any other state, France exemplifies these negative trends 
in the defense industry.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 0 9
As national governments struggle to develop policies to both protect domestic 
industries and encourage regional cooperation, the driving force behind bilateral and 
multilateral collaboration has become the industries themselves. While France and 
Germany have previously endorsed a range o f joint ventures and collaborative defense 
projects, the private sector has superceded national governments in its support for 
transborder consolidation as a means to stay competitive with U.S. defense firms. As 
national marketplaces find themselves unable to provide security to the state in an era of 
technological advances, firms look to develop broad bases of capabilities through shared 
resources. Hence, national security must increasingly be provided by transnational 
markets that have the economies of scale and the research and development capabilities 
to keep up with the advances in military technology. This trend has been accelerated as 
national borders have become less meaningful to national security. Efficiency has 
replaced size as the primary goal of governments in their attempts to maintain defense- 
industrial capability and to preserve market share. In Europe, the state has been 
transformed into the instrument that defines national priorities, while the market has 
become the instrument of development for national industrial policies. The private 
sector has become the driving force behind the contemporary drive for increased 
transnational cooperation. The expression of this drive is a renewed level o f bilateralism 
through joint projects and multilateralism through multinational, collaborative ventures 
which are structured to benefit both national firms and national governments by 
maintaining both market share and capabilities.




The changed nature o f  the nationstate and recast concepts o f sovereignty, when 
combined with the evolving security threats and the contemporary economic pressures 
on the individual nations of West Europe, will further accelerate endeavors to integrate 
the defense structures of the continent. Already joint and collaborative efforts in both 
the civilian and national security organizations of Europe’s nationstates have shifted 
from the unique to the commonplace practice. This is a result o f the higher payoff that 
present attempts at collaborative military ventures provide. In terms of national military 
units, efforts at integration have much lower end-goals are significantly lower than past 
attempts such as the EDC, and thereby they are more attainable. In addition, the 
atmosphere and patterns of interaction which provided nationstates with enhanced 
security and economic stability that were developed and sustained by the Cold War 
experiences of members of the transatlantic Alliance has fostered a culture of 
cooperation which has been accepted by national governments as the most efficient 
means to reconcile interests and capabilities. Institutionalism has also demonstrated the 
practical benefits gained through cooperation outweigh the costs o f reduced sovereignty. 
Most significantly, there is a convergence around the utility of integrated military units 
and a transnational defense sector. The end of the Cold War reduced and transformed 
the perception of security risks to European states. National capitals realized that there is 
no longer a need for large conventional armies and that the emerging security threats to 
Europe are those that can best be met through collective responses. Meanwhile, the
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economic realities o f reduced military expenditures and shrinking global arms markets 
have forced reductions in both equipment production and troop strength. Nonetheless, 
the basic policy adopted by European states in response to these changes is the policy 
pursued during the Cold War: collective security through multilateral military structures 
and continued security integration
As the nationstates of Europe have evolved into first trading states and now 
memberstates, cooperation has become an accepted norm as the security institutions of 
the West have ameliorated the security dilemma and allowed states to magnify their 
capabilities by combining resources. The neorealist conception of the world as an 
anarchical, self-help system with no effective government above the level of the 
nationstate, and no real system of norms or laws, has to be reexamined in the light o f the 
increasing power o f institutions and regimes which temper the individualistic pursuit o f 
interests. West European nationstates no longer “drive for universal domination” 1 in 
order to ensure their own security. Nonetheless, the neorealist emphasis on the world 
structure continues to be important since states in a unipolar system behave differently 
than states in a bi- or multipolar system.2
Realism continues to downplay the importance of cooperation.3 However, 
cooperation has become an essential aspect of the state system that exists in Western
‘To Kenneth Waltz this drive formed the essence of state interaction; Waltz, 
“Anarchic Orders,” 117.
2Different global systems reward and punish state behavior in different manners 
depending on factors such as hegemony and the level o f interstate cooperation.
3Realists define cooperation as “both formal and informal reciprocated restraint;” 
Glaser, 378.
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Europe. Through such collaborative actions as coalition or alliance formation, realism 
accepts the potential for cooperation. Hegemonic stability theory is one manner in 
which such cooperation can be explained.4 Keohane argued “that hegemonic structures 
o f power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development o f 
strong international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed.”5 A 
hegemonic power sets or establishes and enforces the rules and norms surrounding 
cooperation and maintains satisfaction with the organization or regime.
In the immediate post-World War H era, the United States fulfilled this role in 
regards to Western Europe. But as time progressed the features of hegemony were 
transferred to the Franco-German tangent which served as the engine of integration. 
German economic primacy and French political leadership combined to serve the 
national interests of each state through access to the collective resources of the emerging 
institutions. Concurrently, these organizations met the interests o f American primacy, 
which promoted multilateral cooperation as a means to counter hegemonic bids by any 
single European state. Multilateral structures were established which fostered joint 
action and collaboration and which compelled states to internalize the norms and rules of 
the economic and security regimes which developed. As these regimes developed, they 
began to promote cooperation even without the intervention o f a primary power.6 The
4Hegemonic stability theory is the view that “concentration of power in one 
dominant state facilitates the development of strong regimes, and that fragmentation of 
power is associated with regime collapse;” Keohane, “The Demand for International 
Regimes,” 142.
5Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability.”
6Cooperation can be defined as “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy
adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be;” Milner,
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states of Western Europe began to adopt national policies which converged around the 
acceptance of common interests and the willingness to reconcile national interest against 
the interests of the region’s regimes and institutions.7 The free trade regime in Europe is 
one such regime that combines tacit and explicit rules and is characterized by institutions 
that formalize rules and employ multilateral decision making processes.8 This regime 
has both encouraged economic elaboration and it has ameliorated the security dilemma 
through the adoption o f various norms. Common norms which characterize the present 
regime in Europe include sovereignty, collective security, and free trade.9 This series of 
economic, political and security relationships can be termed an institutional complex.'° 
What is significant is that the regimes and institutions o f the region have reached a point 
that they no longer require a primary power to promote cooperation (hegemons may be 
necessary for initiating cooperation, but not for continuing cooperation).
The main ramifications of these regimes has been that traditional methods for 
pursuing power (territorial conquest) have evolved into attempts to enhance wealth and 
power through control o f an increasing share o f the world’s wealth. The result has been 
the rise of first the trading state, and as capital and labor has become even more mobile, 
the virtual state. Germany and Japan in the Cold War and immediate pos-Cold War era
468.
Wan Ham, 189. 
sSchweller, 92.
9Cortell and Davis, 452.
10Van Ham, 190.
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were illustrations o f the trading state: nations whose power was measured in 
economic importance, rather than in traditional geo-military terms, and whose economic 
policy supplants or at least rivals security policy since they have few no or very few, 
direct military threats. The policies of these states tend to reinforce cooperation as they 
acquire interests in the economic success and well-being of their trading partners."
The evolution o f the nationstate has continued past the virtual state into a new 
phase, that of the memberstate, in Europe. This new entity is one that subordinates 
significant amounts of autonomy to international norms. The memberstate also 
internalizes the rules that epitomize the regimes it belongs to. This is done through the 
implementation o f policies and programs which harmonize domestic programs and 
interstate relationships with the main tenets of the international regimes o f which the 
memberstate has joined.12 The process of harmonization is deeper and more lasting in 
Europe than in any other region as the states have already pooled a sizable degree o f 
their national sovereignty on issues ranging from currency to immigration and the 
control and maintenance of borders.13 No other region has effectively denationalized 
borders, the former main function of the nationstate being the preservation of borders, as 
the states o f the ELT have. European states have pursued cooperation in both the 
economic and security fields as the individual nationstates have subordinated national 
autonomy in the search for collective goods. The EU memberstates have realized that
"Rosecrance, “U.S.-Japan,” 6.
12Barkin and Cronin, 107-30.
"Kahler, 4.
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they can only gamer this increase in collective goods through the enhancement and 
augmentation o f multilateral institutions.14
Along with their transatlantic partners, the United States and Canada, the 
member states o f Western Europe have formed a security regime embodied by 
institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western 
European Union (WEU). This regime has institutionalized patterns o f security 
cooperation and collaboration to the point where states have had little incentive to 
pursue their own unilateral security policies. Memberstates internalized both the 
specific rules o f the regime and the regime’s norms. In this fashion, the security 
dilemma has been neutralized among the EU memberstates.
The United States has ensured the credibility o f this security regime by assuming 
a leadership role in its development, and acting first as a hegemon and then as the 
regime’s primary power, to ensure compliance and to set the rules o f the regime. NATO 
was as an alliance to counter the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, but also to 
reintegrate the former enemy powers of World War H into the broader context of 
continental security, and to prevent the reemergence o f the security dilemma among the 
memberstates o f NATO. The continued existence o f NATO after the demise of the 
Soviet threat should have come as no surprise since many o f its main functions continue 
to exist. NATO remains the principle means with which to deter external threats to the 
EU and Western Europe. NATO also continues to ameliorate the security dilemma.
This combination of functions makes future cooperation all the more likely. The
14See Gowa.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 1 6
Alliance increases confidence among memberstates that partners will not defect, and the 
long term relationships also increases the ability of states to form linkage strategies such 
ensure collaboration across a range o f issues.15 The more complex the interdependence 
that exists between nations means it is less likely that single issues can lead to the 
dissolution o f the regime—even if  the single issue is the original reason behind the 
formation of the alliance. The longer the regime exists, the more powerful the 
organization becomes. In addition, the longer it exists the more likely that it will assume 
functions outside of its original purpose as memberstates use the regime to address 
separate issues or new threats that are perceived as intertwined with security concerns.
As memberstates have reexamined security policies in the wake of the demise of 
the Soviet threat, they seek to use the contemporary security structures of Europe to 
address threats that seemed minimal or nonexistent during the Cold War. In the 
immediate post-Cold War era, the re-emergence of nationalism seemed to pose the most 
serious risks to the security of individual states. As the conformity enforced by the 
bipolar system evaporated at the end of the Cold War there were concerns that a 
reunified Germany would attempt to assert itself in security matters or that Russia might 
endeavor to regain its hegemony over the states that formed the former superpower’s 
near and abroad. This would force other states to renationalize defense policy in 
response.
The post-Cold War emergence of nationalism proved to be of particular concern 
for the West in its dealings with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Many o f these
I5Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 36.
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nations do not have homogenous populations and settled borders. Ethno- and religious 
nationalism has been the source o f a variety o f minority problems in the region. The 
potential spread of ethnic and religious conflict has become a security concern even for 
those Western states that lack contiguous borders with strife-torn areas. This is 
especially true since human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European 
security. European security institutions such as NATO and the WEU have been called 
upon to conduct an ever expanding number of humanitarian operations and have been 
deployed in a wide range of peace-keeping and peace- enforcement operations. In 
addition to the problems in Central and Eastern Europe, the potential for a re-emergence 
of Russian expansionism must also be countered. Further exacerbating problems has 
been the collapse of the Russian economy. This may led to an environment which would 
prompt a resurgence of Russian nationalism and a rejection o f Western ideals and 
institutions.
European interests also face threats from the EU’s southern flank. The 
proximity to Europe alone necessitates a close scrutiny of events in areas such as the 
Maghreb and the Persian Gulf. The region remains one o f the few areas of the world 
that can threaten the states o f Europe with direct military action. Furthermore, instability 
in the region can impact the states o f Europe because o f refugee outflows and the 
potential for terrorist acts taking place in those European states with large Arab 
populations such as France and Germany. The proliferation o f sophisticated weapons 
systems and weapons o f mass destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East has increased 
tensions and encouraged states such as France, Spain, and Italy, to call for new security 
structures to counter such threats. EU states have also called for tighter migration
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controls and police powers within the Union in order to prevent the movement of 
suspected or potential terrorists.16
The Middle East and the broader Mediterranean region continue to be the largest 
arms market in the world. In an era of declining arms sales, this makes the region 
important to nations with large defense industries and arms exporters. However, this 
defense-industrial interaction is overshadowed by Europe’s other significant economic 
ties with the region. The EU remains the largest exporter of goods and services to the 
region. Meanwhile the greater Middle East is the EU’s third largest trading partner. 
Nonetheless, the most significant economic interest of the EU continues to be energy.
EU states have long been dependent on Middle East oil and natural gas, and the recent 
decline in oil prices has served only to increase European dependency on energy imports 
from the Persian Gulf and Maghreb. This trend will be exacerbated by the planned 
policies of several nations to reduce the use of alternative energy sources such as atomic 
power.
In response to both the close economic ties between the region and the EU and to 
the broader security concerns, the Europeans have undertaken a number of initiatives to 
maintain and expand relations between themselves and the Arab states. Individual states 
such as France and Germany have engaged in trade and other diplomatic tactics to 
preserve relations with states that are under sanctions by the United States, including 
Iran and Iraq. The West’s main institutions, the EU, the WEU and NATO, have all 
initiated dialogues with nations in the regions. Memberstates have tasked these
l6On this theme, see Federal Republic of Germany, Office o f Press and 
Information, Press Release no. 30487.
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organizations with devising means with which to build a framework to deal with future 
instability. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is an example of a multilateral effort to 
improve relations between West and the states of Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and 
Tunisia, and Jordan after 1995. The Initiative involves biannual, bilateral political 
discussions on issues such as immigration, proliferation and terrorism.
Since the end of the Second World War, the American nuclear umbrella has 
served as a deterrent against the possibility of an attack on Europe by WMDs. In the 
post Cold-War era, the possibility that a rogue state or that a substate actor might acquire 
WMDs has prompted the major powers o f the West to reconsider the means to counter 
nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and work to develop autonomous capabilities. 
The WMD threat is especially significant since the proliferation of ballistic missile 
technology and the willingness o f several states to trade in such weaponry, have 
combined to produce a class of weaponry capable of threatening several European states.
Although atomic weapons are expensive and difficult to manufacture, and the 
presence o f numerous international regimes which monitor the use o f fissile materials 
and highlight potential weapons programs, the spread of nuclear knowledge and the 
capabilities to manufacture such weapons has been facilitated by the end of the Cold 
War. Nuclear weapons reductions have resulted in the unemployment o f thousands of 
scientists and personnel with the knowledge and ability to design and build these 
weapons. Concerns over the proliferation of WMDs are exacerbated by the fact that 
some biological and chemical weapons can be covertly produced with minor expense. 
The trade in dual-use technology which involves the transfer of seemingly innocuous
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materials and equipment that can be used to generate WMDs, only further enhances the 
potential development of WMDs..
The potential procurement or development of WMDs is a  concern not just at the 
state level, but also at the level o f the substate actor. This is especially troublesome in 
the case of terrorist groups. Past experiences have shown that retaliation against these 
groups is difficult Substate actors might be tempted to use WMDs as tools to use for 
political blackmail, such as gaining the release of prisoners, or to destabilize regimes or 
governments in power.
Regimes have been developed to control and address proliferation issues, 
however, in many cases these regimes are only comprised by those states who pursue 
non-proliferation as a national policy and hence would not embark on WMD programs. 
The frameworks provided by international regimes such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) do establish 
international norms and rules for the governance of WMDs and prompt states to 
internalize the norms and rules of the regime. In this way, they encourage states to adopt 
nonproliferation policies and maintain such policies. To counter the direct threats posed 
by WMDs and their potential proliferation, the states of Western Europe need to proceed 
on the course that they have already begun, which is a collective response to the 
development or the potential use o f WMDs. This broad policy follows the multilateral 
manner these states have relied on during the Cold War period which emphasized 
NATO’s Article V guarantee, and its promise of an American nuclear response to a 
WMD attack, as the cornerstone o f defense against attack. The states should, therefore, 
continue efforts to develop inclusive security structures which facilitate cooperation
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among the major European powers and involve the United States. In this manner the 
expertise and capabilities of ail the powers can be combined in such a fashion as to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of efforts to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and 
related technology. This combination o f resources would both reinforce the individual 
capacities of the memberstates and augment deterrence.
In the changed security atmosphere of the post-Cold War era, few states can 
afford the defense expenditures necessary to match interests with capabilities. The 
patterns of cooperation and collaboration developed by the West European states have 
allowed these nations to concentrate resources on economic policies since the joint 
nature o f their security regime both lessened the direct threats from states with 
contiguous borders, while at the same time bolstering individual defense structures by 
granting states access to pooled resources. Institutionalism ameliorated the security 
dilemma and prompted the transformation of the nationstate in an entity which 
increasingly concentrated on the individual well-being of its citizens instead o f  the 
preservation of national boundaries. Institutionalism remains the preferred means to 
counter the emerging security threats of the post-Cold War era. Ethnic and religious 
nationalism that crosses traditional state borders can most effectively be countered 
through multi-state structures that allow for united and consistent policies, and which 
allow the memberstates of Europe to augment their own power through the collective 
resources of the institutions and organizations that make up the security framework of 
Europe. Hence, NATO provides a military solution which involves the United States in 
European security, while CJTF operations and the WEU provide military options that do 
not necessitate the United States. Finally, the broad and inclusive nature of the OSCE
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provides an experienced diplomatic outlet to oversee a range of activities including the 
monitoring of elections and the supervision of minority arbitrations.
The first efforts at security integration in Europe in the Cold War era had less 
than optimum results. The emergence o f the Soviet Union as a potential hegemon in 
Europe and the potential for a re-emergence of Germany as a primary power, prompted 
the other states of West Europe to construct a broad coalition which sought to counter 
the Soviet threat and to restrain German power. This alliance was encouraged by the 
United States as a means to promote U.S. interests and to converse American resources 
(and placate the nation’s domestic audience). There developed a rough balance of power 
which engendered a high degree of stability and equilibrium. Even when the bipolar 
balance eroded with the demise of the Soviet Union, the system remained in place to 
restrain the actors both through the habits and patterns of cooperation and the 
internalization o f the system’s norms.
The West’s security regime had its beginnings in the Anglo-French, anti-German 
Treaty of Dunkirk. The Treaty of Washington and the establishment of NATO marked 
the once and future involvement o f the United States as a major actor in Europe’s 
security architecture. However, even with NATO, the central question over the role and 
place of Germany in European security remained. For the French the United States 
initially served as a counterweight to the Soviet threat and the British served as a 
counterbalance to a potential threat from Germany. The effort to develop a broad and 
highly integrated European army without the Great Britain was therefore ultimately 
doomed when the British refused to participate.
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The European Defence Community (EDC) was initially endorsed by NATO in 
1950 as a modification of a French proposal. However, the initiative ultimately failed as 
France was unwilling to allow for German rearmament without the institutional 
reinforcement that British participation would have provided for the EDC. In 1954, the 
breakdown o f the EDC demonstrated the necessity for both U.S. and British involvement 
in continental security. The compromise that emerged from the EDC, whereby Germany 
was integrated into the security system of the West through the WEU and NATO, 
established the principles that would guide future efforts at military integration and 
indeed serve as a model for the integration of a reunited Germany at the end of the Cold 
War.
At the end of the Cold War, the anti-Soviet coalition did not dissipate, for the 
main tenets that undergirded the transatlantic alliance remained in place. NATO and its 
sister organization, the WEU, provided a means to incorporate the reunited Germany in 
the security architecture of the West without creating security dilemmas for the nation’s 
smaller, less powerful neighbors. In addition, the nationstates of the West had been 
transformed into the memberstates of institutions like NATO and the EU, and there 
emerged convergence over the utility of NATO’s institutionalism as a means to continue 
the security regime of the West. Potential rival organizations such as the WEU and the 
OSCE were unable to develop the broad consensus and acceptance that NATO enjoyed.17
17The WEU could not eclipse NATO since it would not initially involve U.S. 
participation, while the OSCE was seen by most as too large and unwieldy to allow for 
consensus and significant military power to counter threats to the organization’s 
memberstates.
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The main security issues that Europe faced at the end of the Cold War included 
the problem of how to incorporate the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern 
Europe into the fabric o f European security. European states also promoted an enhanced 
role for themselves within the framework of the alliance. Finally, with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, questions emerged over NATO’s future role and mission. In 
particular, questions arose over whether or not NATO could address so-called “out-of­
area” issues and operate outside of the alliance’s national boundaries.
The debate over the fixture o f European security in the immediate post-Cold War 
period also exposed the divergent views of Europe’s major powers. The Atlanticist 
states such as Great Britain and Denmark continued to emphasize the importance of 
NATO and substantial U.S. involvement in Europe’s security architecture. Europeanist 
states led by France, promoted the development o f a European Security and Defense 
Initiative (ESDI) with autonomous military capabilities outside of the frame o f NATO. 
Meanwhile, Russia and several of the neutral states called for the OSCE to become 
Europe’s paramount security organization. The failure of rival institutions to address the 
new security threats faced by Europe merely reinforced the importance and centrality of 
NATO.
In order to both facilitate cooperation between NATO and the former Warsaw 
bloc states, the alliance embarked on a number o f initiatives which included actual 
expansion to several states o f the former Warsaw Pact and the formation of a 
consultative role for Russia within the auspices o f NATO. NATO alleviated the demand 
for an autonomous ESDr by developing structures such as the Combined and Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) which allowed for the establishment of a European pillar within the
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framework o f the Alliance—a pillar that is "separable, but not separate." This overcomes 
the reluctance of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the neutral states to give the 
EU direct political control or authority over the WEU.18 In addition to the expansion o f 
the Alliance to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the Partnership-for- 
Peace initiative PfP, provides a mechanism for security interaction and consultation 
between NATO and nonmember states. PfP does not provide the same firm security 
guarantees that actual membership would entail, but it does prevent a vacuum from 
forming in the geographic space between the West and Russia. In this manner it can 
alleviate the potential emergence o f ethno-nationalistic strife in this region.
In this manner, NATO has become an essential part of the "community-building" 
process of Western Europe by complementing the economic links of the region with 
security measures.19 It extends the institutional framework o f the West into the East and 
initiates the regime-building process. NATO has met the three main security challenges 
currently facing Europe. The alliance has adapted itself to new missions and been able 
to deploy outside of its traditional areas of operation; NATO has begun the process of 
enlargement, and the engagement of Central and East Europe through institutions such 
as PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; and finally, the Alliance has 
endeavored to cultivate a new, post-Cold War relationship with Russia. NATO remains 
the cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and will continue to be for the 
immediate future.
I8Goulden, 21-24.
19Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 85-106.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 2 6
Within the security regime of Europe, apprehensions over the renationalization of 
Western Europe have largely evaporated. Germany is firmly committed to the 
institutional course it embarked on during the Cold War. Cental and East European 
states have worked towards the resolution of minority issues and the acceptance of 
established borders as preconditions for inclusion in the security and economic structures 
of the West.20 Bosnia remains the glaring exception to this trend. Expansion of NATO 
will precede EU expansion into Central Europe. The Visegrad states have already been 
tied into the fabric of the West through the security architecture o f the West, and this 
before these states join the West’s economic system.
NATO remains West Europe's best security guarantee against the re-emergence 
of an assertive or expansionistic Russia, in addition, NATO's nuclear and conventional 
force deterrents also provide the optimum detriment against the of WMDs or ballistic 
missiles against Western Europe. The alliance worked toward developing multilayered 
and multifaceted methods, including anti-missile systems, to deter against the use of 
WMDs. Through increasing joint efforts and multilateral consultations with Russia, 
NATO has established the foundation of a forum by which the former superpower can be 
included in the broad framework of European security. Multilateral efforts have been 
initiated, and have achieved notable success, toward the effective control of Russia's 
nuclear arsenal. Through the establishment of various multinational groups, attempts 
have begun to develop the political means to counter proliferation of WMDs.
20Besides the alliance’s role in the former Yugoslavia. The Polish acceptance of 
borders with Germany and Russia, and both the Hungarian and Romanian attempts to 
settle minority and border issues, are examples of NATO’s influence in promoting 
stability.
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The drive for the development of ESDI has been paralleled by a broad effort to 
produce a more unified defense market in Europe by consolidating national arms 
manufacturers and increasing transnational cooperation and collaboration in defense 
research and production. This movement is the consequence o f declining arms transfers 
and the resultant period o f amalgamation and excess capacity for the major European 
defense manufacturers. The importance of these firms to the economies of nations with 
significant arms exports has led national governments to pursue policies to protect and 
support these firms. Nonetheless, European states have followed behind the United 
States in their transition to the changed market of the post-Cold War era. While most 
American firms gone through a period of consolidation and mergers, the Europeans are 
only now in the process o f making similar market adjustments. The willingness of 
certain European governments to continue to support and subsidize costly and inefficient 
defense manufacturers further retards the process. European governments also continue 
to support policies that would maintain a variety of defense capabilities and resources by 
maintaining the ability to produce a variety of weapons systems, even if less costly or 
more efficient systems are available on the market. Many European producers also 
confront problems that range from redundancy to the disadvantages that small 
economies of scale entail.
In Europe the market has taken the lead in instrumenting necessary reforms. 
European defense firms have themselves become the driving force behind integration 
efforts in the defense-industrial sector. While joint ventures and collaborative defense 
projects were previously promoted by certain governments, they have now been 
superceded by Europe’s private sector in its efforts to remain competitive with the larger
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firms of the United States. As these mergers and consolidations occur, national 
marketplaces can no longer provide complete security to the state. Instead, security has 
to be provided by international or transnational markets. This trend is accelerated in 
Europe as national borders become less important. Hence, efficiency o f production and 
profitability have become increasingly important to national governments as they 
attempt to retain both some element o f defense-industrial capability and to preserve 
market share. The state still defines national priorities, but the market is the driving 
force behind policy development in the defense-industrial sector. The new spirit of 
defense-industrial cooperation in Europe is driven by the private sector and is manifested 
in a renewed level of multilateralism in the form of multinational, collaborative ventures 
that are structured to benefit both national firms and national governments. Increasingly, 
this multilateral effort will also span across the Atlantic as corporations continue to 
ignore national boundaries and use the ease of transference o f capital and labor in order 
to further secure market share and to bolster competitiveness by forming joint and 
collaborative ventures with North American firms.
In the end, economics has become the driving force behind European military 
and defense integration. Declining defense expenditures and increasingly rigid fiscal 
policies have prompted national governments seek methods and means to maintain 
military capabilities by pooling resources and developing specialized niches for national 
militaries. This trend follows the general inclination toward greater institutionalism in 
Europe as the role and power of Brussels continues to expand into spheres that were 
once the sole domain o f the nationstate. The patterns of cooperation and joint efforts 
that were initiated in the security sphere at the end o f World War II, have now come full
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cycle. Economic cooperation, in the form o f the Common Market and later the EU, 
which arose from the failure of deep military integration, caused a redefinition of the 
role of the nationstate as it was transformed into the trading state and ultimately the 
memberstate.
As the drive o f monetary union succeeds, the memberstates must turn to the 
revived effort at security integration in order to complete the institutionalism of the 
modem state. Economic imperatives continue to force national governments to trim 
defense expenditures and the most effective means with which to continue to maintain 
the necessary military capabilities to pursue national or in the case of the EU 
supranational interests, remains multilateral military structures. These structures allow 
nations to burdenshare major initiatives and multilateral efforts on a variety of fronts, 
including procurement and research and development. They also permit memberstates 
to take advantage of the specialized resources and functions of other nation’s individual 
national military units. Hence, again the pendulum swings in the continuing effort 
toward European political, military and economic integration and states turn to the 
development of CFSP as a means to further tap into the pool of resources and 
sovereignty provided by the institutional framework o f the West.
Europe’s memberstates now view military integration as the optimum means to 
preserve capabilities and meet security concerns all the while constraining military 
expenditures. The drive for ESDI has been renewed, but renewed within the institutional 
framework that developed through the course o f the Cold War. By its nature, this 
security architecture maintains the role of the United States as a European power, all the 
while it provides for an increased political and decision-making role for the Europeans
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within the broader context of the transatlantic alliance. Meanwhile, events in Kosovo 
and other strife-torn regions, continue to confirm the validity o f institutions which 
reinforce the centrality o f the United States as a European power that is not in Europe. 
The continuing redefinition of security to focus on the well-being and safety of 
individual citizens parallels the efforts of Europe’s states as they endeavor to devote 
more resources to economic and personal security than to traditional aspects of national 
security such as the defense of static borders. These economic imperatives will continue 
to prompt the memberstates of Europe to continue the course toward integration through 
institutional means.
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